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Abstract 
 
Being a politician has become a profession for many. With the development of the 
European Parliament (EP) into an influential institution at the European level, 
building a career in the EP has become an interesting option for politicians. This 
thesis studies the different career paths of Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) and explores how these career paths and MEPs’ ambitions have an impact 
on their participation in the legislative process and thereby the way they represent 
citizens. This thesis is based on three empirical research papers.  
The first paper identifies two career paths that MEPs might follow, in 
addition to the three others which are generally used, and links these to the activities 
of MEPs in parliament. I find that an MEP’s career path and ambitions are relevant 
in explaining certain legislative behaviour across member states and party groups. 
The second paper looks at the career ambitions of MEPs and finds that 
MEPs’ career paths are also the result of expressed ambitions by politicians 
themselves, despite their dependence on party leadership and the second-order 
nature of EP elections. MEPs looking to pursue a career in the EP are more actively 
involved in the parliament’s activities. This higher level of participation and 
acquired policy influence is rewarded when MEPs stand for re-election. 
The third paper looks at the group of MEPs who become lobbyists after their 
time in parliament. Building on what is known from Washington, this paper finds 
that being on a powerful committee, from a smaller political group and having a 
longer tenure make it more likely that an MEP becomes a lobbyist.  
The findings across the three papers support the idea that the career paths 
and ambitions of politicians provide an important explanation when trying to 
understand an MEP’s willingness to invest resources in the EP’s legislative process. 
4 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
In writing this thesis I have received tremendous support from a number of people 
and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them for this. Ignoring the 
warnings of some, I decided to do this PhD part-time. Without the consistent 
motivation and support from those around me, the task of finishing this thesis would 
have been a lot harder. I will therefore always be grateful to them. 
 First of all, special thanks go to my supervisor Simon Hix who has an 
exceptional talent for motivating people. His clear guidance, creativity and 
constructive encouragement have been fundamental to me being able to write this 
thesis. His enthusiasm and passion were truly inspiring and always made me leave 
his office upbeat and motivated. I have very much enjoyed all the meetings we have 
had to discuss my thesis as well as political developments, of which there were 
many during my time as PhD candidate!  
 I would also like to thank Sara Hobolt and Sara Hagemann for their feedback 
during the annual review sessions. Their rigorous and constructive criticism has 
certainly improved the quality of my work. I owe Lauren Harris a big thank you for 
proofreading key parts of my thesis. 
 While writing this thesis, I was studying alongside an amazing group of 
fellow doctoral students in the Government Department at LSE making it both an 
inspirational and enjoyable place to work. Many of them I now have the privilege 
of calling my friends and I would like to especially thank Ed Poole, Ellie Knott, 
Marta Wojciechowska, Randi Solhjell, Pinar Dinc and Gisela Calderon for their 
friendship, laughter and good cheer.  
 Completing this exercise would not have been possible without a strong 
support base at home. I would like to thank my family, and especially my mum and 
5 
 
dad, Anja and Ger, for their continued support throughout this process. Their 
regular interest in my work meant a lot to me.  
  Finally, and most importantly, I wish to thank my husband Paul. His 
comments about my work on ‘the meppies’ made me laugh at the moments when I 
needed it most. I started this journey with the promise to only stay in London for 
one year. That turned out differently but his love and support remained 
unconditional. Eight years later, this journey is coming to an end with me moving 
back to the Netherlands. I will always be grateful for his support, patience and 
encouragement.  
 
6 
 
Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. 4 
List of tables ............................................................................................................ 8 
List of figures ........................................................................................................ 11 
 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 12 
1.1. Career ambitious politicians ................................................................... 12 
1.2. The importance of understanding politicians’ career paths .................... 16 
1.3. The study of career paths ........................................................................ 18 
1.4. Existing research on careers in the European Parliament ...................... 28 
1.5. Main hypotheses for the research ........................................................... 36 
1.6. Overview of EP careers’ data ................................................................. 38 
1.6.1. Structure of opportunities: data and methodology .......................... 42 
1.6.2. MEPs with static ambition .............................................................. 48 
1.6.3. Structure of opportunities found in long-term data ......................... 58 
1.7. Overview from the papers ...................................................................... 60 
1.8. Appendix ................................................................................................ 66 
 
2. The impact of career paths on MEPs’ activities ............................................ 72 
Abstract ............................................................................................................. 72 
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 73 
2.2. Different types of MEPs and their levels of activity .............................. 76 
2.3. Hypotheses ............................................................................................. 82 
2.4. Operationalisation .................................................................................. 86 
2.5. Empirical analysis .................................................................................. 90 
2.6. Discussion .............................................................................................. 95 
2.7. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 97 
2.8. Appendix .............................................................................................. 101 
 
3. Static ambition in the European Parliament – a multi-level analysis of the 
career ambitions of MEPs ................................................................................... 105 
Abstract ........................................................................................................... 105 
7 
 
3.1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 106 
3.2. Career ambitions in multi-level political systems ................................ 108 
3.3. Hypotheses ........................................................................................... 115 
3.4. Methodology ........................................................................................ 121 
3.5. Results .................................................................................................. 124 
3.6. Discussion and conclusion ................................................................... 132 
3.7. Appendix .............................................................................................. 136 
 
4. The revolving door of Brussels – how politicians become lobbyists .......... 140 
Abstract ........................................................................................................... 140 
4.1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 141 
4.2. The revolving door of Washington ...................................................... 144 
4.3. The revolving door of the EP ............................................................... 147 
4.4. Hypotheses ........................................................................................... 156 
4.5. Methodology and data .......................................................................... 160 
4.6. Results .................................................................................................. 161 
4.7. Discussion and conclusion ................................................................... 170 
4.8.  Appendix ............................................................................................. 174 
 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 177 
5.1. The importance of studying the interaction between career paths and 
behaviour ......................................................................................................... 179 
5.2. Key empirical findings ......................................................................... 180 
5.3. Theoretical and empirical contributions ............................................... 182 
5.4. What does this mean for the European Parliament? ............................. 185 
5.5. External validity ................................................................................... 187 
5.6. Recommendations for further research ................................................ 188 
 
References ........................................................................................................... 191 
 
8 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 1: Average length of membership by member state………………………..40 
Table 2: Average length of membership by EPG…………………………………40 
Table 3: Career paths by EPG……………..……………………………………...42 
Table 4: Cox hazard model: variables’ impact on chances of leaving the EP…….50 
Table 5: Multinomial logistic regression model: numbers are multinomial logit 
coefficients……………………………………………………………...53 
Table 6: (1) Cox hazard model interpretation, changes in probability of (2) leaving 
the EP before the elections or (3) not being re-elected vs. being re-elected 
for selected career variables (%Δ = (e^βkΔ-1) * 100)…………..……….55 
Table 4b: Cox hazard model with results for dummy variables…………………...66 
Table 5b: Multinomial logistic regression model with results for dummy 
variable………………………………………………………………….68 
Table 6b: (1) Cox hazard model interpretation, changes in probability of (2) leaving 
the EP before the elections or (3) not being re-elected vs. being re-elected 
for selected career variables (%Δ = (e^βkΔ-1) * 100) with results for 
dummy variables………………………………………………………..70 
Table 7: Attendance rates…………………………………………………………91 
Table 8: Number of reports amended……………………………………………..93 
Table 9: Motions tabled…………………………………………………………..95 
Table 7B: Attendance rates, with results for dummy variables………………….101 
Table 8B: Number of reports amended, with results for dummy variables……...102 
Table 9B: Motions tabled, with results for dummy variables……………………103 
Table 10: Types of MEPs by Member State……………………………………..104 
9 
 
Table 11: Expressed ambition and actual outcome……………………………...114 
Table 12: Candidacy for 2014 EP elections……………………………………..122 
Table 13: Correlation of activities……………………………………………….124 
Table 14: MEP seeking vs not seeking re-election in 2014 election ……………127 
Table 15: MEP successfully vs unsuccessfully seeking re-election in 2014 
election……………………………………………………………...…129 
Table 16: Post-EP7 career with member state controls………………………….131 
Table 11b: Expressed ambition and actual outcome, with results for dummy 
variables……………………………………………………………….136 
Table 14b: MEP seeking vs not seeking re-election in 2014 election, with results 
for dummy variables…………………………………………………...137 
Table 15b: MEP successfully vs unsuccessfully seeking re-election in 2014 
election, with results for dummy variables…………………………….139 
Table 17: Careers after EP………………………………………………………151 
Table 18: EPG background and post-2014 careers (excluding continuing 
MEPs)…………………………………………………………………153 
Table 19: Member state background and post-2014 careers (excluding continuing 
MEPs)…………………………………………………………………155 
Table 20: Multilogit regression analysis on those who stayed for a career in Brussels 
(either as lobbyists or otherwise) vs those who left the Brussels bubble 
(either for a domestic career or to retire). The data excludes unknowns, 
deceased and imprisoned………………………………………………163 
Table 21: Likelihood interpretation of statistically significant variables in table 
20………………………………………………………………………166 
10 
 
Table 20b: Multilogit regression analysis, with electoral system for EP elections 
and individual EPGs as dummy variables...……………………………174 
Table 20c: Rare events logistic regression on those who stayed for a career in 
Brussels (either as lobbyists or otherwise) vs those who left the Brussels 
bubble (either for a domestic career or to retire). The data excludes 
unknowns, deceased and imprisoned…………………………………..175 
Table 21b: Likelihood interpretation of statistically significant variables in table 
20b………..……………………………………………………………176 
 
 
11 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1: Post-estimation (linear prediction) of relationship between membership 
length and probability of becoming a lobbyist, by membership of a 
powerful EP committee or not showing the marginal effects and 95% 
confidence intervals……………………………………………...........167 
 
Figure 2: Post-estimation (linear prediction) of relationship between national party 
size and probability of becoming a lobbyist, by membership of a powerful 
EP committee or not showing the marginal effects and 95% confidence 
intervals………………………………………………………………..168 
 
Figure 3: Post-estimation of relationship between age and probability of staying in 
Brussels bubble (excl. lobbyists), by having a mega-seat or not showing 
the marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals 
……………………………………………………………….………...169 
12 
 
1 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1.  Career ambitious politicians 
Being a politician has become a profession for many and this is the same for the 
European Parliament (EP). Weber predicted some politicians to be living ‘for’ 
politics. Others would consider being a politician to be a profession. They would 
live ‘from’ politics (Weber, 1921). With the development of the EP into an 
influential institution at the European level, building a career in the EP has become 
an interesting option for politicians. This thesis studies the different career paths of 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and shows how these career paths 
and the MEPs’ career ambitions impact their participation in the legislative process. 
The three papers in this thesis show that MEPs adjust, to some extent, their 
behaviour in line with their career ambitions. These findings are relevant for anyone 
studying the functioning of the EP as the EU’s main democratic institution. These 
findings can also be of interest to those studying democratic representation and 
political careers more generally. 
The reasons for pursuing a career as an MEP are numerous and can also 
change over time. After having spent some time in the EP, politicians can aim for a 
career elsewhere, in national politics or outside of politics altogether. Although 
politicians are likely to say publicly that their career will depend on the outcome of 
democratic elections, such a thing as individual career-planning in politics does 
exist (Borchert, 2011).  
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The career ambitions of politicians can take different forms and are an 
important motivational factor, as shown by the extensive US literature on this topic. 
Some might seek to stay in their current position for longer. Others might look to 
move up the political ladder. Further, others might want to use their time in politics 
to prepare for a career in the private sector. This results in different career 
trajectories that politicians will follow. Of course, politicians will be constrained in 
the extent to which they can decide about their future career steps; they need to be 
realistic and operate, as Schlesinger (1966) put it, within a ‘structure of 
opportunities’ provided. These exogenous factors, such as the positions which are 
available and the electoral rules they are faced with, have an impact on the 
opportunities for a politician to achieve his or her career objectives. 
Within this structure of opportunities though, politicians possess some key 
tools to influence their own career path. Besides some personal aspects which might 
be difficult to change, such as charisma and appearance, politicians can take key 
decisions about their own behaviour and the extent to which they decide to 
participate in the legislative process, thereby seeking to influence the future career 
steps they want to make. The ambition of politicians to pursue a certain office, 
whether it is staying in their current role or moving to a different one, can be 
expected to influence the way in which they behave. In fact, as Maestas (1993) put 
it: “the idea that ambition for ofﬁce shapes the behaviour of political leaders is 
hardly new, nor is it often disputed”. Politicians are likely to adjust their behaviour 
to optimise the chances of achieving their career ambitions and making the most of 
the opportunities provided. The career ambitions can, therefore, be expected to 
influence the participation of politicians in the current political process they are 
active in.   
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Politician’s participation will also be influenced by past experience. The 
experiences built up in previous careers will impact the ability of politicians to fulfil 
the tasks in their current role, which in turn will impact how successful they will be 
in achieving their career ambitions. With both past experience and future ambitions 
having an impact on the participation of politicians, it is important to take the full 
career trajectory into account when looking at its impact on politicians’ 
participation.  
The EP has developed into a powerful legislative institution over recent 
decades. Several treaty reforms, of which the Lisbon Treaty is the most recent 
example, have placed the EP on an equal footing with the Council in many policy 
areas. At the same time as the EP has become more important, we have witnessed 
the development of a growing group of MEPs who pursue a longer-term career in 
this institution (Scarrow, 1997; Beauvallet and Michon, 2010; Whitaker, 2014). The 
growing powers of the EP are likely to have played a role in this by making the EP 
a more interesting institution to work in with an increasing number of important 
political decisions being taken there.  
For citizens in a representative democracy, such as the EU, it is important 
to know who represents them. However, it is certainly also important to know more 
about how citizens are being represented. When the career ambitions of politicians 
affect their behaviour and participation in the political process, it is important to 
understand how the different career ambitions of MEPs affect the way in which 
they decide to represent the citizens who have elected them. Do different types of 
MEPs, including a growing group of politicians who consider the EP to be their 
main political arena, behave differently and adjust their participation in the EP’s 
legislative process to optimise their chances in achieving their career ambitions?  
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Despite a considerable amount of literature on the impact of career 
ambitions on the behaviour of members of the US Congress, this topic has attracted 
relatively limited attention in the context of the EP. This thesis contributes to 
addressing this gap. In three papers, this thesis seeks to expand our existing 
knowledge about the presence of career ambition in the EP and how this relates to 
MEPs’ behaviour in the EP. The first paper identifies a number of career paths that 
exist among MEPs and shows how they relate to different ways of participating in 
the legislative work of the EP. The second paper goes into more detail on the way 
that those pursuing a longer career in the EP can behave best to optimise their 
chances of staying in the EP. Finally, the third paper sheds more light on an issue 
that has hardly been studied before in the EP context: the revolving door of MEPs 
who become lobbyists. The general argument supported throughout this thesis is 
that the career path and ambitions provide an important explanation of an MEP’s 
willingness to invest time and resources in participating in the EP’s legislative 
process.  
This chapter will proceed as followers. First, I will discuss why it is 
important and relevant to study the career paths of politicians in the first place. Then 
I will give an overview of the extensive literature that is available in the US on 
politicians’ career paths and their activities in the political arena. Third, I will 
discuss the literature on careers in the EP followed by the hypotheses of this thesis. 
Finally, I will provide an overview of and introduction into the data used in this 
thesis using a Cox hazard model, concluding this chapter with an overview of the 
findings from the three papers.  
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1.2.  The importance of understanding politicians’ career paths 
Before trying to better understand the relationship between career paths and 
legislative participation, it is important to answer: why we should be interested in a 
politician’s career path at all in addition to the potential impact on behaviour. What 
are the other reasons to care about the career movements of politicians? 
There would seem to be three key reasons to care about the career paths of 
politicians. First, longer tenure is associated with higher quality politicians. 
Building a longer career in the EP gives politicians the opportunity to develop 
policy expertise which they can use to improve the quality of legislation. Measuring 
the quality of politicians is not easy and often subjective measurements are used. 
The quality of politicians contains a number of factors such as competence and 
integrity. Already in the late 19th century, US politicians who were considered to be 
of higher quality because of their experience, had a higher chance of getting elected 
into the House of Representatives (Carson, Engstrom and Roberts, 2007). Mondak 
(1995) found that politicians who are considered to be of lower quality – according 
to content analysis of the Almanac of American Politics and Politics in America 
which describes the members of the House of Representatives – are more likely to 
voluntarily retire or be defeated in an election. Luttberg (1992) used the rankings 
of news organisations to define which politicians are of higher or lower quality. 
News organisations use rankings of politicians on a scale of “best/most effective” 
to “worse/least effective”. Using these subjective rankings, Luttberg found that 
those who score higher, have a higher probability of being re-elected than those 
with the lowest ranking. Miquel and Snyder (2006) find that politicians’ 
effectiveness rises sharply with tenure and highly talented politicians are able to 
move more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Also, they find that 
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effectiveness has a positive impact on an incumbent’s electoral success and the 
likelihood of politicians moving to a higher office. Particularly in environments 
where politicians face limited formal sanctions, personal qualities of politicians are 
potentially important (Besley et al., 2005). The EP election process is an example 
of a situation where politicians face weaker formal sanctions as voters are less well 
informed about the activities of MEPs than they are when it comes to politicians in 
domestic politics. Making sure that the quality of the politicians who serve is high 
is then particularly important for the citizens they represent.  
The second reason we should care about the career paths of politicians is 
that a politician’s career path can tell us something about who controls 
policymaking influence. This is related to the ability of politicians to stay in their 
current role. Turnover in EP membership at each election is relatively high (Corbett 
et al., 2003; Whitaker, 2014). Tenure is associated with securing greater levels of 
influence over a legislative process. Therefore, MEPs with a longer career path in 
the EP are in a more powerful position against the European Commission and the 
Council than their peers with less experience in the EP (Beauvallet and Michon, 
2010). If MEPs with a certain background are better able at making sure they stay 
longer in the EP and obtain more influence, this is a relevant factor to consider, in 
particular, when trying to understand the policymaking process and seeking to 
ensure that the interests of all EU citizens are equally represented in the legislative 
process.  
 The third reason we should care about the career paths of politicians is that, 
besides providing an indication of the quality of politicians, the length of a career 
in a legislature can also provide information about the legislative body in which the 
politician serves. As argued by Polsby (1968), the longer the careers of politicians 
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in a legislature the more institutionalised a legislature can be said to be. This is 
particularly the case when there is more internal than external promotion into 
leadership positions. Politicians only staying in a legislature for a short period of 
time indicates that a legislature is not institutionalised. The emergence of career 
politicians is strongly associated with party system development and legislative 
institutionalisation, which are two important aspects of democratisation (Shabab 
and Slomczynski, 2002). Studying political careers can improve our understanding 
of institutional stability and change (Borchert, 2011). Therefore, features of the 
legislative careers of politicians in an institution become important indicators of the 
nature and the developmental stage of the legislature itself, although this is likely 
to vary by legislative body (Hibbing, 1999).  
 
1.3.  The study of career paths 
The career paths of politicians have attracted the attention of political scientists both 
in the EU and outside, with particular attention being given to career paths in the 
US Congress. There are a number of findings from the US literature, which is 
significantly more developed on this topic, that can inspire our thinking about the 
career paths of MEPs and their participation in the legislative process.  
One of the earlier contributions in the field is made by Barber (1965) who 
argued that the different career path decisions of politicians could be explained by 
the differences in personalities and psychologies. Studying the behaviour of 
politicians in the Connecticut state legislature, he found that politicians in the same 
institution with similar prospects for promotion to higher offices showed different 
ambitions for promotions. Barber explains this by different types and personalities 
of politicians. After Barber though, studying the career paths of politicians 
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following a rational choice approach gains traction, in line with a broader trend in 
political science.  
A common starting point in the area of political career trajectories is 
Schlesinger (1966) who considered a politician to be a rational actor operating in a 
structure of opportunities. He argued that career ambition is an important 
motivation for politicians and that there are three broad categories of politicians 
who pursue their political ambitions. The first category of ‘progressive’ politicians 
is those aiming for a higher political office. In the US this includes, for example, 
politicians looking to move from a state legislature to the federal level. The second 
category is those politicians with a ‘static ambition’ who are looking to stay in the 
office they are in and pursue a long-term career there. The third category is the one 
of ‘discrete’ politicians who do not pursue a long-term political career. Schlesinger 
argued that the career path of a politician is the result of rational individual career 
decisions and that politicians adjust their behaviour in line with these ambitions.  
Since Schlesinger, an extensive body of literature further developed his 
theory of the role that ambition plays in politics, particularly in the context of the 
US Congress. This literature shows that the career choices of Congressmen are 
affected by a combination of the opportunities provided and the potential benefits 
of a career choice (Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979; Kiewiet and Zeng, 1993). Black 
(1972) looked at the extent to which the structures in which politicians need to 
compete for office (here defined as the size of the community and the degree of 
competition) have an impact on the risks that ambitious politicians face and the 
investments they need to make in order to reach a certain political office. Black 
does not suggest that these structures directly cause a politician to have ambition 
and be successful or not. Instead, the structures create barriers for politicians and 
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thereby indirectly influence the type of politician that will make it to the political 
office he or she is competing for. Black’s findings also support the idea that career 
changes can broadly be explained by rational choices.  
When first looking at politicians with progressive career ambitions, Rohde 
(1979) identified a number of key factors that predict whether someone will seek a 
higher office and leave their current position. One of the factors he finds to be 
important is the margin of the incumbent’s last election victory. Another factor is 
the prospective opposition that a candidate will face. Also, party members and the 
margin of electoral victory of the politician’s current seat are factors that play a role 
in a politician’s decision to aim for a higher office. Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 
(1987) looked at the motivations of US Senators who pursue a progressive career 
path by running for President in the 1972-1988 period. They find that those with 
relatively low costs of running a campaign, no political liabilities and willingness 
to take risk are more likely to aim for the Presidency. Brace (1984) also finds 
evidence that the nature of the opportunities provided to run for a higher office (for 
example incumbency and redistricting) have an important influence on the 
progressive ambition of Congressmen to decide to run for the higher office. 
Copeland (1989) looked at the motivations of House Representatives to run for a 
Senate seat. He finds that those who already have powerful positions in the House 
are less likely to run for the Senate and those who do run, do this with a strong 
personal support base rather than consider it as an opportunity that they need to 
take.  
Instead of trying to move up the political ladder (i.e. having a progressive 
ambition), some politicians decide to leave politics (i.e. have a discrete ambition). 
Jacobson and Kernell (1983, cited in Masthay and Overby, 2017) find that decisions 
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to stand for re-election or retire from Congress were based on cost-benefit 
calculations by the individual politician. Theriault (1998) finds that reaching the 
career ceiling in Congress is the key predictor of why politicians decide to retire 
voluntarily. Looking at the careers of members of the House of Representatives in 
the second half of the twentieth century, Moore and Hibbing (1998) explain that 
those who are not achieving their goals are more likely to retire voluntarily than 
others. Being of higher age, in less senior positions, more at risk of losing the next 
election and with greater distance from the party’s ideology all increase the 
likelihood of voluntary retirement (Moore and Hibbing, 1998). This result is 
confirmed by Kanthak (2011) who finds that legislators with an ideological position 
further away from their party are more likely to leave the House of Representatives 
to satisfy their ambition elsewhere. Those closer to the party’s ideology, on the 
other hand, are less likely to leave and more likely to obtain a more senior position 
inside the House (Kanthak, 2011). 
There are also differences between political parties, with Republican 
representatives retiring more quickly than their Democratic colleagues (Ang and 
Overby, 2008). Strategic retirements because of financial incentives or redistricting 
also take place in the House (Groseclose and Krehbiel, 1994). Analysing 
retirements in the US Senate during the last four decades of the 20th century, 
Bernstein and Wolak (2002) find that age and minority party status are predictors 
of retirements. These findings are confirmed by Masthay and Overby (2017). They 
also find that, unlike in the House, there are no differences between the Republicans 
and the Democrats in the Senate in terms of politicians’ likelihood to retire.  
 After considering those with progressive and discrete ambitions, the third 
category in Schlesinger’s categorisation is those with a static ambition. Some have 
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looked at why politicians decide to pursue a career inside the institution they are 
elected in (Fenno, 1996; Loomis, 1988; among others cited in Hibbing, 1999). 
Squire (1988) finds that advancement prospects in the legislature, as well as pay, 
are important motivations for politicians to continue pursuing a career in the same 
institution. Spending energy and resources on trying to ‘move up’ only makes sense 
when career opportunities to do so exist (Squire, 1988).  
Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) made an important contribution by combining all 
three career trajectories – progressive, static and retirement – into one analysis. As 
they argued, a binary analysis of each separate career option is less useful as 
politicians will normally face the three career options simultaneously. In contrast to 
Moore and Hibbing’s later study, they find that age has no effect on an incumbent’s 
decision to run for re-election. Also, leadership positions and vote margins have no 
effect. Those who were going to lose their seat because of redistricting but who had 
an opportunity to progress to a higher office were likely to do so.   
The career paths of politicians have attracted only limited academic 
attention outside of the US. Where scholars have focused on career politicians, their 
analysis has been mainly descriptive of the career paths found without linking these 
career paths to politicians’ activities. In Canada for example, it has been found that 
the phenomenon of politicians staying in the same role for longer is less common 
than in the US and turnover rates in Canadian assemblies are higher than in their 
southern neighbours (Moncrief, 1994). 
 
So far, I have only looked at the factors influencing the career movements 
of politicians as described in the US literature. I will now turn to the literature which 
links the career paths of politicians with their behaviour. Bernick (2001) concludes 
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that legislative careers are complex phenomena. The length and quality of the 
political career as well as how it fits into someone’s overall career path are different 
for every individual. Bernick argues that legislative career orientations can explain 
differences in attitudes of politicians towards how they believe they should behave 
in their role, suggesting that career orientation has an impact on behaviour. 
Politicians’ career ambitions influence the way in which they participate in their 
current position as politicians adapt their behaviour to enhance the chances of 
obtaining the position they ultimately desire.   
 Analysing the behaviour of politicians in parliament can be done either by 
looking at the voting behaviour of politicians or considering how actively 
politicians participate in the legislative process, for example through their 
participation in plenary votes, debates and tabling motions or amendments. Hall 
(1996) examined the motivation of Congressmen to become legislatively active in 
a number of (sub)committees. He argues that members of a parliament face two 
decisions on every issue that comes up: which policy position to take and how active 
to participate. Hall makes the distinction between revealed preferences and revealed 
intensities of a parliamentarian. By intensities, he means the time and legislative 
effort one puts in an issue (Hall, 1996). Politicians are limited in how much time 
and effort they can invest in certain legislative activities. It can be expected that the 
professional background of a politician has led to the development of certain skills 
which the politician can use once elected to office. Having certain skills is likely to 
influence which type of legislative activity a politician is better at getting involved 
in. Politicians also face strategic choices about how to deploy the resources they 
have to achieve their future goals, including those of re-election and promotion to 
higher office (Strøm, 1997).  
24 
 
Research linking politicians’ career path with participation in Congress has 
mainly focused on the political experience of members of Congress but the results 
from these analyses have been inconclusive. Frantzich (1979) concluded that those 
who entered the House of Representatives with no previous political experience, 
were introducing more legislative proposals than colleagues who did have 
experience in politics. This was argued to be the case as those without previous 
political experience lack the appreciation of how difficult it can be to get legislation 
passed, underestimating the importance of building coalitions and trust with 
colleagues. Those with past political experience have a greater understanding of 
policy development and the functioning of the legislative institution impacting the 
way they behave when elected into parliament, for example when it comes to 
committee assignments (Berkman, 1993). Experienced politicians are better able at 
being appointed to and maintaining their positions on influential committees 
throughout their time in Congress (Berkman, 1993). Looking at the number of bills 
introduced and speeches given by newly elected Congressmen in the 84th-99th 
congresses, Little and Moore (1996) find no evidence that previous political 
experience has a positive impact on legislative participation in terms of bills 
introduced and speeches given. Francis (2014) however finds that Members of 
Congress with legislative experience, are more active in the legislative process. For 
example, they introduce more bills and are more successful in seeing their bills 
become law. She shows that newly elected Congressmen from certain non-political 
backgrounds are active in introducing and co-sponsoring bills on policy topics that 
relate to their non-political experience. Those without political experience are found 
to be less well able to follow accepted political norms in Congress such as 
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cooperating with other members (Payne, 1980) and may, therefore, struggle to 
participate actively in certain areas of the legislative process.  
Besides the fact that participation is impacted by past experience, 
participation is also expected to have an impact on future career steps. As cited 
before, Schlesinger (1966) argued that politicians can, therefore, be expected to 
adjust their behaviour in line with their ambition. As Frantzlich (1979) put it, for 
most Congressmen, the desire for re-election controls behaviour. Congressional 
scholars studying the impact of career ambition on legislative activity have found 
that ambitions have an impact on the policy positions that politicians take who are 
looking to move up (Francis and Kenny 1996, 2000; Francis et al. 1994; Hibbing 
1986; Van Der Slik and Pernacciaro 1979; as cited in Maestas, 2003). The ambition 
of these politicians also influences the way they allocate their resources and 
participate in certain legislative activities (Herrick and Moore, 1993; Meastas, 
2003). Mayhew (1974) shows that Congressmen adapt their behaviour and 
positions to their static ambition of seeking to become re-elected. Much of the 
legislative activity in Congress can be explained by this desire to become re-elected. 
In fact, a growing concern in the US has been the impact of careerism on legislative 
behaviour and policy outcomes (Opheim, 1994). 
 Herrick, Moore and Hibbing (1994) compare US representatives who are 
seeking re-election with those who do not. They find that the two groups are 
involved in different forms of legislative activity, suggesting that future career 
prospects and objectives have an influence on the current behaviour of politicians. 
They find that politicians seeking re-election are more selective in which roll-call 
votes they participate in and are more active in proposing legislation. Those 
26 
 
planning to leave Congress have a more tightly focused legislative agenda being 
more successful in getting legislation passed.  
Herrick and Moore (1993) find that politicians with the career ambition to 
move to a higher political office are more active than colleagues seeking to stay and 
pursue their career in Congress. These progressively ambitious politicians introduce 
more bills, are more active on the floor and are more likely to specialise in a certain 
legislative area. Those who seek to secure a more senior political position outside 
of their current legislative arena focus more on their constituents while those 
looking to get promoted inside their current political arena are more effective in 
getting legislation passed, despite tabling fewer bills.  
Considering the level of activity of House of Representatives between 1975 
and 1995, by using bill and amendment sponsorship and co-sponsorship, Wawro 
(2000) finds that Democratic representatives with higher levels of activity are more 
likely to obtain leadership positions in the House than their Democratic colleagues 
who are less active. This effect was not found for Republicans. Once in these 
leadership positions, it has been found that these Democratic representatives 
continue to be active. This is confirmed by Schiller (1995) who shows that senior 
senators and senators who chair committees, sponsor more bills than their, more 
junior, colleagues. Similar results were found at lower levels of government in the 
US by Hamm, Harmel and Thompson (1983) who looked at the state legislatures 
in South Carolina and Texas where they found that those more senior politicians in 
leadership positions show more legislative activity. Wawro’s (2000) findings 
contradict with Payne’s (1980) who finds no evidence that active participation in 
committee work helps in advancing a Congressman’s political future.  
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While a number of studies have been conducted on the impact of legislative 
participation on future political careers (either inside the current institution or 
outside in a different political role), the body of research on how legislative 
participation influences what politicians do after they have left politics altogether 
is more limited. Borders and Dockery (1995) provide an overview of the variation 
in post-congressional careers but their work does not include an analysis explaining 
why this variation occurs. In their study of post-Congressional careers, Herrick and 
Nixon (1996) find that there is considerable variation in post-congressional careers 
that are being picked up. They explain this variation by the expressed interests of 
former Congressmen and the opportunities provided to them. Members’ behaviour 
while in Congress may also have an impact on their employment options after they 
leave, with age being a relevant factor. A number of studies in the US have also 
looked at the impact of behaviour in Congress on politician’s ability to get a job in 
the private sector after having left politics, in particular as a lobbyist (Butler and 
Sovey, 2010; Kim, 2013). They find that having served on powerful committees is 
an important explanatory factor with participation in the legislative process being 
an underexposed issue.  
To summarise, there are a number of findings from the US that can inspire 
our thinking about the career paths of MEPs and their participation in the legislative 
process. The US literature shows that politicians do adjust their behaviour in line 
with their career ambitions. A number of studies find that dependent on the career 
objectives, politicians are involved in different legislative activities and also show 
different levels of activity. At the same time, also the external factors that influence 
which career movements are realistic and within reach for politicians are relevant 
to consider as well. The analysis from the US shows some mixed results on the 
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impact of past political experience on the way politicians participate in their current 
position. The findings on how future career steps can be related to being actively 
involved in certain types of legislative activity are more consistent with those 
politicians having progressive career ambitions being more likely to participate 
actively.  
One question is whether these findings are likely to be applicable in the EP 
as well. There are some important differences between the EP and the US Congress 
that can have an influence on whether the US observations are likely to be found in 
the EP context. First, the electoral connection between voters and MEPs is 
relatively weak. One aspect of this is the lack of public scrutiny which is much more 
prominent in the US and is likely to play a more important role when trying to 
understand Congressmen’s behaviour. Second, the EU is different from the US with 
respect to the EP’s party group system and the electoral rules. Also, an MEP has 
two principals, namely the national party and European Party Group (EPG) 
leadership. This might shape the opportunities provided to politicians. Third, for 
many politicians in the EU, being an MEP is not considered to be the highest 
political office. Instead, a career in national politics is often considered to be ‘first-
order’. It is therefore worth considering how the career paths of MEPs and their 
participation have been studied so far to see which findings resemble those in the 
US.  
 
1.4.  Existing research on careers in the European Parliament 
There have been some interesting examples of how career paths can differentiate 
between MEPs. For some MEPs, being elected to the EP follows from having had 
a senior political position in national politics. An example of this in the current EP 
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is Guy Verhofstadt, the leader of the ALDE group, who used to be prime-minister 
of Belgium (1999-2008). Jean-Luc Dehaene is another example of a former Belgian 
prime-minister who got elected to the EP and stayed until he passed away in 2014. 
Some MEPs, however, start their political career in the EP before moving to a 
(senior) position in domestic politics. The Finnish politician Alexander Stubb was 
an MEP between 2004 and 2008 before becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
eventually even Prime Minister of Finland. Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert was a 
member of the EP from 2004-2010 after which she moved to a career in domestic 
politics in the Netherlands. She became an MP in the Dutch Parliament before being 
appointed as Minister of Defence in the Dutch government. Other MEPs do not get 
involved in national politics at all, but decide to pursue a long-term career in the 
EP. Hans-Gert Pöttering, German MEP and former President of the EP, is an 
example of this. He has been an MEP since the EP’s first direct elections in 1979.  
  There is a growing academic interest in the experience and career paths of 
MEPs. The first step in this area was taken by Westlake (1994) who studied British 
MEPs who were active in the EP from 1979 until 1992. He examined whether direct 
elections of the EP have led to the socialisation of MEPs into a group of true 
Europeans with a distinctive European career path. Westlake describes several 
possible career paths which an MEP can follow and identifies two main categories: 
the Westminster-oriented stereotypes and the Strasbourg-oriented stereotypes. 
Westlake took the previous political career of MEPs into account and considered 
the interest of politicians in pursuing a career in Westminster or in the EP. He 
concluded that Westminster acted as a considerable drain on youthful talent who 
were first elected to Strasbourg (Westlake, 1994). Having a position as MEP would 
help to get elected for Westminster. Kauppi’s study (1996) focused on political 
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careers of French MEPs and he finds that French MEPs tend to play a marginal role 
in national politics and only a few of them are able to use their experience in the EP 
to step up to a career in national politics. 
 Following Westlake and Kauppi, Scarrow (1997) studied political 
experience and the career paths of MEPs from the four countries with the largest 
delegations in the EP (France, Germany, Italy and the UK). The focus of her study 
was on the political career paths of MEPs and how their EP membership fits in this. 
She looked at previous elective office experience both at national and sub-national 
level. In her work, she identifies three different categories of MEPs. First, a group 
of MEPs who use their EP membership as a ‘stepping-stone’ for winning national 
political offices. Second, a group of MEPs who are committed to their European 
position for a longer term, the ‘European careerists’. Third, a group of MEPs who 
only stay in the EP for a short period of time after retirement from national elected 
office or who use their short EP membership to get a position to a non-elective 
public office or to a career in the private sector. Scarrow’s study shows that there 
are considerable differences between the four member states which she examined 
in the types of MEPs who are elected, but that it has become more likely that: 
 “future EPs will be filled with careerist MEPs who will view the parliament 
as their principal political arena, and who will seek to increase the institution’s 
prestige and power relative to other European and domestic institutions” (Scarrow, 
1997).  
 This view was also shared by Beauvallet and Michon (2010) who find an 
emerging EP elite who dominate the work in the institution. They argue that, 
whereas in the first directly elected EP in 1979, the typical European political 
profile was one of the end-of-career MEP, in more recent parliaments a younger 
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group of politicians has been elected who stay in the EP for longer periods and 
choose to build a career in the institution. These EP careerists specialise in the 
European political arena and tend to dominate leadership positions in the EP. 
Whitaker (2014), too, finds that MEPs are indeed building careers in the EP and 
greater proportions of MEPs aspire to stay than was previously the case. 
As Ting (2016) explains, previous political experience has enabled a 
politician to build up a network and develop skills which are necessary when elected 
to parliament. Studies on the US Congress have shown that the political experience 
of candidates has a significant electoral impact in elections and Hobolt and Høyland 
(2011) have demonstrated that political experience is even valued in less candidate-
centred elections such as those for the EP. In their study on the EP elections, they 
show, first, that voters prefer candidates with more political experience and, second, 
that parties that choose experienced candidates for the European elections are 
rewarded by the electorate. This leads to the conclusion that not only national 
political cleavages and the attitudes towards the national governments matter in 
European elections (Hobolt and Høyland, 2011), but also the competences of the 
candidates.  
A recent contribution to the literature about the career paths of MEPs comes 
from Daniel (2015). The focus in his work is on how the changing nature of the EP 
has affected political careers. He tries to explain which MEPs follow which 
pathway and under what conditions. He confirms the findings of others that the EP 
has become a more attractive institution to work. The increases in legislative power, 
the professionalism of the work and the compensation are all factors making it more 
likely that MEPs will seek re-election. He also showed that there are considerable 
country-specific differences in the ways that national political parties select their 
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EP candidates. He argues that in federalised countries national parties are more 
accustomed to nominating candidates across multiple levels of government and 
therefore might select different types of politicians for the EP than the national 
level. In this, he tries to link national institutional variations with the differences 
that can be observed in the career paths of MEPs at the EU level. Through his work, 
Daniel not only contributes to the literature of politicians’ career paths and 
candidate selection but also to the literature on political parties as organisations.  
Although Daniel’s main focus is on the career paths of MEPs and the 
institutional development of the EP, he also links the career paths that MEPs follow 
with their behaviour in the EP. He argues that MEPs who are seeking a long-term 
career in the EP are more likely to specialise within the institution, occupy 
leadership positions and are able to progress policy initiatives in a way that one-off 
MEPs would not be able to. He finds that more senior MEPs are more likely to be 
active as rapporteur as they are able to deliver on policy development. In this way, 
more senior long-serving MEPs are better able at contributing to both the power 
and content of the EP’s work (Daniel, 2015).  
Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard (2015) show that the political parties play 
an important role in selecting candidates for EP elections and take their decisions 
based on their desire to accomplish either electoral, organisational or policy goals. 
Their findings show that the role of national parties in the election process should 
not be underestimated. The ability of an MEP to pursue a career in the EP depends 
on both the national and European party leadership. The national and European 
party leaderships are of influence on how well MEPs are able to gain re-election, 
whether they are able to build careers inside the chamber and which options they 
have outside parliament – either in politics or elsewhere. When applying a 
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principal-agent structure, the MEP as an agent has two principals. The two 
principals, being the national and European party leadership, decide about different 
aspects which are of importance to an MEP. The EPG leadership allocates 
rapporteurships, decides about the speaking time of the MEP and decides about 
committee membership, but the ultimate sanction of nominating (or not) a member 
for re-election is reserved for the national party leadership (Scully, 2007). In all 
member states, the party leadership of the national parties have some control over 
the selection of the candidates for the EP elections by determining the list of 
candidates or approving the regionally selected candidates (Hix, 2002). 
With the presence of two principals, MEPs clearly face a dilemma: if they 
want to be re-elected or promoted in national politics they need to act in line with 
the national party, but in order to be promoted within the EP and secure certain 
policy outcomes they need to follow the EPG discipline (Hix, 2005). The policy 
position an MEP takes will then be important in the context of their career 
ambitions. But how does this effect work for the level of participation in the 
legislative process? It can be expected that national parties prefer MEPs who stay 
closer to the national party line, but do they reward MEPs who are very active in 
the EP’s by making their re-election more likely?  
Most others who have studied career paths in the EP have not linked these 
career paths to the legislative participation of MEPs (e.g. Westlake, 1994; Scarrow, 
1997; Verzichelli and Edinger, 2005; Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard, 2009a and 
b; Beauvallet and Michon, 2010; Hobolt and Høyland, 2011; Whitaker, 2014). They 
have mainly provided descriptive analyses of the career paths that exist in the EP 
by for example showing the tenure in the EP by member state and committee. Some 
of them, for example Whitaker (2014), went further by also conducting quantitative 
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analysis on the factors that influence whether an MEP stays in the EP or not. 
Variables controlled for in Whitaker’s analysis include, for example, the electoral 
system used in EP elections, whether an MEP’s party formed part of the national 
government and whether an MEP was a member of a key EP committee in the 
previous term. He finds that being an MEP from one of the two largest groups (EPP 
and S&D), membership of the most important committees and holding an EP 
leadership position all increase the chance of returning to the EP after an election. 
Hix, Hobolt and Høyland (2017) identify in their study, which focuses on 
how career trajectories are associated with different levels of legislative activity in 
the EP, electoral institutions and candidate selection rules as important factors that 
moderate the association between career ambitions and legislative activity. They 
show that MEPs who seek to move from the European to the national (state) level 
participate less in legislative activities than those looking to stay at the European 
political level. This effect of career ambitions on legislative participation is stronger 
in candidate-centred systems than in party-centred systems (Hix et. al. 2017).  
 To sum up, the main focus in the literature on the EP has been on identifying 
the different career paths that exist among MEPs. Several scholars, with Scarrow 
(1997) being a prominent example, have shown how politicians move around from 
the European to the national level and vis-versa. These politicians consider the EP 
to be a stepping-stone to national politics, a place to retire or a long-term option. A 
number of authors find that there is a growing category of MEPs who stay in the 
EP for longer and consider it to be their main political arena to operate in. National 
specificities and other exogenous factors do have an impact on the career 
trajectories that are available for MEPs. Some of these exogenous factors, such as 
the differences in the way political parties select their candidates, are much less 
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present in the US which makes it harder to make an explicit EU-US comparison on 
those factors.  
 From the US literature, we know that a relationship exists between the career 
paths of politicians and their behaviour in Congress. It is however relatively 
unknown how the career paths of MEPs relate to their behaviour in the EP. We only 
understand, to a limited extent, why MEPs behave in the way they do. Extensive 
research has been conducted on the voting behaviour of MEPs (and even there the 
focus has not been predominantly on the MEPs’ career paths) but the literature is 
limited with respect to the MEPs’ level of legislative participation in the form of 
tabling amendments, motions and participating in plenary votes.  
Similar to Richard Hall’s approach when studying the behaviour in the US 
Congress (Hall, 1996), this thesis will focus on the participation of MEPs in 
parliament instead of examining the voting behaviour, ideology or policy 
preferences of MEPs. When studying members of parliament, the focal point should 
not be limited to a politician’s legislative objectives but should also include his or 
her willingness and ability to pay for achieving them. Participation is not the same 
as the motivation for being elected. It is about the question of why, and to what 
extent, parliamentarians become active and participate once they are elected to 
parliament. As Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963) formulate, the member’s principal 
dilemma is “not how to vote but what to do with his time, how to allocate his 
resources and where to put his energy” (quoted in Hall, 1996). Hall argues that 
participation might not always be rational. In some cases, free-riding could be a 
better alternative than to actively participate in the legislative process. Nevertheless, 
we see that parliamentarians spend considerable amounts of time on participating, 
albeit to varying degrees. Better understanding why some MEPs participate more 
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actively than others would increase our knowledge about the functioning of the EP. 
This is why the primary focus of my research is on seeking to understand why 
certain MEPs participate more actively than others in the EP’s work by focusing on 
the different career paths and ambitions of MEPs as an explanatory factor. 
 
1.5.  Main hypotheses for the research 
Building on the existing body of literature, a number of hypotheses are prepared 
which set out areas that are worth exploring in more detail. One of the objectives of 
this thesis is to increase our knowledge about the different career paths that exist in 
the EP. As others have shown, over time, in line with the increase of powers of the 
EP, the number of MEPs pursuing a long-term career in the EP has increased and it 
is likely that the data in this thesis will show a similar trend: 
H1: Over time, the number of MEPs with a long-term career in the EP has 
increased 
 
The key focus of the analysis in this thesis, however, is on trying to understand how 
a politician’s career path relates to his or her participation in the EP’s legislative 
process. The underlying assumption used in this thesis is based on the rational 
choice idea that MEPs take decisions in line with their desire to pursue a certain 
career path, subject to certain limitations they are faced with. It is therefore expected 
that different types of MEPs, as defined by their differing career paths, participate 
differently in the EP’s legislative activities. For the different career paths, the 
hypotheses to be tested in this thesis are therefore: 
H2: Those MEPs looking to stay in the EP for longer participate more 
actively in the EP’s work  
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H3: Those MEPs looking to move to a career in national politics participate 
less actively in the EP’s work 
H4: Those MEPs looking to leave politics altogether participate less 
actively in the EP’s work 
 
With electoral punishment and reward being a weaker explanation for MEPs’ 
participation, given the second-order nature of the EP elections (Reif and Schmitt, 
1980; Schmitt, 2005; Hix and Marsh, 2007), it is important to consider whether an 
MEP’s legislative activities are of influence on his or her re-election opportunities 
in the first place. In the absence of a strong electoral connection a link can still be 
made between the behaviour of MEPs and their likelihood of getting re-elected, 
namely through the role that the national party leadership plays. It can be argued 
that the national party rewards more active MEPs, who have proven their ability to 
obtain policy influence, by placing them higher on the electoral list. One of the 
hypotheses tested in this thesis is therefore:  
H5: Of the MEPs who have a desire to pursue their career as MEP, those 
who participate more actively are more likely to be re-elected than their 
peers who participate less  
 
Relatively little is known about what MEPs do after their time in the EP when they 
do not retire or move to national politics. This thesis also tries to address this gap 
by focusing on one category of former politicians who regularly attract public 
attention: those who become lobbyists, through the revolving door. In the context 
of the focus of this thesis on the relationship between career paths and legislative 
participation, the question arises whether legislative participation is also relevant 
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for those who pursue a future career outside of politics by becoming a lobbyist. In 
the US, where the revolving door of politicians has been studied in much greater 
detail, broadly two schools of thoughts have emerged (this is further elaborated on 
in chapter four). On the one hand is the idea that revolving door politicians are 
valuable because they have process and content knowledge. The length of service 
and membership of a powerful committee are found to be useful indicators here. 
On the other hand revolving door politicians are valuable because of their network 
of contacts. Having been in leadership positions and having a relatively closer 
ideological proximity to those in power are relevant factors here. Given the high 
turnover in the EP and the many different political ideologies present, I believe that 
having a network of contacts is less important than having process and content 
knowledge in the EP context. The following hypothesis will therefore be tested: 
H6: Those MEPs who have spent a longer period of time in the EP and have 
been a member of a powerful decision-making committee are more likely to 
become a Brussels-based lobbyist after their time as an MEP  
 
Each of the individual papers will have its own, additional hypotheses which will 
be elaborated on in more detail in the respective papers.  
 
1.6.  Overview of EP careers’ data 
Before moving to a discussion about the three individual papers of this thesis, I will 
first introduce some of the data that is used in the thesis. In this section, I describe, 
in broad terms, what the data tells us about the average length of time an MEP 
spends in the EP of those who were in office recently (in the seventh EP from 2009 
until 2014) and how many of them have a political background. I will then also 
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discuss and analyse some of the exogenous variables that influence the length of 
time an MEP is likely to spend in parliament considering all MEPs who have been 
elected since the first election of the EP in 1979. This provides a general 
introduction into the data that is used in this thesis.  
First, I have selected a subset of the data by focusing on the MEPs in the 
last full parliamentary term (2009-2014). This is the same data as being used in 
chapter three of this thesis. Some of this data comes from Hix and Noury (2015). 
In terms of personal information, this data contained information about an MEP’s 
age at the time of the 2014 elections and the member state he or she represented. 
Added to this was information about the EPG that each MEP belongs to which was 
derived from the EP website. Information on the length of membership of an MEP 
until the start of the seventh EP (2009-2014) was added by calculated the number 
of days from the start date until election day in 2009. Information on an MEP’s start 
date came from the EP website. The data that was needed to identify the career 
paths as used in table three was found on MEPs’ personal websites, the websites of 
national parliaments and in some cases from interviews given by MEPs in national 
and international media. 
For this period, the MEPs in the dataset have spent at the end of the term on 
average 2,942 days in the EP, over eight years. However, this also includes the 
member states which joined the EU more recently in 2004 and 2007 and whose 
MEPs have not yet had the chance to build a long-term career in the EP. When 
looking at the length of EP membership per member state it becomes clear that there 
are significant variations between them (table one). On the one hand, there are some 
member states with a relatively low average length of EP membership. This group 
includes, understandably, MEPs from some of the member states which joined in 
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the last decade but also Greece and Finland. On the other hand, some member states 
have MEPs who stay significantly longer in the EP than the average. This includes, 
for example, Germany and the UK. Croatia was dropped from the analysis given 
that it only joined the EU in 2013. Also, when looking at the EPGs of the MEPs, 
significant differences can be found (table two).
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It is worth not only looking at the average number of days in the EP but also 
at the career paths that MEPs follow. For this, I have looked at the same time period 
(2009-2014) and categorised the MEPs in the same five groups as I developed in 
the first paper of this thesis (see chapter two). For the ﬁrst type, the young ‘stepping-
stone’ politicians, a dummy variable was created, with all those MEPs under the 
age of 41 and no previous domestic political career being selected. The MEPs in 
this category also all had a career in national politics after the 2014 EP election. 
The second type of MEPs, the ‘retirees’, are all those MEPs over the age of 60 who 
had a career in domestic politics prior to their election as an MEP. The ‘EP 
careerists’, the third type, were selected by considering those with no previous 
domestic career who served at least two terms in the EP and who are now either in 
their third term or had been an MEP since 2004 and were re-elected in the 2014 EP 
elections (i.e. having started their third term in 2014). The fourth category of MEPs 
of ‘former national politicians’ who pursue a second political life by serving in the 
EP was selected as those between 40 and 55 years old with a previous career in 
domestic politics, or between 55 and 59 years old with national political experience 
and more than one term in the EP (in order to distinguish them from the EP retirees). 
The final category of ‘one-off’ MEPs was selected by taking those MEPs who did 
not have a political career at the national level or at EP level prior to 2004. MEPs 
in this category also did not become re-elected to the EP in 2014 and did not embark 
on a senior domestic political career after their time in the EP (i.e. they were active 
in politics for a maximum of two EP terms). With this categorisation, I captured 
514 MEPs out of the 838 that were included in the dataset for the seventh EP. Table 
three shows the different types of MEPs by political group. It is found that at least 
25 percent of the MEPs are committed to the EP for longer and particularly those 
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from the EPP are well represented in this group. The EP seems to be used by only 
a few as a stepping-stone into domestic politics. Also, using the EP as a place to 
retire from national politics seems to be a less common phenomenon than anecdotal 
evidence might suggest.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6.1. Structure of opportunities: data and methodology 
For this analysis, I look at all MEPs since the first direct election of the EP in 1979. 
The data is analysed using the Cox hazard model. As used in other work on the 
length of political careers (e.g. in the context of the US Congress or UK ministerial 
careers), the benefits of using such a duration model include the ability to predict 
the probability of a career ending at any value or combination of values of the 
explanatory variables (Fogarty et al., 2013). In addition, given some limitations to 
the Cox hazard model, the data is also analysed by using a multinomial logistic 
regression analysis. 
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As the literature in the US has shown, various factors impact the 
opportunities that politicians have to pursue their career objectives. As part of the 
introduction to this thesis, and moving on from the above general description of the 
seventh EP, I will conduct an analysis to describe the different potential factors that 
are correlated with an MEP’s ability to stay in the EP or to leave and pursue a career 
elsewhere. How does the context in which an MEP operates influence an MEP’s 
decision to stay in the EP or to take advantage of the exit opportunities provided? 
Or to stay in the terms of Schlesinger (1966), what are the factors impacting the 
‘structure of opportunities’ to MEPs? This analysis does not yet link the career paths 
of MEPs to their participation in the legislative work. This will be done in the 
individual papers of this thesis. 
As Borchert (2011) has argued, the key factors influencing career paths are 
the availability, accessibility and attractiveness of offices. Whether or not an MEP 
has the ambition to build a career in the EP, he or she is likely to be influenced by 
a number of factors specific to his or her own circumstances that constrain him in 
achieving his ambitions. In the case of the career paths of MEPs, the relevant factors 
that will be analysed in this section can be placed into three categories: 1) the factors 
attracting MEPs to pursue a career within the EP; 2) the exit opportunities provided 
to MEPs to pursue a career elsewhere; and, 3) external factors of influence, such as 
electoral rules. Within the structure of opportunities, MEPs can decide about how 
they wish to participate in the work of the EP.  
In order to identify which factors are relevant for the structure of 
opportunities that MEPs are faced with, the data needs to show when MEPs joined 
and left the EP. This is combined with information about which political groups an 
MEP was a member of, which member state they represent and which positions 
44 
 
they have held within the EP. Knowing which member state an MEP represents also 
means that data about the national political situation can be added as well as 
information about the electoral rules for both national and European elections.  
Part of the data used for this section comes from Hix and Noury (2015) and 
is also used for the individual papers in this thesis. The dataset Hix and Noury 
compiled contains information on all politicians who were MEPs from its first 
direct election in 1979 until the most recent election in 2014. It comprises 
information about 3205 different MEPs in total. In terms of personal information, 
the dataset shows the MEPs’ age at the start of their mandate in the EP as age is an 
important factor to consider in the context of career paths. If a politician is elected 
to the EP at a later stage of his or her life and is already approaching retirement, he 
or she is less likely to pursue a long-term career in the EP. Younger, and even 
middle-aged MEPs have a much longer time period to develop a career in the EP. 
The MEP’s gender, as well as the population size of their home member 
state at the start of an MEP’s mandate were also added to the analysis. This data 
was obtained from Eurostat. The dataset already contained information about both 
the EPG and the national political party that each MEP is a member of, including 
the total number of MEPs each of these groups contain. Larger groups tend to 
dominate and are able to provide their members with the opportunity to specialise, 
which could make it more attractive for members of these groups to stay in the EP 
and develop a career. This information was derived from the EP website.  
 The increase in power has made the EP a more interesting political 
institution for policy-seeking politicians. The starting year of EP membership was, 
therefore, included to measure the impact of increasing EP powers over time. Time 
was thereby taken as a measurement of the increase in powers given that the 
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increase in the EP’s powers has been gradual. Whether an MEP had held a ‘mega-
seat’ (Carroll et al., 2006) was also added to the analysis. A mega-seat here is 
defined as holding a senior position such as committee chair or EP (vice)president. 
Getting hold of such a mega-seat is likely to increase the chances of an MEP seeking 
to remain in the EP (Whitaker, 2014). A long career in the EP can, because of the 
experience built up, be helpful in securing a senior position in the parliament but at 
the same time, the desire to obtain a senior position is likely to be a motivating 
factor for building a long-term career in the EP. The EP website provided the 
information needed for this variable. 
Besides the factors attracting MEPs to continue their career inside the EP, 
this analysis also considers the potential factors attracting MEPs to pursue a career 
outside the EP, for example in national politics. The information on national politics 
is mainly derived from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2015). The 
domestic political arena here is relevant as, for most member states, this will be a 
more prestigious level than being an MEP (Hix, 2008). There are a number of 
factors that influence whether a career at the national level is a viable alternative 
for MEPs. First of all, the number of entry opportunities, both by the number of 
seats available and the number of parties in a national parliament can be expected 
to influence the likelihood of an MEP moving from the European to the domestic 
political level. Parties control access to a career in politics, as they decide about 
nominations and re-nominations for elections (Borchert and Stolz, 2011b). The 
database contains the necessary information about the total number of seats in each 
national parliament as well as the effective number of political parties. Whether an 
MEP’s national party is often in government, or tends to be in opposition is also a 
relevant factor. A party in government will give a politician more chances to gain a 
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powerful position and influence policy, which makes moving to national politics a 
more attractive alternative. The database, therefore, also shows which parties have 
been a member of a national government. On this basis, each MEP was given a 
coding to show whether his or her member state tends to have coalition 
governments or single-party governments.  
Electoral systems not only affect which parties are elected but also who gets 
elected to represent these parties in the legislature. Therefore, the electoral formula 
and district magnitude are of impact on the types of representatives that are elected 
(Farrell and Scully, 2007; Norris and Franklin, 1997). In a proportional 
representation system, where politicians do not need to run on a personal ticket in 
a district but can be included on a party list by the party leadership, the electoral 
system will be more open for MEPs who are less well-known in their constituencies. 
For national elections, each member state has its own electoral rules with, for 
example, the UK using a majoritarian system and Germany using a combination of 
closed-list proportional representation and a majoritarian system. These electoral 
systems have an influence on how candidate-centred the elections are, which could 
improve the chances of an MEP to be elected nationally – if he or she has developed 
a more public profile during the EP membership. On the other hand, in party-
centred elections, an MEP might have been able to prove his or her qualities to the 
party leadership, who then, in turn, include him or her as a candidate on the party 
list for the national elections.    
It is relevant to note that dual mandates were abolished in 2004 so that MEPs 
were no longer able to be an MEP of both their national parliament and the EP at 
the same time. This means that they will have had to choose between a long-term 
career in the EP and a career in national politics. Abolishing dual mandates can be 
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expected to have reduced the number of MEPs pursuing a long-term career in the 
EP as some will have opted for the career path in national politics so this needs to 
be included in an analysis on the long-term trends. 
Both the Cox hazard model and multinomial logistic regression model are 
used to analyse the data for this section. The Cox hazard model has been used in 
other studies on political career lengths, for example in the context of the US 
Congress (Fogarty et al., 2013) and UK ministerial careers (Berlinski et al., 2010)1. 
The Cox hazard model does, however, have its limitations. Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones (1997) explain that problems can arise with the Cox model when more than 
a single observation (of the risk of failure) exists at the same time2. Standard 
continuous-time event history models such as the Cox model cannot easily handle 
the problem of the co-occurrence of events.  
In their paper, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones describe the events of 
retirement and ambition for Congressmen as discrete-time events given that, 
although these events can occur anywhere in time, they tend to occur near the onset 
of an election cycle. For their case study of Congressmen’s careers, Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones use a competing risk model using multinomial logistic 
                                                          
1 Given the relatively high turnover of MEPs in between EP elections, we would seem to be dealing 
with a continuous-time process event which would justify the use of the Cox model, being a standard 
continuous-time event history model. The benefits of using the Cox hazard model include the ability 
to predict the probability of a career ending at any value or combination of values of the explanatory 
variables (Fogarty et al., 2013). Traditional regression-based methods would be less suitable for 
studying politicians’ career patterns because of the problem of right-censoring and time-varying 
variables that are included in the analysis. For a more detailed discussion on the use of event history 
models, I refer to Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) 
2 Prentice and Farewell (1986) state that, as a rule of thumb, no more than 5% of the observations 
should fail at one time to avoid a bias in the results. In the case of MEPs’ careers, the EP elections 
which take place every five years do however lead to a failure in more than 5% of the observations 
at one time. The data in this situation would, therefore, suggest that we are dealing with a discrete-
time event, rather than a continuous-time event 
48 
 
regression analysis3. It was therefore decided to analyse the data in this introduction 
by using a multinomial logistic regression in addition to the Cox hazard model. The 
multinomial logistic regression analysis here leaves out the period after the 2009 
elections but is, therefore, likely to have created a selection bias. Every MEP for 
each term is included in the analysis4.  
To sum up, time is a key factor when analysing the motivations of MEPs to 
stay in the EP, which explains the need to use the Cox hazard model. The Cox 
hazard model helps us to understand long-term trends in MEPs’ career behaviour. 
The multinomial logistic regression model complements the Cox hazard model by 
analysing MEPs’ careers as a discrete-time event. As the following section will 
show, the results of both models point in the same direction, albeit emphasising 
different elements. 
 
1.6.2. MEPs with static ambition 
The dependent variable in the analysis, the length of time an MEP has spent in the 
EP, was included in the dataset by calculating the number of days that an MEP had 
spent in the EP until the 2014 elections.  
Table four shows the outcome of the Cox hazard model. The length of 
membership was used as the dependent variable in the analyses whereby the 
independent variables show the impact they have on the risk of an MEP leaving the 
                                                          
3 This allows them to consider three possible outcomes: whether a Congressman will seek re-
election, retire or aim for a higher position. This model cannot, however, simply be copied for the 
situation under analysis in this section. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones were able to select an 
observation period which ended in the past, something which is not done for the data under 
consideration in this section. In doing so, they were able to avoid severe right-censoring problems 
4 Other than the Cox hazard model, which only includes each MEP once, for the multinomial logistic 
regression model, MEPs can be included on multiple occasions, depending on how many terms they 
have served. This is necessary as this model analyses for every term whether an MEP has left, or 
has or has not been re-elected, whereas the Cox hazard model assesses the risk that an MEP will 
leave during his or her time in Parliament 
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EP. This means that variables which show a number greater than one increase the 
risk of an MEP leaving the EP at any point in time. Column two in table four 
includes the EPGs as control variables. Table six shows the findings in clear 
percentage points. 
As could be expected, the older an MEP gets, the more likely he or she is to 
leave the EP. An increase in age by one year increases the likelihood of an MEP 
leaving by 1.8 percent. Male MEPs also turn out to have a higher chance of leaving, 
namely by 10.6 percent, all else being equal. At the same time, the larger the 
member state is, the lower the risk that an MEP will leave. An increase in population 
size of one million reduces the likelihood of an MEP leaving the EP by 1.7 percent. 
The size of the EPG and national party group in the EP has an influence on the risk 
of an MEP leaving, with MEPs from larger groups being less likely to leave. Having 
one MEP extra in the national party group reduces the likelihood of an MEP leaving 
by 0.5 percent. This confirms the idea that larger groups incentivise their members 
to stay possibly by dominating the work of the EP. Having been a committee chair 
or EP (vice)-President also significantly reduces the risk of an MEP leaving. This 
could confirm the idea that MEPs who are in more powerful positions and who are 
able to develop a significant career in the EP have more of an incentive to stay. 
However, it is more likely to be the case that in order to become a committee chair 
or EP (vice)-President, one needs to stay in the EP for longer. It is therefore worth 
investing time in a career in the EP, as it increases the likelihood of being able to 
obtain one of the ‘mega-seats’ in the parliament. Having influence over the 
policymaking process seems to be a relevant incentive for staying in the EP too. For 
each subsequent EP term, the likelihood of an MEP leaving the EP shrinks by 6.9 
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percent. This confirms the idea that the gradual increase in powers for the EP over 
time has made it more likely overall for MEPs to stay in the EP. 
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As well as considering the incentives at a European level, the Cox hazard 
model analysis also considers certain factors that can attract MEPs to move to the 
national level. Here, it is shown that the more MP positions there are available in 
the national parliament, the more likely it is that an MEP will end their EP career. 
Every extra MP seat in a national parliament increases the likelihood of an MEP 
leaving the EP by 0.2 percent. This confirms the idea that MEPs who have more 
exit opportunities to move to the national level are more likely to leave the EP. On 
the other hand, the existence of mainly single-party governments has the opposite 
effect, reducing the likelihood of an MEP leaving the EP by as much as 15.4 percent 
but only when controlling for EPGs. The existence of mainly single-party 
governments could make moving to a career in national politics less attractive, as 
the politician risks ending up in opposition. The data does not include whether an 
MEP has in fact taken the opportunity to move to domestic politics but should be 
seen as an analysis of the structure of opportunities at national level. 
Being allowed to have dual mandates (i.e. to be a member of both the 
national parliament and the EP) significantly reduces the risk of an MEP ending 
their career at European level (by as much as 34.8 percent), as MEPs do not have 
to choose between the two institutions.   
 The analysis also includes the effects of electoral rules, both for European 
and national elections. National electoral rules do not seem to have an effect on the 
risk of an MEP leaving the EP, but MEPs elected under the single transferable vote 
or single member plurality, the system that was used in the UK until 1999, are less 
likely to leave the EP, while closed-list and open-list proportional representation 
increases this likelihood.  
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The data was also analysed using a multinomial logistic regression model to 
complement the findings of the Cox hazard model. The dependent variable of this 
model is whether an MEP i) left the EP before the elections, ii) was not re-elected 
at the elections (either because he or she had decided to step down or because he or 
she lost against a competitor) and iii) the MEP was re-elected. Table five shows the 
outcome of the analyses. The data selected for this analysis includes all MEPs from 
1979 up until the 2009 elections. The outcome of the 2009 elections is also included 
in the analysis. This cut-off point was selected to limit the impact of right-censoring. 
This selection might in itself, however, have created a selection bias. The table 
shows how much the log-hazard of ending an MEP’s career increases or decreases.  
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Column one compares leaving the EP before the elections with being re-
elected and column two shows not being re-elected vs. being re-elected. The 
variable ‘age’ in column one, for example, shows that a one-unit increase in ‘age’ 
is associated with a 0.0259 decrease in the relative log odds of leaving early vs. 
being re-elected. Interpreting the increases and decreases of log-hazards is not 
straightforward but a convenient way of interpreting logistic regression coefficients 
is through the use of odds ratios (for a discussion, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 
1997)5. Odds ratios greater than one imply that the probability of an event 
happening increases when the value of the variable increases by one unit. Odds 
ratios lower than one indicate a decrease in the probability of an event happening 
when the value of the variable increases by one unit.  
 Table five shows that the same variables were included in the multinomial 
logistic regression model as were included for the Cox hazard model. The model 
does, however, have its limitations as discussed before, and shows fewer variables 
having a significant impact. For those variables which do have a significant impact, 
the odds ratios are calculated and are displayed in table six.  
As could be expected, the time that an MEP has spent in the EP has a 
negative impact on the probability of him or her leaving the EP early before the 
elections vs. being re-elected. The percentage shown in table six for this variable 
might seem small, but given that the length of EP membership is calculated in days, 
the effect is significant.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The coefficient can be converted into odds ratios by using the following formula: %Δ = (e^βkΔ-1) 
* 100 (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997) 
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 Some results might seem contradicting each other but are merely the 
methodological effect from deploying different types of statistics. An example of 
this is the effect of ‘age’. The Cox hazard model shows a positive result there 
suggesting that the older an MEP is, the more likely it is he or she will leave the EP 
(for example to retire).  At the same time the multinomial logistic regression model 
shows a negative result meaning that that the younger an MEP is, the more likely it 
is that he or she will leave the EP before the next elections (rather than get re-
elected). For example, an MEP who is ten years younger than a colleague is 25.6 
percent more likely to leave the EP before the elections vs. being re-elected. This 
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does not contradict the Cox hazard model but complements it by showing that those 
MEPs who leave the EP early, are likely to be younger than their peers. This could 
for example be explained by the fact that younger MEPs are more likely to move to 
the national political arena when there are national elections halfway through the 
EP term.  
Also the results on the impact of holder a committee chair or EP president 
position seem, at first sight, to contradict each other between the Cox hazard model 
and the multinomial logistic regression model. The results from the Cox hazard 
model show that being/having been a committee chair or EP president reduces the 
likelihood of leaving the EP. On the other hand, when these two variables have a 
positive value in the multinomial logistic regression model, it means that with the 
experience of having been a committee chair or EP president, it is more likely that 
an MEP will leave the EP instead of being re-elected. This seems contradictory but 
can be explained by the fact that for the Cox hazard model an MEP was assigned 
with having been committee chair or EP president when an MEP had had this 
position at some point during their time in the EP. It is however likely that an MEP 
will only get this position if he or she stays in the EP for a longer period of time. 
The Cox hazard model will therefore interpret this as if being a committee chair or 
EP president reduces the likelihood of an MEP leaving. However, it is more likely 
that those who ‘survive’ longer in the EP have more chance of being a committee 
chair or EP president.  
The multinomial logistic regression model analyses whether an MEP has 
left for every term between 1979-2009. This means that if an MEP stayed in the EP 
for two terms, the model included two observations for this MEP. Each individual 
observation had information on whether an MEP had been a committee chair or EP 
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president during that particular term. The results show that if an MEP had been in 
such a senior position in that term, it was more likely that he would leave before the 
end of that term. This suggests that either once an MEP has made it to such a  senior 
position and loses this role, subsequent work in the EP becomes less appealing and 
other opportunities outside the EP attract more, or that obtaining such a role makes 
an MEP visible and makes it more likely that an MEP is given opportunities outside 
the EP. At the same time, those who do decide to run for re-election have a higher 
chance of getting re-elected having been a committee chair.  
 Again, the increase in powers of the EP over the years makes it significantly 
less likely for an MEP to leave the EP. For each new term, the probability of leaving 
the EP before the elections vs. being re-elected decreases by nearly 35 percent.   
 In terms of the factors attracting MEPs to move to the national political 
arena, having mainly single party governments has a strong positive effect of nearly 
48 percent on MEPs not being re-elected to the EP vs. being re-elected. This would 
require further analysis as it seems to be at odds with the findings of the Cox hazard 
model. 
 The electoral systems for the national and European elections show mixed 
results in terms of impact on MEPs’ length of career. Using semi-open proportional 
representation lists in the EP elections reduces the probability of an MEP leaving 
the EP before the elections vs. being re-elected by 36 percent, whereas proportional 
representation in national elections increases the chances of an MEP not being re-
elected vs. being re-elected by nearly 44 percent.  
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1.6.3. Structure of opportunities found in long-term data 
The findings in this introduction support the first hypothesis of this thesis that over 
time, in line with the increase of powers of the EP, the number of EP careerists has 
increased. In line with Schlesinger’s view it has been found here that politicians 
operate in a structure of opportunities which includes, for example, the positions 
which are available and the electoral rules that are set. These parameters have an 
impact on the opportunities for a politician to achieve his or her career objectives.  
The Cox hazard model provides the opportunity to study the development 
of EP careers over a longer period of time. The multinomial logistic regression 
model is used as a robustness check to try to analyse the data in a different way 
given the discrete-event characteristics of the data. The focal points of both models 
are somewhat different, with the Cox hazard model analysing the risk of an MEP 
leaving the EP and the multinomial logistic regression model comparing the 
probabilities of an MEP leaving the EP early or not being re-elected vs. being re-
elected and prolonging his or her EP career. The analysis provides an insight into 
the different variables that have an impact on an MEP’s ability to pursue a career 
in the institution. Group size, both in terms of member state and political party, 
seems to be of significant influence on the length of EP membership. Larger groups 
tend to dominate the work in the EP and membership of a larger member state or 
party increases the likelihood of staying in the EP. Seniority would seem to be an 
important motivating factor for building a career in the EP, while at the same time 
having EP experience is often a precondition for obtaining a senior position. The 
finding that committee chairs and EP (vice)-Presidents are less likely to leave the 
EP is, therefore, difficult to interpret. The findings from the multinomial logistic 
regression model, however, suggest that EP experience is a precondition for 
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obtaining a senior position, given that MEPs who have held such a ‘mega-seat’ are 
more likely to leave the EP before the elections. The analysis also suggests that the 
increase in the EP’s powers has reduced the likelihood of MEPs leaving. This would 
support the argument that the EP has become a more attractive institution in which 
to build a long-term career.  
In terms of the opportunities for MEPs to leave the EP and move to the 
national political arena, the Cox hazard model finds that the more opportunities 
provided in the national parliament (in terms of total number of seats available), the 
more likely it is that an MEP will end his or her EP career. There would then be 
more entry opportunities for MEPs to move to national politics. The data does not 
conclude whether these MEPs have in fact moved to the domestic political arena. 
When MEPs were allowed to also be a member of their national parliament, 
the likelihood of an MEP leaving the EP was significantly lower. This suggests that 
many MEPs are willing to give up their seat in the EP if they are able to get a seat 
in the national parliament, which would be in line with the idea of politicians 
perceiving the EP as being of ‘second-order’ importance.  
The impact of electoral systems on the likelihood of an MEP pursuing a 
career in the EP is mixed and, in many cases, not statistically significant. Overall, 
the findings suggest that MEPs from larger member states and larger political 
groups are more likely to stay in the EP. The increase in powers of the EP has also 
reduced the likelihood of MEPs leaving the parliament. At the same time, when 
MEPs have more opportunities at the national political level, the likelihood of them 
leaving increases.  
These findings show some interesting long-term trends. At the same time, 
however, the size of the group (either member state or political group) that an MEP 
60 
 
is a member of is unlikely to be a sufficiently substantiated explanatory factor in 
explaining why an MEP stays in the EP. Group and party size could be a proxy for 
an underlying explanatory variable which has not been captured in this analysis. 
This could be potential policymaking power. Also, the impact of the increase of 
power of the EP on MEPs staying in the EP suggests they might be interested in 
obtaining policy influence. 
It can be expected that in order to obtain policy influence, an MEP needs to 
participate in the legislative process. Legislative participation should, therefore, be 
looked at to better understand the development of career paths. This is what I will 
explore further in this thesis.  
 
1.7.  Overview from the papers 
The three papers in this thesis focus on different elements of the relationship 
between the career paths of MEPs and their behaviour in the EP. The first paper 
looks at the different types of MEPs that exist and argues that two new types of 
MEPs can be identified, in addition to the three that are generally used in the 
literature. A key contribution to the debate about the different career paths that exist 
among MEPs comes from Scarrow (1997). She categorised MEPs as falling in the 
young, ‘stepping-stone’ MEPs who are looking to move to national politics, the EP 
careerists of politicians who have a long-term commitment to the European 
institution and the retirees of domestic politicians who use their time in the EP to 
retire from politics altogether. The paper, however, argues that two further types of 
MEPs can be identified namely the former domestic politicians who pursue an 
active, second political career in the EP and the ‘one-off’ politician who only stays 
in the EP for a short period and has not had a political career before nor has one 
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after. These five types of MEPs capture the vast majority of MEPs under analysis 
in the paper. 
 The paper continues to show that these different types of MEPs participate 
differently in the EP. Analysing behaviour of the EU15 MEPs from the first half of 
the sixth EP (2004-2009), the paper finds that those with an interest in pursuing a 
long-term career in the EP are more actively involved in the institution’s work and 
attend more plenary votes than their peers. This paper is different from other 
publications in this area in that it also takes into account the outcome of the 2009 
EP elections and is thereby better able at identifying the actual career paths of the 
politicians.  
The second paper goes a step further by not only looking at the achieved career 
outcomes but also the desired ones. It can be expected that MEPs who have the 
same career ambition will behave in a similar way, regardless of whether they are 
successful in achieving this ambition. This paper focuses specifically on one type 
of MEP: those with a static ambition, seeking to build a career inside the EP. The 
paper, first of all, looks at, based on survey data, whether the expressed ambitions 
of MEPs are in any way a predictor of their future career steps. It turns out that 
those MEPs who have an ambition to still be an MEP in ten years’ time are 
significantly more likely to be successful in achieving that. This shows that MEPs 
do influence their own career paths and are not solely reliant on election outcomes 
and party leadership preferences. The paper then analyses the behaviour of MEPs 
in the seventh EP (2009-2014) not just by looking at those who were successful in 
becoming re-elected but also by looking at the total group of MEPs who stood for 
re-election in the first place, including those who failed to be re-elected. It can be 
argued both groups of candidates have a similar ambition and it would, therefore, 
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be interesting to consider whether, once an MEP has managed to be included on the 
candidate list, participation in the legislative work is found to have an impact on the 
likelihood of success in being re-elected. The paper finds that those who take on 
more rapporteurships during their time in the EP are more likely to become re-
elected. This confirms the idea that those who have the ambition of staying in the 
EP are rewarded if they participate more actively in the institution’s work.  Those 
who do not seek a career at European political level are found to be significantly 
less actively involved in the EP’s work.  
 For the third paper of this thesis, the focus is shifted towards a career path 
that some MEPs pursue but which has not attracted much academic attention to 
date: being a Brussels lobbyist. With the growing importance of the EP in the EU 
policymaking process, it is likely to become more important for lobbying firms to 
employ people with knowledge of the functioning of the EP. Former MEPs would, 
therefore, be very suitable. Studying the revolving door phenomenon has hardly 
ever been done in the EP context while it has been studied in significantly more 
detail in the US. Taking the lessons learned from the US literature, this paper looks 
at those MEPs who become a lobbyist after the 2014 EP election. It finds that 
although the revolving door phenomenon might be less common in relative terms, 
due to the higher turnover rate in the EP, in absolute terms the number of politicians 
becoming a lobbyist is not too dissimilar from the US. The paper considers whether 
new lobbyists used to behave in a different way from their peers when being MEP. 
It finds that neither participating actively in the legislative work nor being in one of 
the key positions in the EP helps an MEP to become a lobbyist. Having been a 
member of a powerful committee as well as having a longer period of experience 
in the EP are much more important predicting factors for finding who becomes a 
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lobbyist after having been an MEP, suggesting that in particular process and content 
knowledge are important for revolving door politicians. To avoid capturing the key 
characteristics of anyone who decides to stay in the ‘Brussels bubble’ after their 
time as MEP (rather than only those of who become a lobbyist), those moving to 
other Brussels-based jobs (e.g. in the European Commission) are analysed 
separately.   
 
Career ambition is not just an exogenous factor that can help to explain the 
career path of an MEP. Ambition is also endogenous as it is subject to, for example, 
the opportunities provided to an MEP which in turn will have an impact on their 
ambition. Ambition is related to realistic expectations and has an influence on the 
goals that an MEP will set. It thereby also changes the career outcomes. Although 
the focus of this thesis is on understanding the relationship between the career paths 
of MEPs and their behaviour in parliament, there are limitations to this study. It is 
easy to draw quick conclusions about the impact that career paths have on 
legislative activity while there are other factors of influence as well which are not 
captured in this thesis. Aspects such as differences in personalities, habits and social 
backgrounds all come into play. These aspects can influence both the career 
decisions that MEPs take as well as the behaviour that they show in the EP. A 
legitimate question can, therefore, be raised whether the conclusions from the 
analysis are about the relationship between an MEP’s career path and their 
behaviour in parliament or whether the analysis actually captures the influence of 
personal characteristics on legislative behaviour. Therefore, it has to be 
acknowledged that linking politicians’ career paths with their behaviour only shows 
that a correlation exists but it does not necessarily prove causality between the two. 
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In an ideal situation, one would control for all the personal variables that come into 
play but as this is not a randomised experiment, this is not possible. Some control 
variables included in the analysis are related to an MEP’s personality and social 
backgrounds, such as member state background, age and gender. However, these 
variables are imperfect and hence no conclusions can be made about causal effects.  
This does however not mean that conducting these analyses is pointless. 
Even without being able to draw firm causal inferences, improving our 
understanding of the relationship between career paths and MEPs’ behaviour is 
important. The contributions made to the literature as explained before are relevant. 
As Black (1972) also found, although the social background of politicians can have 
an impact on career choices, the more near-term background plays a powerful role 
in the political choices that politicians make as well. In fact, Davidson (1969) even 
argued that social background variables provide a scant explanation of legislative 
role-taking while career paths provide a much more insightful explanation about 
legislators’ behaviour.  
All in all, this thesis covers a broad range of issues in the field of the career 
paths of MEPs and their participation in the EP. They cover both pre- and post-EP 
careers, different activities and EP-terms as well as focus in more detail on the 
relationship between career paths and legislative participation for two types of 
MEPs, namely those with an ambition to stay in the EP and those who become a 
lobbyist after their time in parliament. The findings lead to the conclusion that 
career paths and ambitions are a relevant factor to take into consideration when 
studying the activities of MEPs as they need to make strategic decisions about how 
to allocate resources. Career paths will not be the only factor influencing these 
decisions but should not be ignored in future studies on the activities of MEPs.  
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The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: chapters two, three and 
four present the three papers described earlier in this introduction. Chapter five 
summarises the key findings and contributions of this thesis, both from a theoretical 
and an empirical point of view. It also sets out the key regularities found in the three 
papers. Chapter five also discusses the importance of studying the interaction 
between career paths and behaviour and elaborates on the implications for the EP 
and the external validity of the findings. The thesis is concluded by making some 
recommendations for future research in this area. 
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2 
2. The impact of career paths on 
MEPs’ activities 
 
Abstract 
The increasing powers of the European Parliament in recent decades have made it 
a more attractive institution for ambitious politicians who are keen to build their 
political career in the EU’s multi-level system. A key contribution to the debate 
about the career paths of MEPs is made by Scarrow (1997). Her work, which 
identiﬁed three different career paths taken by MEPs, has been widely cited and 
used as a basis for other studies on this topic. Building on Scarrow’s work, this 
paper describes two additional categories of MEPs – former national politicians and 
‘one-off’ MEPs – and links MEPs’ careers with their activities in parliament. It 
ﬁnds that over and above the factors that have previously been identiﬁed as 
inﬂuential on an MEP’s behaviour, his or her career path and ambitions are relevant 
in explaining certain legislative behaviour across member states and party groups. 
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2.1.  Introduction  
Politicians are not only focused on reaching desired policy outcomes but they also 
consider how their legislative participation can enhance their individual career 
ambitions. In Ambitions and Politics, Schlesinger (1966) observed that politicians 
change their behaviour in accordance with their career ambitions. Politicians are 
not only interested in serving the needs of their current constituents but are also 
forward-looking in identifying the constituents that they would like to serve in the 
future. A multi-level governance system, such as the EU, provides an interesting 
laboratory for examining politicians’ ambitions.  
The new powers granted to the European Parliament (EP) from the 
Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s placed MEPs on an equal footing with the 
Council in most policy areas, making the EP a more attractive institution for 
ambitious career politicians. MEPs can be at very different stages of their career 
when they enter the EP. This has also changed over time. At the beginning of the 
1980s, many MEPs had political experience at the national level, something that 
was less the case in the 1990s (Beauvallet and Michon, 2010). A key contribution 
to the debate about the career paths of MEPs is made by Scarrow (1997). Her work, 
in which she focuses on how EP membership ﬁts into the political career paths of 
MEPs, has been widely cited and used as a basis for other studies on this topic. 
Scarrow captures the different types of career paths in three categories: (1) the 
young ‘stepping-stone’ politicians aiming for a career in domestic politics; (2) the 
long-term ‘EP careerists’; and (3) the short-term MEPs close to retirement or 
looking for a career outside politics.  
Building on Scarrow’s work, and that of those who have followed her, this 
paper considers whether Scarrow’s approach of using a politician’s career 
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background as an indicator for predicting future career ambitions is sufﬁcient. It is 
likely that a politician’s career background, combined with age, does not provide 
enough information to identify all the different career trajectories of MEPs. Adding 
observed behaviour to the analysis should improve our understanding of a 
politician’s career ambitions. It is argued that linking past experience with observed 
behaviour and career ambitions identiﬁes two other categories of MEPs in addition 
to the three already described by Scarrow and would improve our understanding of 
MEPs’ different career ambitions. The ﬁrst new category is of MEPs who have 
already had a political career at the national level but are not close to retirement. 
Because of the increase in powers of the EP over the past few decades, building a 
career in the EP has become an interesting alternative option for these politicians. 
The second new category is of ‘one-off’ MEPs who only stay in the EP for a short 
period of time. They have no political experience, nor do they pursue political 
experience after their time in the EP. This category covers a range of different 
proﬁles, for example, party loyalists who have been rewarded by their national party 
or non-political public ﬁgures. It may also include politicians who were expected 
to be promising candidates but turn out to be poor-quality politicians.  
As Hall (1996) argues for the representatives in the US Congress, 
parliamentarians face two decisions on every issue that comes up: which position 
to take and how active to be. This paper will examine whether the career paths of 
MEPs can explain their level of legislative activity and whether using observed 
behaviour can provide a better indication of career ambition than considering past 
experience alone. For this paper, an original dataset is used which includes data of 
MEPs who were active in the ﬁrst half of the sixth EP (2004-2007). The impact on 
the behaviour of the different types of MEPs is analysed in a number of OLS 
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regression models where certain types of activities were included as dependent 
variables. The empirical ﬁndings broadly conﬁrm the existence of different types 
of MEPs, and their associated career trajectories in the multi-level EU context. 
Those MEPs interested in developing a career in the EP are generally more active, 
in particular in those areas which ﬁt within their career paths. MEPs who are not 
aiming for – or are not able to secure – a long-term career in the EP focus their 
activities on other areas, some of which are probably outside the EP. This is in line 
with Schlesinger’s ﬁnding of politicians who change their behaviour in accordance 
with their career ambitions.  
The career paths of MEPs are relevant to their level of engagement and 
should not be ignored in future studies on their activities. The analysis in this paper 
shows that there are types of MEPs that can be identiﬁed across countries and across 
party groups and that this explains an MEP’s behaviour in certain situations. 
Therefore, over and above these factors of inﬂuence that have already been 
identiﬁed to have an impact on the legislative activity of an MEP and the ambition 
they demonstrate, career paths are a further relevant factor that should be taken into 
account. This paper shows that combining past career activities with observed 
activity in parliament leads to better predictions about a politician’s career 
ambitions than looking at someone’s career background in combination with age 
alone.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, existing literature on political ambition 
theory and the career paths of MEPs is discussed, and why the categorisation 
developed by Scarrow should be expanded is explained. Second, the link is made 
with the activities of MEPs, and hypotheses are put forward which set out the 
possible expected differences in activities between the different types of MEPs. 
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After an explanation of the variables’ operationalisation, the empirical results are 
presented and discussed. 
 
2.2.  Different types of MEPs and their levels of activity 
In contemporary politics, where becoming a politician is considered to be a 
profession in itself, it is important to understand the career ambitions of politicians. 
Career politicians not only focus on policies that aim to beneﬁt society; they also 
consider how their legislative participation can enhance their individual ambitions. 
It can be expected that politicians adjust their behaviour to increase their chances 
of being promoted to their preferred political position. Some politicians will look 
to move to a higher political ofﬁce whereas others wish to pursue a career in the 
legislature they are currently in, or leave politics altogether. These career ambitions 
are expected to impact the choices politicians make in their current position. 
Schlesinger (1966), in one of the ﬁrst comprehensive attempts to study political 
career ambitions, identiﬁed that political ambitions can manifest themselves in three 
different forms: discrete, static and progressive. Discretely ambitious politicians 
only seek to be in ofﬁce for a limited period of time, whereas politicians with static 
ambitions aim to stay in ofﬁce for as long as possible. The third category of 
progressive politicians describes those who seek to obtain a higher political ofﬁce.  
Careers inﬂuence the way politicians behave and participate; a key incentive 
here is the desire to become re-elected. Politicians aiming to be re-elected, or 
elected to a different ofﬁce, can be expected to direct their activities towards 
achieving that goal. Hibbing (1986) showed for example that members of the House 
of Representatives alter their voting behaviour in line with the constituency that 
they hope to serve in the future. Russo (2011) identiﬁed that re-election incentives 
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can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the behaviour of MPs in the Italian Parliament. 
He found that seeking re-election, either as a constituency MP or as a local 
politician, incentivises parliamentarians to engage in constituency service. 
Concerns of re-election have an impact on politicians’ activities, as is also shown 
by Bernecker (2014) in his analysis of activities of MPs in the German Bundestag, 
where he found that MPs from opposition parties competing in marginal seats are 
signiﬁcantly more active in parliament than colleagues who are more secure of 
keeping control of their seat. In the UK context, Allen (2012) proved that the 
political experience obtained by a politician prior to becoming an MP can inﬂuence 
his behaviour once elected and impact his future career trajectory. This shows that 
re-election, or election to a different ofﬁce, affects the behaviour of politicians in 
the institution in which they are active, which explains the importance of linking 
the different types of politicians to their activities in parliament.  
Schlesinger’s political ambition theory has been widely applied in the US 
(see e.g. Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979; Hibbing, 1986), but less so in the EU context, 
while its multi-level governance system provides an interesting opportunity to 
consider political career ambitions (Borchert and Stolz, 2011b). In the EU, national 
political ofﬁce is still considered to be the highest political ofﬁce and elections to 
the EP are therefore still seen as ‘second-order’ (Hix and Marsh, 2011). However, 
for professional politicians, the creation and the development of the EP has 
provided new career opportunities and various ways of moving between territorial 
levels have become possible (Borchert and Stolz, 2011b). It can be assumed that in 
this multi-level setup, politicians optimise their behaviour in pursuit of their career 
goals.  
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Scarrow (1997) studied the political experience and career paths of MEPs 
from the four countries with the largest delegations in the EP (France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK). She considered MEPs’ previous elective ofﬁce experience, both 
at the national and subnational level, and identiﬁed three different categories. First 
are a group of MEPs who use their EP membership as a stepping-stone towards 
election to national political ofﬁce. Second are a group of MEPs who are committed 
to their European role for longer, which she calls the ‘European careerists’. Third 
are a group of MEPs who stay in the EP for only a short space of time following 
retirement from national elected ofﬁce, or who use their brief EP membership as a 
stepping-stone towards a position in non-elective public ofﬁce or in the private 
sector. The direct election of the EP and its increase in powers has made this 
institution an interesting career opportunity for politicians. It has been argued that, 
for a growing number of actors, the EP provides for a route to political 
professionalisation and development (Scarrow, 1997; Stolz, 2001). Evidence 
suggests that it is indeed the case that more and more MEPs build a career in the 
EP (Whitaker, 2014) and develop as an elite with a European political career 
(Verzichelli and Edinger, 2005).  
Scarrow has not been the only contributor to the academic literature on 
MEPs’ career paths. Apart from more descriptive information about the background 
of MEPs which is available in some textbooks (e.g. Corbett et al., 2011), a limited 
group of scholars has focused in more detail on EP candidates’ experience in 
national or regional politics, or MEPs’ post-EP careers (e.g. Beauvallet and Michon, 
2010; Hobolt and Høyland, 2011; Meserve et al., 2009a and b; Gherghina and 
Chiru, 2010; Hix et al., 2012). The overall number of studies on the career paths 
and ambitions of MEPs covering pre- and post-EP positions is, however, small, in 
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particular in comparison with the number of studies available on US Congressmen’s 
career paths. For those studies which are available, Scarrow’s categorisation is often 
still, at the very least, a point of reference. An example of the application of 
Scarrow’s categorisation is that by Poguntke et al. (2007), who use Scarrow’s 
typology to describe the development of a distinctive EP career path and the impact 
that such a path might have on national parties’ policy positioning. In Hix et al. 
(2003) too – which takes stock of 50 years of research on the EP – Scarrow is the 
main author mentioned in the context of MEPs’ career paths. Given that Scarrow’s 
work dates back 20 years, it is important to assess the extent to which her work is 
still applicable or needs to be updated. It can be questioned whether a politician’s 
career background, combined with age, is a sufﬁcient indicator of future career 
ambition and provides enough information to identify all the different career 
trajectories of MEPs. Analysing career background and its effect on observed 
behaviour could provide better explanations and predictions about a politician’s 
career ambitions. This paper aims to connect the career paths of MEPs with 
observed behaviour in order to reach more credible conclusions about the different 
career ambitions that politicians demonstrate.  
In this paper, it is argued that the expansion of the EP’s powers has attracted 
a new type of politician. These are politicians who have already had a career at the 
national level, either as an MP or a member of the government, whose political life 
at the national level has come to an end. For these politicians, a career in the EP has 
now become an interesting alternative. It could be argued that these MEPs simply 
become EP careerists, as already described by Scarrow. However, there are a few 
reasons why these two categories are distinct from each other. An MEP with a 
previous domestic political career can be expected to have closer connections with 
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the national party and have a greater network of politicians who are still active in 
domestic politics. Given the importance of inter-institutional connections, for 
example with the Council (Høyland, 2006), an MEP with a domestic political 
background might be better positioned to take on certain rapporteurships which 
could enhance his ability to build a career in the EP compared with an EP careerist. 
MEPs with a domestic political background are more likely to enter at a higher level 
in the EP, with a better chance of obtaining high-proﬁle rapporteurships or senior 
positions. National experience means that a politician has already proven his 
qualities. This is likely to give these politicians an advantage over EP careerists. 
It is also thought that the category of retiring politicians and those who are 
MEPs for only a short period of time, as described in Scarrow’s analysis, in fact, 
encompasses two different types of MEPs who behave differently and have 
different career ambitions. This category should, therefore, be split into two: one 
for EP retirees and another for MEPs who are elected for a short period of time and 
who are not career politicians – a category which could be referred to as ‘one-off’ 
MEPs. This type of MEP does not typically have a domestic political career either 
before or after his time in the EP, and typically stays in the EP for two terms at 
most. It is important to separate this new category of ‘one-off’ MEPs from the 
retiring MEPs, as these two groups have very different interests in participating in 
the EP’s work. The former group includes party loyalists who have been rewarded 
by their party with one or two terms in the EP for service to the party, but who do 
not pursue a political career there. It also includes MEPs who are public ﬁgures 
outside of politics and who are able to appeal to certain parts of the electorate. 
Finally, this category also includes MEPs who turn out to be poor-quality politicians 
and who are deemed unﬁt for a political career at either the European or domestic 
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political level. For this last group of ‘one-off’ MEPs, their ambition might never be 
truly revealed, as they are considered to be poor-quality politicians. It must be 
admitted that this category is difﬁcult to operationalise and may consist of further 
subcategories. This category is heterogeneous, which makes it difﬁcult to develop 
a theoretical expectation. The results of any analysis of this category will, therefore, 
need to be interpreted with caution, as the theoretical expectations for this group 
can be multiple. However, the fact that the ‘one-off’ MEPs have very different 
backgrounds, as well as very different career ambitions from the retiring MEPs, has 
an impact on the activities they are expected to demonstrate and justiﬁes their 
existence as a distinct category. 
This paper will test whether the different types of MEPs show different 
levels of activity in the EP. The activities and participation of MEPs can be 
measured in many different ways.  In his study of the US Congress, Hall (1996) 
identiﬁed two modes of legislative participation of Congressmen: formal and 
informal. Much of MEPs’ work takes place in formal committees and the plenary, 
while informal work often takes place behind the scenes without any ofﬁcial note-
taking. Formal participation can, however, often be seen as a good indicator of who 
has participated behind the scenes (Hall, 1996). An MEP who takes up a 
rapporteurship can be expected to spend considerable time not only on drafting a 
report but also on talking to EP colleagues, other EU institutions and lobbyists. The 
formal participation of a rapporteur is thereby an indication of considerable 
informal participation as well.  
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2.3.  Hypotheses 
As discussed, one could expect that different types of MEPs would display different 
levels of activity, as they are at different stages of their career, are of different ages 
and have different work experience and career goals. For the ﬁrst type, the young 
and inexperienced MEPs, it could be expected that they would try to use their time 
in the EP as a training period for a career in domestic politics and to build up a 
proﬁle for the national party leadership. They could, therefore, be expected to be 
less actively involved in the detailed legislative work of the EP, but rather to spend 
a considerable amount of time with the national party and their constituency. This 
lower level of activity by young and inexperienced politicians was also found by 
Bailer and Ohmura (2013) in their analysis of the German Bundestag, where they 
showed that young politicians had lower levels of activity at the beginning of their 
political career than the average Member of the Bundestag: 
H1: Young, stepping-stone MEPs participate less actively in the EP’s 
legislative work  
 
For the second type, the MEPs who are close to retirement, it could be 
expected that, although they have domestic political experience, they are in the 
process of winding down their political life, and this should be noticeable in their 
activities. It could be expected that these MEPs have little or no interest in engaging 
actively in the day-to-day work of the parliament in terms of tabling motions, asking 
questions or writing reports. The effect was found elsewhere as well, for example 
in the German Bundestag (Bailer and Ohmura, 2013): 
H2: Retiring MEPs participate less actively in the EP’s legislative work 
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The EP careerists, the third type of MEP, are on the other hand focused on 
a long-term career in the EP and could be expected to be particularly keen to 
develop good relationships with the EP and European party group (EPG) 
leadership. They would, therefore, be expected to participate actively in the 
parliament’s work. The idea that politicians who are members of a legislature for 
longer are more actively involved in the institution’s work is also found at national-
level legislatures, for example in Poland, where experienced MPs are more deeply 
involved in the legislative process than newcomers (Shabad and Slomczynski, 
2002): 
H3: EP careerists participate more actively in the EP’s legislative work 
 
For the fourth type of MEP, the new category of politicians with national 
experience who are looking to build a career in the EP, it could be expected that 
they would show levels of active engagement similar to those of the EP careerists. 
However, they are likely to enter at a higher level, given their national experience, 
and are more easily able to build up a senior proﬁle in the EP relatively quickly than 
are the EP careerists. This should help them in obtaining, for example, relevant 
rapporteurship positions, while not necessarily displaying the same level of effort 
in being involved in the day-to-day work of the EP (e.g. attending plenary voting 
sessions) as EP careerists do. This fourth type of MEP is more likely to acquire 
certain privileges early on.  
H4: Former national politicians participate more actively in the EP’s 
legislative work, particularly through obtaining senior roles in the 
parliament 
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The ﬁfth type of MEP, those who only stay in the EP for a relatively short 
period and who are not career politicians, could be expected to have limited interest 
in or capability for impressing the political leadership of either their national party 
or EPG. They would therefore not show signiﬁcant levels of activity or involvement 
in the parliament’s work.  
This group, for example, includes those who were thought to be ‘good 
quality’ politicians, but who turn out to be of poor quality. The national party 
leadership has given them the opportunity to start their political career in the EP 
arena, possibly with the prospect of moving to a different political role later on. 
During the course of their (short) time in the EP it however turns out that they are 
not suitable for the political profession and it is decided to not let them run for re-
election. It is unlikely that the EPG leadership will give them responsibilities 
through, for example, rapporteurship positions on key files. They will also not be 
able to move to committee chair positions. These poor-quality MEPs might 
however still show activity levels similar to national or EP careerists in areas over 
which they have complete control and for which they do not need support from their 
political leadership, such as attending plenary sessions. 
Another example of the one-off MEP category are those MEPs who have a 
small set of policy objectives that they want to achieve as an MEP. They might have 
been public activists outside of politics. They are likely to be quite active in the EP 
trying to achieve their policy goal. They are however not interested in pursuing a 
long-term political career and leave politics again after achieving their policy goals 
(or after realising they cannot be achieved).  
Also, this group of one-off MEPs can consist of MEPs who were already 
public figures before being elected to the EP. The national party has included them 
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on the ballot paper to attract more votes from the electorate. These public figures 
might have a policy objective that they want to achieve in the EP but this is not 
necessarily the case and they are unlikely to be interested in pursuing a long-term 
career in the EP or reaching senior positions in the EP.   
Finally, the group of one-off MEPs also includes former party officials who 
have had a non-elective office (e.g. party chairmanship). These officials who have 
contributed to the development of the national party can be rewarded for this by the 
national party by including them on the ballot paper. Again, these former party 
officials do not pursue a long-term career in the EP and do not necessarily have a 
particular policy objective they wish to achieve. They will therefore not be 
particularly active when elected to the EP. 
As becomes clear, this group is heterogeneous and consists of a number of 
subcategories, which makes the development of theoretical expectations difﬁcult. 
It is therefore important that this category is set up as a separate group, distinct from 
the other categories of MEPs. Although desirable, breaking up this category further 
into subcategories would be very complicated and an analysis of the MEPs’ 
characteristics at such individual level would go beyond the scope of this paper.  
H5: One-off MEPs participate less actively in the EP’s legislative work in 
areas where they are dependent upon the political leadership in the 
parliament 
 
MEPs’ activity levels are, however, unlikely to be explained by their career 
trajectory alone, and other factors should therefore also be taken into account by 
including them as control variables in the analyses; these are mentioned in the 
operationalisation section of this paper. Finally, the committee to which an MEP 
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belongs could also be expected to have an impact on the level of that MEP’s 
legislative activity. For instance, members of a more powerful committee which 
can have a signiﬁcant impact on policy outcomes could be expected to be more 
active than those working on committees whose work has hardly any inﬂuence on 
legislation. 
 
2.4.  Operationalisation 
The assertions set out above are tested in this paper by means of a new dataset 
covering those MEPs who served the full period of the ﬁrst half of the sixth EP from 
July 2004 to January 2007, which compiles information on the member states that 
MEPs represent and on the characteristics and career paths of the individual MEPs. 
The sixth EP was selected as it is one of the most recent parliaments on which 
sufﬁcient data about post-EP careers could be collected at the start of this study. 
The EU15, rather than the EU25, was selected, as the MEPs from the ten accession 
states in 2004 had not been able to develop certain career paths and would, 
therefore, distort the analysis. The population size of the member state an MEP 
represents is included in the dataset in millions of inhabitants in 2004; this 
information was obtained from Eurostat. The ﬁrst half of the sixth EP was selected 
(rather than the full sixth EP) as a number of MEPs normally move to a different 
committee halfway through an EP term. As this could lead to a drop in perceived 
activity (e.g. these MEPs joining a new committee are not likely to table motions 
straight away), it was decided to focus on the ﬁrst half of the sixth EP to avoid a 
distortion of the data on this point. Data on committee membership was obtained 
from the EP website; the classiﬁcation of EP committees as more or less powerful 
was devised by Yordanova (2009). Information about gender, age and national 
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party of the MEPs, as well as their number of days in parliament, was obtained from 
online sources such as the EP and MEPs’ personal and national party websites.  
The dataset also includes information on how many MEPs are from the same 
national party and whether the national party is represented in the Council. This 
information came from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2015). Bigger 
groups in the EP could dominate the work as they are better resourced and better 
able to spread the workload among their members. Therefore, the dataset includes 
information about the size of the national party and EPG of an MEP. Data on 
whether the national party is represented in the Council is included as well, as 
Høyland (2006) found that this could have an impact on an MEP’s activity level in 
the form of rapporteurships obtained. The analysis does not include further data on 
political parties, such as their ideological positioning, although by including the 
EPGs as control variables these effects are indirectly captured in the analyses. The 
MEP-speciﬁc variables focus in particular on parliamentarians’ professional 
backgrounds. Information on MEPs’ career paths was sourced from the EP website, 
MEPs’ personal websites and, in some cases, interviews given by MEPs in national 
and international media. This includes information about the careers of MEPs 
before the 2004 elections and after the 2009 elections. Career paths were coded by 
indicating whether an MEP had had a national political career as MP, senator, 
minister or Prime Minister. Whether MEPs had had careers outside of politics, for 
example as doctors, engineers or education professionals, was also recorded. The 
data used in this paper’s analyses does not cover whether an MEP has been a local 
or regional politician, even though politicians who were active at these levels might 
have developed experience similar to those active at the national political level. 
Based on Schlesinger’s assumptions about progressive career ambitions and the fact 
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that the national political ofﬁce is still considered to be the highest political ofﬁce, 
it is assumed that the regional political level is not the main level competing with 
the European one. It might, however, be the case that career patterns at the European 
level are similar to those at a regional level. Further research should be conducted 
to establish whether this is the case. The ﬁve types of MEPs described above were 
constructed using career background information. For the ﬁrst type, the young 
‘stepping-stone’ politicians, a dummy variable was created, with all those MEPs 
under the age of 41 and no previous domestic political career being selected. They 
also all had a career in national politics after the 2009 EP election. The second type 
of MEPs, the ‘retirees’, are all those MEPs over the age of 60 who had a career in 
domestic politics prior to their election as an MEP. The EP careerists, the third type, 
were selected by considering those with no previous domestic career who served at 
least two terms in the EP and who are now either in their third term or had been an 
MEP since 1999 and were re-elected in the 2009 EP elections (i.e. having started 
their third term in 2009). The new, fourth, category of MEPs of former national 
politicians was selected as those between 40 and 55 years old with a previous career 
in domestic politics, or between 55 and 59 years old with national political 
experience and more than one term in the EP (in order to distinguish them from the 
EP retirees). The other, newly identiﬁed, category of ‘one-off’ MEPs was selected 
by taking those MEPs who did not have a political career at the national level or at 
the EP level prior to 1999. MEPs in this category also did not become re-elected to 
the EP in 2009 and did not embark on a senior domestic political career after their 
time in the EP (i.e. they were active in politics for a maximum of two EP terms). 
Theoretically there could have been an overlap between the young MEPs and the 
EP careerist. This would only be the case for MEPs who had been elected to the EP 
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in the 1994 election and had a national career after the 2009 election while still 
being under the age of 41. This means that this MEP would have been elected in 
1994 at the age of maximum 25. The data did however not contain such overlapping 
cases. The remaining group, that of MEPs whose career path could not yet be 
identiﬁed, was omitted from the empirical analysis in order to avoid distortion of 
the data. This leaves 433 out of the 539 MEPs from the dataset included in the 
analysis. 
MEPs’ levels of activity can be measured in a number of different ways; the 
data for this was provided by Votewatch.eu. Attendance rates are based on 
attending roll-call votes in plenary. The simple use of roll-call votes for studying 
the behaviour of MEPs has previously been criticised (see Carrubba et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, it can be expected to provide a solid indication of how often MEPs 
attend the plenary, as roll-call votes are used in around one-third of all votes (Hix 
et al., 2007). Two other measures of activity which are used in this paper are the 
number of reports amended and the number of motions tabled. These three 
measures of activity are included in the analyses as continuous dependent variables. 
These measures of activity were selected as they provide an indication of 
the overall level of activity in the parliament. They are similar to the 
operationalisation of ‘activity’ as used elsewhere (e.g. Bailer and Ohmura, 2013). 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that these measures are not exhaustive, given the wide 
range of activities in which MEPs can be involved (Corbett et al., 2011). However, 
as attendance at plenaries and motions indicates activities in the plenary and the 
number of reports amended indicate how active an MEP is in his committee, the 
three measures selected should provide a realistic indication of an MEP’s overall 
level of participation in the EP’s work. Attendance in plenary has also been found 
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to be a predictor of the allocation of rapporteurships in committees (Yoshinaka et 
al., 2010) so these three types of activity should provide a reasonable indication of 
the dependent variable ’activity’ overall that is used in this paper. 
 
2.5.  Empirical analysis 
In this section, we consider the empirical ﬁndings of the analyses conducted. Table 
seven shows the impact of the different types of MEPs on their attendance rates in 
plenary roll-call votes. Column one in the table shows a basic model of the impact 
of some variables, such as gender and age, on the attendance of MEPs. Here, it 
seems that both the population size of the Member State that an MEP represents 
and the size of the EPG he or she belongs to should have an effect on attendance 
rates. The explanatory power of this model is, however, limited. The question 
therefore arises how much this basic model can be improved by adding more 
information about the different types of MEPs. These effects are shown in column 
two, where the retiring MEP is left out as the baseline variable. It was decided to 
use the group of retiring MEPs as the baseline variable as it is generally expected 
that these MEPs will be the least active. Table seven shows that adding the different 
types of MEPs as well as the other control variables to the basic model signiﬁcantly 
improves the explanatory power of the model. In this analysis, it is shown that EP 
careerists, former national politicians and one-off MEPs attend signiﬁcantly more 
plenary votes than their colleagues. In particular, EP careerists attend more votes, 
with attendance rates nearly ten percent higher, which equals to about one week per 
year in Strasbourg. Young MEPs do not attend signiﬁcantly more votes than retiring 
MEPs from the baseline category and seem to be less active in this respect than 
colleagues from the above-mentioned categories. 
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6Table eight shows the same set-up as for the analysis testing the attendance 
rate. In this table, the number of reports amended in the committee is used as the 
dependent variable and analysed in order to assess MEPs’ committee activity, 
which constitutes an important part of parliamentary work. The basic model in 
column one shows that gender, age and population size have a signiﬁcant impact 
                                                          
6 Other variables were controlled for. These include models where data on the member state, EPG 
and national party size was included and whether the national party was represented in government 
and thereby in the Council (see Appendix) 
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on the number of reports amended. On average, men amended nearly ﬁve fewer 
reports over the period 2004-2007 than women. MEPs from bigger member states 
are also less likely to amend reports. Including the different types of MEPs and 
other control variables in the analyses again improves the explanatory power of the 
basic model. It ﬁnds that MEPs who do not have a long-term career in the EP are 
more likely to submit amendments to reports than MEPs who do pursue a career in 
the EP, such as the EP careerists and the former national politicians. Young MEPs 
and one-off MEPs on average submit amendments to around three to four more 
reports than their peers. This could be explained by the fact that the MEPs pursuing 
a career in the EP are possibly more often the rapporteurs themselves. They would 
therefore logically be less likely to submit amendments to reports. With regard to 
the other variables included in the analysis, it is interesting to note that an MEP who 
is a member of a powerful committee will submit amendments to a signiﬁcantly 
higher number of reports. An MEP who is a member of a powerful committee 
amends at least two reports more than colleagues who are members of less powerful 
committees. This could be explained by the fact that for MEPs on a more powerful 
committee, amending a report has an actual impact on policy outcomes. For this 
type of activity, it seems therefore that it is not only the type of MEP that can go 
some way to explaining the variance, but also the inﬂuence that a committee has on 
policy decisions. 
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7The third type of activity analysed here is the number of motions tabled by 
an MEP. Again, the basic model, which only ﬁnds EPG size to be of signiﬁcant 
impact on the number of motions tabled, is signiﬁcantly improved by adding the 
MEP types and other control variables. It ﬁnds that EP careerists are much more 
active in this type of activity than their peers, with around seven motions more 
                                                          
7 Other variables were controlled for. These include models where data on the member state, EPG 
and national party size was included and whether the national party was represented in government 
and thereby in the Council (see Appendix) 
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tabled in the period analysed. The young MEPs, former national politicians and 
one-off MEPs do not show a signiﬁcantly high number of motions tabled in 
parliament. The dominance of EP careerists in this type of activity could be 
explained by the fact that this group try to make themselves more visible among the 
party and parliament leadership in order to promote the development of their career 
in the EP. Young, retiring and one-off MEPs have much less interest in doing so. 
Former national politicians could also be expected to show similar levels of activity 
as EP careerists but, as discussed above, they are likely to face less pressure to be 
visible as they have already proved their qualities as national politicians. Another 
interesting and signiﬁcant effect found here is the number of motions tabled by 
members of a powerful committee. MEPs who are members of a powerful 
committee table signiﬁcantly fewer motions than their colleagues; around eleven 
fewer in the period 2004-2007. This could be explained by the fact that these MEPs 
are able to achieve their policy aims by inﬂuencing the relevant legislation directly 
through rapporteurships or by tabling amendments (as is shown in table eight), 
whereas MEPs from less powerful committees need to table motions to be heard 
(table nine). 
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2.6.  Discussion8 
The empirical ﬁndings broadly conﬁrm the expectations about different MEPs’ 
career ambitions and activities. Young and inexperienced MEPs who, after a short 
period of time in the EP, pursue a career in domestic politics were not expected to 
be interested in getting overly involved in the work of the EP. The relatively lower 
                                                          
8 Other variables were controlled for. These include models where data on the member state, EPG 
and national party size was included and whether the national party was represented in government 
and thereby in the Council (see Appendix) 
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attendance rate, as well as the limited number of motions tabled in parliament, 
conﬁrm these expectations. The only type of activity they seem to be more active 
than many of their peers is submitting amendments to reports. This could be 
explained by the fact that these stepping-stone MEPs are less likely to be able to 
obtain rapporteurships, and therefore tabling amendments to reports is their main 
way of seeking to inﬂuence legislation. It could also be that this is a way by which 
they can at least show their national party leadership that they are able to conduct 
some of the parliamentary work that will also be required at the national level, even 
though submitting amendments is not as signiﬁcant as obtaining a rapporteurship 
position. 
 The EP careerists are very active in the EP’s work. They attend more plenary 
votes than any of the other types of MEPs and also table more motions than any of 
their colleagues. By doing this, these static career-ambitious politicians want to 
make themselves visible to their EPG leadership, who decide about the prospects 
for developing a career in the EP. The fact that EP careerists table fewer 
amendments to reports could be because they are more often the rapporteurs 
themselves – also given that higher plenary attendance rates are associated with 
more rapporteurships (Yoshinaka et al., 2010) – but this assumption needs to be 
conﬁrmed by further research.  
The former domestic politicians, who have had a senior career in domestic 
politics and thereafter look to build a career in the EP – which makes them distinct 
from retiring MEPs – are overall also found to be more active in the EP’s work than 
many of their colleagues. They attend slightly fewer plenary meetings and table 
fewer motions than the EP careerists, though. They probably face less pressure to 
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conduct a lot of the groundwork, such as tabling motions, as they have proved their 
qualities in the national political arena.  
The one-off MEPs are found to be more active than would actually be 
expected from these discrete career-ambitious politicians. However, they turn out 
to be active in areas which do not require signiﬁcant qualities or previous political 
experience, such as attending plenary voting sessions and tabling amendments to 
reports; the latter can be expected to require less political ‘quality’ than being a 
rapporteur. This would conﬁrm the idea that the one-off MEP category is composed 
of people who turn out to be of lower quality or ambition. Given the heterogeneous 
nature of this group, these ﬁndings need to be interpreted with caution.  
Overall the career ambitions of the different types of MEPs seem to be 
broadly conﬁrmed by their observed behaviour. Those MEPs pursuing a career in 
the EP are generally active, in particular in those areas which ﬁt with their career 
ambitions. MEPs who are not aiming for, or able to get, a long-term career in the 
EP focus their activities on other areas, some of which are probably outside the EP. 
 
2.7.  Conclusion 
Politicians change their behaviour in accordance with their career ambitions 
(Schlesinger, 1966) and the EU provides an interesting multi-level context to study 
politicians’ career ambitions and legislative behaviour. Even though the national 
political level in the EU can still be considered to be the ‘highest’ political ofﬁce, 
the gradual expansion of powers of the European Parliament has provided career 
politicians with an interesting additional opportunity to pursue a political career. 
MEPs are at a wide variety of different stages in their career when they enter the 
EP. Some have only just started their political career, whereas others are about to 
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retire after serving many years in politics. A key contribution to the study of the 
career paths of MEPs is that of Scarrow (1997), who identiﬁed three types of MEPs. 
The techniques used by Scarrow and others to identify career paths mainly look at 
the past experience of MEPs in combination with age, from which they claim to be 
able to identify a future career trajectory of politicians, for example as a national or 
a retiring politician. It can be questioned whether Scarrow’s approach of basing a 
politician’s career ambitions on their career background is sufﬁcient. Analysing 
career background and its effect on observed behaviour could provide a better 
explanation and prediction of someone’s career ambitions. Scarrow’s 
categorisation is limited in scope and does not seem to cover the full range of career 
paths and ambitions present in the EP. 
A new type of MEP that seems to have emerged is that of politicians who 
previously had a senior domestic political career and decided to pursue a further 
career at European level. These MEPs do not move to the EP arena in order to 
bridge the gap between the domestic career and retirement but are looking to build 
a truly European career. Another group of MEPs that can be identiﬁed is what one 
might call ‘one-off’ MEPs. This is a group of MEPs who are not career politicians 
and who do not have a domestic or European career in politics either before or after 
their time in the EP, either because they are not interested or because they lack 
quality. They usually stay in the EP for only a short period of time and do not build 
a political career. This group is however heterogeneous in nature and its ﬁndings 
need to be interpreted with caution. Further analysis on this speciﬁc group in future 
studies would be recommended.  
It could be expected that MEPs who are in different stages of their career, 
and who therefore have different levels of experience and career goals, show 
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different levels of activity in the EP. This paper has, within the broader framework 
of political career ambitions in multi-level systems, built on Scarrow’s work and 
shown that over and above the factors that have already previously been identiﬁed 
to have an inﬂuence on an MEP’s behaviour, such as member state of origin and 
EPG membership, the career path of an MEP can be a relevant factor in explaining 
certain legislative behaviour across member states and party groups. Those MEPs 
interested in developing a career in the EP are overall found to be more active, 
particularly in the key areas of the EP’s work, whereas those who only stay in the 
EP for a short period of time are either less active or active in areas of less 
importance. Other control variables were included in the analyses which showed 
that membership of a powerful legislative committee also makes MEPs 
signiﬁcantly more likely to be actively involved in tabling amendments to 
legislative reports than their colleagues who sit on less powerful committees. MEPs 
on powerful committees are, however, less actively involved in tabling motions.  
The ﬁndings presented in this paper could be of relevance beyond the EP 
and have broader implications for our understanding of politicians’ career 
ambitions and their legislative behaviour in a multi-level system. The different 
types of careers found in this paper can be used when studying other political levels, 
for example national or regional. This paper also gives an insight into how 
legislative careers of politicians can change when the balance of power between 
different levels of government changes. When a particular level of government 
becomes more powerful, it creates new, interesting career opportunities for 
politicians. A similar effect could possibly be found at regional levels in the case of 
decentralisation.  
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The conclusions reached in this paper provide a number of suggestions for 
further research. First, it would be interesting to see whether MEPs from the EU 
member states that joined in the past ten years are developing the same or different 
career patterns and ambitions as described in this paper and whether the analyses 
could be repeated for other EPs. Second, the dependent variable in this paper of 
‘activity’ could be strengthened by testing other types of activities (e.g. 
rapporteurships and questions asked) in future research. Third, to extend the 
analysis from this paper beyond the EP, it could be considered whether the different 
types of politicians as described here are also present in other ‘second-order’ 
legislative institutions such as regional parliaments. Finally, the basic models in the 
analyses include population size and the size of the EPG as control variables. In 
further research, it would be interesting to analyse whether differences in the types 
of MEPs can be found between member states and political groups. 
As Scarrow has also previously shown, MEPs’ career paths are relevant and 
differ between member states, and should not be ignored in future studies on the 
activities of MEPs. The analysis in this paper shows that, across countries and party 
groups, it is possible to identify types of MEPs with different backgrounds and 
career ambitions, which can in certain situations explain an MEP’s behaviour. 
Therefore, over and above these factors of inﬂuence that have already been 
acknowledged to have an impact on an MEP’s activities in the EP, career paths are 
a further relevant factor to be taken into account when studying the legislative 
behaviour of MEPs.
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3 
3. Static ambition in the 
European Parliament – a multi-
level analysis of the career 
ambitions of MEPs 
 
Abstract 
The European Parliament has grown to become one of the key institutional players 
in the EU legislative process. This paper looks at the career ambitions of Members 
of the European Parliament and how they need to go about achieving them. 
Applying Schlesinger’s division of static, discrete and progressive career ambitions 
of politicians, the findings suggest that career paths are not solely the result of 
decisions by the national party leadership, but are also the result of expressed 
ambitions by politicians themselves. MEPs looking to pursue a career in the EP are 
more actively involved in the parliament’s activities. This higher level of 
participation and acquired policy influence, in particular through writing legislative 
reports, is rewarded when MEPs stand for re-election. Active participation in the 
EP does not help those looking to move to the national political arena, nor is it 
widespread among those leaving politics altogether.   
106 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Over the past few decades, the European Parliament (EP) has grown to become one 
of the key institutional players in the EU legislative process. Starting as a parliament 
that was initially only consulted in the legislative process, the EP now has co-
decision powers in the majority of European policy areas. Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) have played a key role in the development of the institution. 
Over the years, the EP has attracted a wide range of different types of MEPs, 
varying from young, first-time politicians, to those who use the EP as a place to 
retire from national political life. Turnover in EP membership at each election is 
relatively high (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2011; Whitaker, 2014). Some 
MEPs, however, choose to pursue a career in this European institution and stay on 
for multiple terms, some for longer than 25 years. This paper looks at the 
relationship between career ambitions and legislative participation and whether 
MEPs who show active levels of participation in the legislative work of the 
institution have a higher chance of being able to pursue a career within the EP. As 
has been argued before, participation can be regarded as a pivotal indicator of a 
legislator’s quality, commitment or diligence (Hix, Hobolt and Høyland, 2012). Do 
MEPs who are not seeking re-election or who are looking to move to the national 
political arena behave differently?  
 In recent years, the number of long-term career politicians in the EP has 
appeared to increase. It could be argued that this is a natural consequence of the 
EP’s new powers, which make it a more attractive institution for politicians to work 
for. MEPs working there for longer periods could be a good thing. Tenure is 
associated with securing greater levels of influence over the legislative process 
(Fogarty et al., 2013). Therefore, MEPs with longer tenures can be expected to be 
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in a more powerful position vis-à-vis their peers and the other legislative institutions 
than MEPs with less experience in the EP. Building a longer career in the EP also 
gives politicians the opportunity to develop policy expertise which they can use to 
improve the quality of legislation. Moreover, tenure is correlated with producing 
more legislative amendments and proposals (Hibbing, 1991).  
With the expansion of the EP’s powers, the body of literature on this 
institution has also grown. Although the career paths of MEPs seem to attract 
increasing attention, few researchers have focused on linking these career paths 
with the behaviour in parliament. How should MEPs who hope to stay in the EP 
behave in order to achieve their goals, and does this differ for those looking to move 
to the national political level? Does being active in parliamentary work increases 
the likelihood of being ‘promoted’ to the national level or does it make it more 
likely that the MEP will be given the opportunity to stay longer in the EP? Given 
the above-mentioned benefits of securing a longer tenure in parliament, it is 
important to understand how politicians successfully pursue this ambition, whether 
active involvement is rewarded, and how.  
 This paper analyses the activities of MEPs who were active in the seventh 
EP between 2009-2014. Combining different datasets with new data sources, it is 
possible to analyse the relationship between MEPs’ activities and whether they 
stood for re-election in the 2014 EP elections. The paper also analyses the activities 
of MEPs and whether they were successful in becoming re-elected. Given that 
Europe is a multi-level political system, this paper considers whether politicians 
moved to national politics after the 2014 elections or whether they left politics 
altogether, either to retire or pursue a career elsewhere. A number of additional 
variables which could have an impact on an MEP’s re-election chances were 
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included in the analysis, including the member state and political group background 
of an MEP and the electoral system in which they were elected.  
 It has been found here that an MEP’s own activities do have an influence on 
whether he or she stays in the EP, with MEPs wishing to stay in the EP significantly 
being more actively involved in a number of parliamentary activities, including 
taking on rapporteurships and writing own initiative reports. This higher level of 
participation is also rewarded, as those MEPs who are more actively involved have 
a higher chance in being re-elected than their peers who also stand for re-election 
but who have been less active, in particular when they have been able to influence 
policy by obtaining rapporteurships. MEPs looking to move to national politics are 
found to be less active; a similar pattern to those who are leaving politics altogether.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. First, the ideas of politicians’ career 
ambitions, as developed by Schlesinger (1966) are introduced. This section also 
introduces the available literature on the career paths of MEPs, recognising the 
multi-level context in which European politicians operate. Second, the potential 
factors of influence on an MEP pursuing a career in the EP are discussed; on this 
basis, the hypotheses for the analysis are then developed. Third, the methodology 
and data used in this paper are explained, followed by a discussion of the empirical 
findings and the conclusions.  
 
3.2. Career ambitions in multi-level political systems 
Politician’s career ambitions are both numerous and diverse. Whereas some wish 
to pursue a lifelong career in the institution to which they are elected, others aim 
for a different political office or a career outside of politics. Differences in 
ambitions are likely to influence politicians’ behaviour, as they will consider the 
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impact their legislative participation will have on their career opportunities. Is this 
also the case in the EP? What kind of behaviour do MEPs need to show if they are 
interested in pursuing a career inside this institution? Will their participation matter 
or are MEPs’ career paths purely a result of decisions by the national party 
leadership? Does the national party leadership reward active participation by 
‘promoting’ an MEP to the national level or by increasing their chances of 
becoming re-elected to the EP? Although politicians are likely to say in public that 
their career depends on the outcome of democratic elections, such a thing as 
individual career-planning in politics does exist (Borchert, 2011).   
Schlesinger (1966) argued that “ambition lies at the heart of politics”. 
Schlesinger identified three different forms of ambition: ‘static’, ‘discrete’ and 
‘progressive’. Statically ambitious politicians try to stay in office for as long as 
possible and seek to build a long-term career there. Discretely ambitious politicians 
only seek to stay in office for a short period of time and have no desire to pursue a 
political career elsewhere. Progressive politicians, on the other hand, constantly 
seek to obtain a higher political office; this should be noticeable in their political 
behaviour.  
Career patterns are usually interrelated with the existing institutional 
framework that is available. Politicians operate within a given ‘structure of 
opportunity’ (Schlesinger, 1966) and will have individual preferences for moving 
around within this structure. Career ambitions and the opportunities provided to 
politicians are closely related and shape a politician’s career choices.  
Following several treaty reforms, the EP has become a key legislative player 
at EU level exercising co-decision powers in many policy areas. Pursuing a political 
career in the EP has, therefore, become a more interesting option for politicians. 
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With the growing powers of the EP, and the influence individual MEPs can have 
on how these powers are being used, it is also of growing importance to understand 
who the people are who get elected to the EP and who stay there. The career 
ambitions of politicians influence the way they participate in their current position 
as they adapt their behaviour to improve their chance of obtaining the position they 
ultimately desire. It is therefore worth considering whether the different levels of 
ambition as described by Schlesinger exist in the EP just as they do in the US 
Congress and whether indeed MEPs adjust their behaviour in line with career 
ambitions. 
  
Although many scholars in the US have studied why some politicians decide 
to run for a higher office or why politicians seek the career track they do within the 
legislative body to which they belong (cited in Hibbing, 1999), European 
researchers have tended to disregard careerism (Borchert and Stolz, 2011b) and the 
legislative careers of MEPs has only recently started to attract attention from 
scholars. And in part, very few have actually linked the career trajectories of MEPs 
to their participation in the legislative process. This paper seeks to address this gap 
in our knowledge. 
First, when looking at the career paths of MEPs, Scarrow (1997) considered 
the political experience of MEPs from France, Germany, Italy and the UK and 
concluded that there were three types of MEPs that could be identified, who follow 
a similar characterisation to Schlesinger’s. First, a group of young MEPs not 
looking to pursue a career in the EP, but planning to use their time in the EP as a 
‘stepping-stone’ to a career in national politics. Second, a group of politicians who 
are aiming to stay in the EP for longer, the so-called ‘European careerists’. Third, a 
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group of MEPs who only stay in the EP for a short period of time either because 
they are about to retire or are looking to pursue a career outside of politics. Scarrow 
expected that it would become increasingly likely that the EP would be filled with 
static EP politicians looking to stay in the EP for longer, now that the EP has been 
professionalised and presents a serious alternative for politicians looking to run for 
office (Scarrow, 1997).  
This view was also shared by Beauvallet and Michon (2010) who found an 
emerging EP elite who dominate work in the institution. They argued that, whereas 
in the first directly-elected EP in 1979, the typical European political profile was 
one of the end-of-career MEP, in more recent parliaments, a younger group of 
politicians has been elected who stay in the EP for longer periods and choose to 
build a career in the institution. These EP careerists specialise in the European 
political arena and tend to dominate leadership positions in the EP.  
Whitaker (2014), too, finds that MEPs are indeed building careers in the EP 
and greater numbers of MEPs aspire to stay than was previously the case. One 
aspect to which only high-level attention has been given so far when analysing the 
career paths of MEPs (Whitaker, 2014) is the interaction of EP membership with 
political careers at other levels within the multi-level political entity that exists in 
Europe.  
With the EU growing in importance, the European system can be labelled 
as ‘multi-level’ (Deschouwer, 2003). The multi-level system, whereby politicians 
can move between local, regional, national and supranational levels, provides 
politicians with a wide variety of career options. Within this system, the national 
political level is likely to attract a considerable number of politicians from the EP 
level. In the multi-level system of the EU, there is a more or less structured 
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hierarchy of offices which are valued differently by different politicians based on 
their career ambitions and opportunities. In Germany, for example, career patterns 
are oriented towards the national level, whereas in Belgium politicians move more 
frequently between regional, national and supranational levels (Van Houten, 2009). 
In fact, German politicians show very limited movement between different levels 
of government (Borchert and Stolz, 2011a). For most politicians in Germany, the 
national political level is considered to be the most prestigious level. Hix (2008) 
considered the prestige and policymaking powers of the various offices in the EU 
system and identified the following hierarchy: (1) national prime minister, (2) 
Commission President, (3) national cabinet minister, (4) Commissioner, (5) 
member of a national parliament, and (6) MEP. In general, Hix argues that national 
political offices are more desirable for politicians than European offices, except 
perhaps for some of the very small member states. He adds, however, that the choice 
between being an MEP and being a member of a national parliament is less easy to 
make. Being a backbench MP will in many cases be less desirable than being an 
MEP with more policy influence, in particular with the most recent increases in 
power for the EP. This idea is in line with Borchert and Stolz (2011b) who have 
argued that the career ambitions of professional politicians are no longer necessarily 
focused on the national political arena alone and new career patterns are emerging.  
Although Whitaker (2014) and others (Hobolt and Høyland, 2011; Meserve, 
Pemstein and Bernhard, 2009a and b; Verzichelli and Edinger, 2005; Westlake, 
1994) have considered the careers of MEPs, these studies did not cover whether 
certain types of MEPs show different levels of legislative participation than others. 
In particular, hardly any focus has been given as to whether those with an ambition 
of staying in the EP, show this by participating more in the EP’s legislative process. 
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Daniel (2015) is probably the exception and the focus in his work is on how the 
changing nature of the EP has affected political careers. Part of his analysis is on 
the interlinkages between MEPs’ careers and behaviour in parliament with his main 
conclusion being that EP careerists write more reports.  
This paper aims to develop our existing knowledge about the career paths 
of MEPs and the impact their ambitions have on their legislative behaviour. It 
increases our knowledge about the extent to which MEPs are able to pursue their 
career ambitions and whether more engaged MEPs are rewarded by allowing them 
to stay longer in the EP. Taking the multi-level context into account, this paper also 
improves our understanding of whether MEPs who have the ambition to move 
around in this multi-level system (in this case by moving to the national level) 
participate in the EP in a different way.  
 
Before getting into an analysis of the different career ambitions of MEPs 
and the behaviour they show, it is important to understand two aspects better. First, 
whether the ambitions of MEPs are at all related to the actual outcomes of elections. 
Second, whether we are at risk of detecting an unobserved phenomenon. 
To address the first issue, I use survey data collected by Hix, Scully and 
Farrell (2011) as part of the European Parliament Research Group. The surveys of 
2000 (1999-2004 EP) and 2006 (2004-2009 EP) were selected using the answers to 
the question: “Where would you most like to be in ten years from now?”. MEPs who 
participated in the surveys were a representative sample of the wider EP 
membership, considering key variables such as the EPG, gender and member state 
(Hix, Scully and Farrell, 2011). In total, 319 MEPs responded to this multiple-
choice question. The answers were converted to binary response (e.g. a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
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answer on whether an MEP had the ambition to stay in the EP) which made it 
possible to analyse them in a logistic regression model. The answers were compared 
with data on EP membership at the end of the seventh term, in 2014.  
 Using logistic regression models, the findings show (table 11) that those 
MEPs who had the desire to be an MEP ten years were statistically significantly 
more likely to still be an MEP even when controlled for various factors such as age, 
group membership and electoral systems. MEPs who expected to have retired were 
significantly less likely to still be an MEP. The ambition to be a national MP did 
not show a significant effect. Those looking to retire were also found to be more 
likely to have done so. This shows that MEPs’ ambition is related to the actual 
outcome of career decisions and is not solely a function of national party leadership 
decisions.  
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For the second issue, it is important to be aware when there is a risk of 
having an unobserved latent factor causing the observed phenomenon (in this case 
for example active MEPs being more likely to be re-elected). Here, a valid question 
can be raised whether ambitious, active MEPs are favoured in the future (and re-
elected) or whether those who are favoured (and more likely to be re-elected in the 
future) allowed better access to leadership positions and rapporteurships. If this 
second, unobserved phenomenon is stronger, the correlations found later in this 
paper are of less value. However, I think it can be argued that such unobserved 
phenomenon is not present in this situation for the following reason. An MEP is 
dependent on two different actors for the two aspects which come into play here, 
namely the ability to become re-elected vs. having access to leadership positions 
and participation opportunities. The ability to become re-elected is influenced by 
the national party (leadership) and their decision about whether and where to put 
the candidate on the ballot paper. With the electorate taking the ultimate decision 
in the ballot box about re-election. The EPG leadership, on the other hand, decides 
about access to leadership and participation opportunities. When considering this 
in a principal-agent structure, the MEP as agent has two principals. If both the 
aspects of re-election opportunities and participation in the EP were decided upon 
by one principal, the argument for being at risk of having an unobserved 
phenomenon would have been a lot stronger but this is not the case here in the EP.  
      
3.3. Hypotheses 
Whitaker (2014) rightly points out that building a career in the EP is complicated 
by the second-order nature of EP elections. As has been argued elsewhere, voters 
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are largely ignorant of the day-to-day activities of MEPs (Hix, Hobolt and Høyland, 
2012). A question is whether even in such a second-order institution, the behaviour 
of MEPs changes in line with their career ambitions. Another question is whether, 
if is found, the national party leadership and the electorate reward this different 
level of participation. It is expected that MEPs will adapt their behaviour in line 
with their career ambitions. This means that static, discrete and progressive MEPs 
should show different levels of participation.  
One of the ideas here is that MEPs who show active levels of participation 
in the legislative work of the institution have a higher chance of being able to pursue 
a career in the EP. Some of the ‘EP-careerists’ can be expected to be interested in 
obtaining influence over policymaking (policy-seekers). This idea would seem to 
be supported by recent research which showed that policy leadership is mostly 
associated with incumbents’ electoral fortunes (Wilson et al., 2016). The MEPs 
have become experts in a certain policy area or feel passionate about particular 
policy initiatives they hope to undertake in the European political arena now that 
the EP has gained co-decision powers in many policy areas after a series of treaty 
reforms. MEPs looking to stay in the EP can, therefore, be expected to show active 
levels of participation, both through actions which they control themselves, such as 
attendance at plenary sessions, as well as activities which are controlled by the EPG 
leadership, such as rapporteurships and the production of own initiative reports.  
For those who are interested in using the EP as a stepping-stone to national 
politics, spending a considerable amount of time on legislative work in the EP might 
not necessarily be an efficient way to achieve that goal. It might be more efficient 
to spend time in the constituency and build up a network of support that is needed 
to move to the national political arena. This should be noticeable in their level of 
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participation. It could, therefore, be expected that these progressive career 
ambitious politicians would show lower levels of participation in the work of the 
EP.  
The remaining group of MEPs is composed of those who neither wish to 
move to national politics nor stay in the EP. This includes politicians who are close 
to retirement and those who will pursue a career outside of the European and the 
national political arena. Retiring politicians, in particular, have less of an incentive 
to be very active in the work of the EP at all as they do not need to impress the 
political leadership in order to be nominated for re-election.  
Whether or not an MEP has the ambitions to build a career in the EP, he or 
she is likely to be influenced by a number of factors specific to his or her own 
circumstances and these will need to be controlled for in any analysis. Age is an 
important factor. If a politician is elected to the EP at a later stage of his or her life 
and is already approaching retirement, he or she is less likely to pursue a long-term 
career in the EP. Younger and even middle-aged MEPs have a much longer time 
period during which to develop a career in the EP. Age has been used by some as a 
proxy for career ambition (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard, 2009a). Gender could 
also be of influence on an MEP’s career ambitions. The EP has a significant higher 
proportion of women compared to national parliaments. As shown in the US 
literature, women often underestimate their own competence to run for a certain 
office (Lawless and Fox, 2015). This despite the fact that in the US, women are as 
successful as men in winning elections (Fox, 2000). Once they get elected, they are 
also as successful as men in getting legislation passed (Bratton and Haynie, 1999). 
Nevertheless, given their own underestimation of competence, this could have an 
impact on their decision to pursue a certain office and therefore an MEP’s gender 
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is included as a control factor in the analysis. The length of time an MEP has already 
been in the EP could also be of influence. Its effect could go both ways: the longer 
an MEP has been a member, the more likely it becomes he or she will leave at some 
point; while younger, stepping-stone MEPs who have only been in parliament for a 
short period of time could also be more likely to leave.  
As larger groups tend to dominate the work of the EP and significantly 
influence voting and policy outcomes, policy-seeking MEPs could be particularly 
attracted to building a career in one of the larger groups. Larger groups in this 
context could mean larger national political groups, EPGs or member states. The 
effects of being in these groups should be controlled for.  
As stated before, when applying a principal-agent structure, the MEP as an 
agent has two principals. The two principals, being the national and European party 
leadership, decide about different aspects which are important to an MEP, but the 
ultimate sanction of nominating a member for re-election is reserved for the 
national party leadership (Scully, 2007). In all member states, the party leadership 
of the national parties have some control over the selection of the candidates for the 
EP elections by determining the list of candidates or approving the regionally-
selected candidates (Hix, 2002). The loyalty of MEPs to their national party could, 
therefore, have an influence on the opportunities for MEPs to be reselected and 
pursue an EP career. Very loyal MEPs might be rewarded by the national party on 
the other hand by moving them to the national political arena. Strong loyalty to the 
EPG could, however, lead to MEPs being rewarded by the EPG leadership with 
more rapporteurship positions. Politicians focused on pursuing a career in the EP 
are likely to try to balance their loyalty between their EPG and their national party 
(Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard, 2009a). With this in mind, it is important to 
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control for both EPG loyalty and national party loyalty, as loyalty might prove more 
important than participation. 
This paper attempts to approach the career ambitions of MEPs from a multi-
level perspective. A particular focus is on the participation in the EP work by MEPs 
who are looking for a career in national politics. With regard to the possibilities for 
developing a career in national politics, there are a number of factors that influence 
whether a career at the national level is a viable alternative for MEPs. First of all, 
the number of entry opportunities, both by the  number of seats available and the 
number of parties in a national parliament, can be expected to influence the 
likelihood of an MEP moving from the European to the domestic political level. 
Parties control access to a career in politics, as they decide on nominations and re-
nominations for elections (Borchert and Stolz, 2011a). If there are relatively more 
national parliamentary seats and more political parties, it could be expected that 
there are more opportunities for MEPs to move to the national level. What is also 
important is whether an MEP’s national party is often in government, or tends to be 
in opposition. A party in government will give a politician more chances to gain a 
powerful position and influence policy, which makes moving to national politics a 
more attractive alternative. Equally, an MEP of a party that is often in government 
might have closer ties to the Council, which could make it more attractive to stay 
in Brussels. 
Another external factor of influence on the candidate selection is the 
electoral system (Farrell and Scully, 2007). Electoral systems would not only affect 
which parties are elected but also who gets elected to represent these parties in the 
legislature. Therefore, the electoral institutions and candidate selection rules are 
important factors to control for when studying the selection of MEPs. In their study, 
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Hix, Hobolt and Høyland (2017) identify electoral institutions and candidate 
selection rules as important factors that moderate the association between career 
ambitions and legislative activity with the effect of career ambitions on legislative 
participation being stronger in candidate-centred systems than in party-centred 
systems.  
In the analysis of this paper, I will first look at whether participating more 
in the EP’s work increases the likelihood of staying on as an MEP. For this, I will 
follow a two-step approach, testing two hypotheses: 
H1: Those MEPs standing for re-election have participated more actively in 
the EP’s work 
H2: When standing for re-election, those MEPs who have participated more 
in the EP are more likely to become re-elected 
 
When these hypotheses are tested, this paper moves on to consider the multi-level 
context in which MEPs operate. It will be tested to what extent the participation of 
static, progressive and discrete ambitious MEPs differ. For this, I look at the actual 
position of MEPs who were active in the eighth EP, after the 2014 elections. It 
follows from the above two hypotheses that it is expected that static MEPs who 
were re-elected in 2014 had participated more actively. It is expected that: 
H3: Progressively ambitious MEPs looking to move to the national arena 
are more focused on the national level and participate less actively in the 
work of the EP 
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3.4. Methodology 
To test the relationship between MEPs’ activities and the likelihood of staying in 
the EP or moving to national politics, a logistic regression analysis is used. For the 
analyses in this paper, the 2009-2014 EP was selected, as this was the most recent 
full parliamentary period available. The data should show whether an MEP’s 
activities have an impact on whether he or she stood for re-election in the 2014 
elections. They will also show the impact of an MEP’s activities on whether he or 
she stayed on in the parliament after the 2014 EP elections, whether he or she moved 
to national politics or whether he or she retired from political life. Information about 
age, gender, length of membership, the size of the group(s) he or she was a member 
of, loyalty, electoral systems as well as the opportunities at the national level were 
included as control variables.  
For the dependent variables in this paper, information on which MEPs had 
returned to the EP after the 2014 election was derived from the EP website. 
DeHavilland consultancy (2014) provided information about whether an MEP 
stood for re-election in the 2014 election or whether he or she had not been a 
candidate. Table 12 shows that nearly 43 percent of the MEPs were re-elected in 
the 2014 elections. Nearly 30 percent of MEPs did not seek re-election, either 
because they moved to a career elsewhere or had decided to retire. Others failed to 
become re-elected or their data was not available. Those for whom it was unknown 
whether they had stood for re-election were excluded from the analysis. This 
significant turnover in MEPs at the 2014 elections is in line with previous EPs, 
where around 50 percent of MEPs were new (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 
2011). 
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In cases where MEPs did not return to the EP after the 2014 elections, it was 
considered whether they had moved to national politics shortly before or after the 
2014 elections. Information about whether an MEP had (most likely) retired or 
moved to a career outside of European or national politics was also included as 
dependent variables in the analysis. This information was found on MEPs’ personal 
websites, the websites of national parliaments and in some cases from interviews 
given by MEPs in national and international media. A career in national politics 
was defined as being an MP, senator or a member of the government. 
Some of the data used for this paper for the independent variables comes 
from Hix and Noury (2015). In terms of personal information, the dataset contained 
an MEP’s age at the time of the 2014 elections, and the member state he or she 
represented. The population size of an MEP’s home member state at the start of an 
MEP’s mandate was also added to the analysis. This data was obtained from 
Eurostat. The dataset already contained information about both the EPG and the 
national political party that each MEP belongs to, including the total number of 
MEPs each of these groups contain. This information was derived from the EP 
website. Information on the length of membership of an MEP until the start of the 
seventh EP (2009-2014) was added by calculating the number of days from the start 
date until election day in 2009. Information on an MEP’s start date came from the 
EP website.  
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The analysis also includes information about an MEP’s gender and the 
electoral system used in the EP elections (open-list proportional representation 
(OLPR), semi-OLPR, closed-list proportional representation and single 
transferable vote). In a proportional representation system, where politicians do not 
need to run on a personal ticket in a district but can be included on a party list by 
the party leadership, the electoral system will be more open for MEPs who are less 
well-known in their constituencies. On the other hand, in party-centred elections, 
an MEP might have been able to prove his or her qualities to the party leadership, 
who then, in turn, include him or her as a candidate on the party list for the elections. 
This could have an impact on an MEP’s chances of becoming re-elected. The 
information on the electoral system was obtained from an article by Hix and 
Hagemann (2009).  
This paper also considers the factors which could influence whether an MEP 
pursues a career outside the EP in national politics. The information on national 
politics is mainly derived from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2015). 
The database contains the necessary information about the total number of seats in 
each national parliament as well as the effective number of political parties. The 
database also shows which parties have regularly been a member of a national 
government. On this basis, each MEP was given a code to show whether his or her 
party is likely to be a governing party. This information provides an indication of 
the entry opportunities that an MEP has to switch to a career in national politics. 
The dataset used also contains information about the activities of MEPs in 
the 2009-2014 period. This information was compiled by Hurka, Kaeding and 
Obholzer (2015) and sets out the attendance rates of MEPs at plenary roll-call votes 
as well as the number of speeches, rapporteurships and own initiative reports. All 
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four activities were included in the analyses at the same time as independent 
variables, as it was found that they were not significantly correlated (see table 13). 
Hurka, Kaeding and Obholzer (2015) have also calculated the loyalty of MEPs to 
their EPG and national political group analysing the number of times an MEP has 
voted out of line with the majority of his or her group.  
 
 
 
 
    
3.5. Results 
In this section, the empirical findings of the analyses conducted are being 
considered. For the empirical analysis, three steps are taken. First, the relationship 
between an MEP’s participation and whether he or she stands for re-election or not 
is analysed. Second, it is assessed for those who do decide to stand for re-election 
what the impact of participation on the success rate of re-election is. Third, the 
analysis is taken into a broader context by conducting a multinomial analysis of the 
different levels of participation of MEPs with different career ambitions.  
Before moving to an assessment of whether an MEP’s activities have an 
impact on whether he or she is successful in pursuing a career in the EP or moving 
to national politics, it is important to first analyse the impact of activities on an 
MEP’s likelihood of standing for re-election. The decision whether an MEP will 
stand for re-election is normally taken by both the MEP and the national party 
leadership, possibly subject to a decision by the party membership. This paper seeks 
to capture the impact of ambition on participation but the election outcome only 
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shows who has been successful in pursuing that ambition, leaving out the total 
population of MEPs who wish to continue in their role and have the same ambition. 
This thereby creates a selection bias. One would expect that those who have the 
desire to continue as an MEP to portray the same level of activities, independent of 
whether they are successful in the 2014 elections or not.  
Table 14 shows the outcome of the logistic regression model on the first 
step, looking at whether an MEP stood for re-election in 2014. The independent 
variables show the impact they have on the likelihood of an MEP standing for re-
election. The logit coefficients that are reported show the effect of the independent 
variable on the logarithm of the odds of being in the 1 category of the dependent 
variable, rather than the 0 category. As odds ratios are easier to interpret and can be 
converted into changes in percentages, table 14 also shows the odds ratios converted 
into percentages of the independent variables for cases in which the effects are 
statistically significant9. The percentages show the increase or decrease in the 
likelihood of an event happening when the value of the independent variable 
increases by one unit. 
Different forms of participation as well as a number of control variables are 
included. The results show that MEPs who were more active in writing own 
initiative reports were significantly more likely to seek re-election. Own initiative 
reports could be seen as a form of participation which is particularly well suited for 
expressing an eagerness to be active in the EP as they do not bring the policy 
influence which is for example the case with (most) rapporteurships. When 
controlling for member states, giving more speeches also increases the likelihood 
of standing for re-election. It could therefore be said that there is a moderately 
                                                          
9 The coefficient can be converted into odds ratios percentages by using the following formula: 
%Δ = (e^βkΔ-1) * 100 (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997) 
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positive effect of participation on seeking re-election. Understandably, the length 
of membership of the EP has a negative impact on the likelihood of seeking re-
election, with longer-serving MEPs less likely to seek re-election again. The entry 
opportunities at the national level do not seem to have an effect on an MEP’s 
decision to stand for re-election.  
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As mentioned, I will take a two-step approach here and have first looked at 
whether MEPs who have been more active are more likely to seek re-election. I will 
now consider whether the more active MEPs who do seek re-election are more 
likely to indeed be re-elected. Included in the dependent variable here are the MEPs 
who were successful in seeking re-election in the 2014 elections. Only those 
seeking re-election were included in the analysis. It has been found here that those 
who were rapporteur more often in the 2009-2014 period were more likely to be 
successful in becoming re-elected. This finding suggests that national parties might 
reward those MEPs who have been a rapporteur by placing them higher up on the 
ballot paper. For a national party, it is expected to be appealing to have an MEP 
who has proven to have political and policy influence in the EP. For MEPs looking 
to pursue a long-term career in the EP, gaining policy influence by obtaining a 
rapporteurship would, therefore, seem very important. Interestingly, being a 
member of a party that is likely to be in government from time to time (i.e. not a 
complete outlier in the national political spectrum) also increases the likelihood of 
becoming re-elected.  
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Table 16 moves on and analyses what MEPs did after the 2014 elections, 
with member states included as control variables using a multinomial model. Some 
MEPs were re-elected, other politicians moved to a career in national politics and 
again others left politics altogether, either to retire or pursue a career elsewhere. 
Table 16 displays the logistic regression analyses for all four outcomes. Here the 
positive effect of the participation of MEPs on the likelihood of an MEP returning 
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to the EP is again confirmed. It has been found here that MEPs who gave more 
speeches, had more rapporteurship positions and wrote more own initiative reports 
in the 2009-2014 period were significantly more likely to return to the EP after the 
2014 elections. For example, holding a rapporteurship once increases this 
likelihood by five percent, confirming the findings in table 14. Writing own 
initiative reports has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of returning to the EP 
with an increase of over 40 percent.  
 For MEPs who moved to national politics after the 2014 EP elections, the 
effects are the opposite, although - apart from writing own initiative reports - not 
statistically significant. MEPs moving to national politics have generally stayed in 
the EP for a shorter period of time. Increases in EP membership length make it less 
likely that MEPs will still move to national politics. This would support the idea 
that some politicians use the EP as a stepping stone to national politics.  
 Politicians who leave the EP and do not move to national politics to pursue 
a career elsewhere show lower levels of participation, although most forms of 
activity are not statistically significant. MEPs who leave the EP and move to a 
career outside of politics write significantly fewer own initiative reports. Those 
MEPs who retire after the 2014 elections participate significantly less in giving 
speeches but interestingly they do attend more plenary votes. The same effect as in 
table 14 of whether an MEP’s party is likely to be a governing party can be found 
here. MEPs from parties which are more likely to be in government have a higher 
chance of staying in the EP and are less likely to leave politics altogether than those 
whose parties are not.      
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3.6. Discussion and conclusion 
Being a politician has become a profession for many. With the development of the 
EP as an influential institution at the European level, building a career in the EP has 
become an interesting option. As others have found, the EP is becoming populated 
more and more with MEPs looking to build a long-term career in this institution. 
Schlesinger (1966) argued that politicians have different levels of ambition, with 
static politicians trying to stay in office for as long as possible, discrete politicians 
only wishing to stay in politics for a short period of time, and progressive politicians 
looking to move to a higher political office. Politicians can be expected to adapt 
their behaviour in line with their desired career objectives.  
The EU can be characterised as a multi-level system, with politicians 
moving around between different levels. Despite the growing importance of the EP 
in recent decades, the national political level is generally still seen as the top level 
that progressively ambitious MEPs tend to aim for. Static MEPs, on the other hand, 
can be expected to adapt their behaviour in such a way that will optimise their 
chances of staying in the EP. This paper has tried to expand our existing knowledge 
about the career paths of MEPs, the impact their ambitions have on their legislative 
behaviour and to what extent active MEPs are rewarded by being allowed to pursue 
a career in the institution.  
The findings suggest that the political career ambitions that MEPs express 
are in line with what they end up achieving. MEPs who wish to be an MEP in ten 
years’ time are more likely to be in that position in the future, whereas those who 
wish to retire often have done so. This undermines the idea that the career decisions 
are solely set by the national party leadership, or are only the outcome of an 
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electoral decision. Those who are keen on building a career in the EP also have the 
opportunity to do so.  
Using a logistic regression model, the empirical findings give a moderately 
positive confirmation that being active as an MEP improves the likelihood of 
staying on as an MEP. More active MEPs are more likely to seek re-election in the 
first place. Writing an own initiative report could be seen as a clear expression of 
interest in participating actively in the EP, as it does not bring the policy influence 
that (most) rapporteurships do. Secondly, when standing for re-election, MEPs who 
have participated more by obtaining rapporteurships are more likely to be re-elected 
than colleagues who participated less. This could be because of the fact that the 
national party rewards more active MEPs, who have proven their ability to obtain 
policy influence, by placing them higher on the electoral list. It could also be that 
the electorate rewards more active MEPs, although this is probably less likely, 
given the second-order nature of EP elections. All in all, it shows that if an MEP is 
looking to pursue a career in the EP, participating actively at least in certain types 
of activities helps towards achieving that goal.  
The analysis also includes a multinomial regression comparing four groups 
of MEPs: i) those who stayed as MEP after the 2014 election, ii) those who moved 
to national politics, iii) those who left politics altogether, and iv) those who retired. 
Those wishing to move to national politics do not need to be as active to 
demonstrate to the national party leadership that they are worth being moved to the 
national political arena. MEPs who moved to national politics after the 2014 EP 
elections spent considerably less time on own initiative reports. Politicians who are 
not seeking re-election and do not return to the EP or national politics - either 
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because they pursue a career elsewhere or retire - are found to be less active than 
their peers, too.  
These findings broadly confirm Schlesinger’s idea that politicians adapt 
their behaviour in line with their desired career ambitions (Schlesinger, 1966). The 
EU provides politicians with an interesting multi-level structure in which to operate. 
The expansion of the EP’s powers has provided politicians with an alternative 
career option. The new powers given to the EP over the last 25 years has allowed 
politicians to take up new influential co-legislative positions. This paper has looked 
at the careers of MEPs and how their participation helps them secure their career 
objectives, either in the EP or at the national level. It has been here found that 
MEPs’ careers are influenced by more factors than elections alone and that MEPs 
themselves can influence their career prospects.  
For future studies on this topic, the analysis would benefit from additional 
data on the post-EP careers of MEPs. The analysis could also be repeated for other 
EP terms. Future studies could also look at the movement between the EP level and 
the local and regional political level, as the current paper focused only on the 
national political level. Finally, it would be worth trying to capture additional data 
on legislative participation, such as the number of amendments to legislation tabled 
and the number of committee meetings attended. This would build a broader picture 
of the full range of activities that MEPs undertake.  
As Schlesinger (1966) argued, ambition lies at the heart of politics. A better 
understanding of the career ambitions of politicians is crucial in understanding the 
functioning of the institution itself and thereby ultimately the democratic process. 
MEPs’ careers are found to be influenced by more factors than the simple external 
event of elections alone. Their own activities can and do influence whether an MEP 
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stays in the EP, with MEPs seeking to leave politics or move to the national level 
operating differently from those who are keen to build a future in the EP. 
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3.7. Appendix 
3.8.  
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Table 14b continued: 
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4 
4. The revolving door of Brussels – 
how politicians become lobbyists 
 
 
Abstract 
The increase in powers of the European Parliament has made it a key target for 
lobbyists. Having knowledge about and access to the EP is important for them. This 
makes former MEPs ideal candidates to be hired by lobbying firms. The revolving 
door of politicians moving to the private sector is yet to be studied in the EU 
context. Building on what is known from Washington, this paper seeks to identify 
the characteristics of MEPs who pursue careers as lobbyists. Being on a powerful 
committee, from a smaller political group and having a longer tenure makes it more 
likely that an MEP becomes a lobbyist. Neither participation in legislative work nor 
holding one of the ‘mega-seats’ in the EP were found to be significant factors.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Since the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, the powers of the European 
Parliament (EP) have steadily been increasing. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EP 
operates on an equal footing with the Council in many policy areas. Not 
surprisingly, in line with its increase of powers, the EP is attracting more attention 
from lobbyists and interest groups (Kohler-Koch, 1997; Lehmann, 2009) and some 
have argued that the EP has become a key target for lobbyists (Earnshaw and Judge, 
2006; Kaeding, 2004). 
 In order to be a successful lobbyist in Brussels, one needs to be familiar with 
the legislative procedures of the EU including in the EP. A lobbyist needs to decide 
when it is best to approach relevant legislators and what messages to use. 
Contacting a legislator at the wrong time, or with the wrong message can be 
ineffective or even counterproductive. Lobbying firms or organisations that need to 
be represented will, therefore, be looking for people who are able to represent them 
and who are familiar with the procedures and practices in the relevant institutions. 
It could be expected that, in line with the EP’s increases in powers, former MEPs 
are in higher demand from lobbying firms given their familiarity with the practices 
of the EP and their network of contacts.  
This paper seeks to identify what the characteristics are of those MEPs who 
become lobbyists, and whether they occupy certain positions or participate in a 
certain way in the EP. To ensure that any characteristics found are not simply those 
of everyone who pursues a career in the Brussels ‘bubble’ after their time in the EP, 
this paper also considers all those who stay in Brussels after their time as MEPs but 
who work outside of lobbying. This is done to avoid capturing the characteristics 
of those who are keen on staying in the EU’s political environment in general, rather 
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than solely of those who become lobbyists. The Brussels bubble here is defined as 
the working place related to the EU policymaking process excluding any domestic 
political positions that might be involved in it. Most positions in this working 
environment are based in Brussels, but this is not necessarily the case.  
 A former MEP will have built up experience with how the EP operates. He 
or she will have a better understanding of legislative procedures and windows of 
opportunity for lobbyists. He or she will also have built up a certain level of 
expertise in a policy area through the EP committees, which have grown in 
importance and now forms the backbone of the EP’s legislative work (Neuhold, 
2001). In addition, a former MEP will have built up a network in the parliament, 
both with the EP’s permanent staff as well as with colleagues who continue in their 
roles as MEPs. This valuable network of contacts can be used by a former MEP on 
becoming a lobbyist.  
 Revolving door politicians have become a widespread phenomenon in 
Washington. Between 1998 and 2004, 43 percent of the members who had left 
Congress became registered lobbyists (Kim, 2013). There is a significantly larger 
volume of literature on the revolving door of Congress than there is on the EP. This 
paper seeks to address this gap by looking at which lessons-learned from the US 
might be applicable to the EP. The decision to compare the EP with the US 
Congress was taken given the significant body of literature available in the US 
which is not available for other legislative institutions.  
Seeking to understand the revolving door phenomenon is relevant from both 
a social-ethical perspective as well as from an empirical academic perspective. 
First, the presence of a revolving door may undermine the trust of the public in the 
EP. Second, the existence of a revolving door might have an impact on current 
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MEPs’ behaviour in the parliament and should, therefore, be of interest to all those 
seeking to understand the legislative behaviour of MEPs.  
 Using data on the activities of MEPs in the seventh EP, 2009-2014, and their 
career paths after the 2014 EP elections, this paper finds that the revolving door 
phenomenon, to a limited extent, does exist in the EP. MEPs who are on powerful 
committees, members of a smaller national party and who have been in the EP for 
a relatively longer period of time are more likely to become lobbyists. Active 
participation or having been in a senior EP position are not associated with an 
increased likelihood of becoming a lobbyist. This suggests that familiarity with the 
practices and content of the EP’s key committees are more important assets for 
lobbyists than having access to contacts, through, for example, their experience in 
a senior role in the EP. This is understandable given the high turnover in the EP, 
which undermines the value of having a network of contacts from the previous EP-
term. 
This paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on the career paths 
of MEPs. It seeks to better understand the relationship between one career path that 
former MEPs can follow (i.e. becoming a lobbyist) and their activities whilst still 
employed as MEPs. This paper does not seek to add to the already substantial body 
of literature on the impact of lobbying on the EP. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, the literature on the revolving door 
phenomenon in Washington is discussed. This is followed by a, short, overview of 
the revolving door in the EP context; This section includes some introductory data 
on post-EP careers. Subsequently, the hypotheses are developed and tested. The 
paper finishes with a discussion of the results and conclusion.  
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4.2. The revolving door of Washington 
The phenomenon of politicians becoming lobbyists is well known in the US. Eggers 
(2010) even concluded that almost two-thirds of all federal lobbying in the US 
involves a former congressional staffer or former member of Congress in some way, 
confirming the widespread existence of the revolving door phenomenon in 
Washington. It is not difficult to understand why. Baumgartner et al. (2009) found 
well-connected lobbyists with a government background to be more successful. 
They showed that employing revolving door lobbyists is associated with a slightly 
higher chance that an organisation’s preferred outcome occurs, even though the 
effect is weak. Lazarus and McKay (2012) showed that having a revolving door 
lobbyist representing a school’s interest significantly increased the chances of that 
school securing more congressional funding. Their study provided evidence that the 
revolving door lobbyist himself had a significant effect, above and beyond lobbying 
alone.  
Herring (1929) observed the revolving door phenomenon as early as the 
1920s (quoted in Salisbury et al., 1989). The revolving door phenomenon contains 
two parts. The first part concerns those who move from the private sector to 
government positions; the second part concerns those public officials who move to 
the private sector (Cohen, 1986). In this paper, I deal with the latter. The revolving 
door of politicians is a widely criticised phenomenon in the media but, surprisingly, 
it is not widely studied (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Kim, 2013; LaPire et al., 2014). 
A number of scholars in the US in the 1960s, 70s and 80s studying the revolving 
door mainly analysed case studies and anecdotes in specific policy domains (e.g. 
Bauer et al., 1963; Milbrath, 1963; Berry, 1984). Their findings did, however, not 
allow for making representative statements about the revolving door at large.  
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This changed with the more quantitative approach of Gormley (1979) and 
Cohen (1986) who studied movements between the private sector and government 
agencies, focusing on the revolving door of the Federal Communications 
Commission. Their work led to a broader analysis, studying other public-sector 
venues, policy domains and time periods. Salisbury et al. (1989) looked at lobbyists 
with congressional or executive experience. Their analysis showed that lobbyists 
with a background on Capitol Hill have a better understanding of the policy process 
and content. They also have a broader network of contacts, which helps them in 
their post-congressional lobbying career. Heinz et al. (1993, quoted in LaPire et al., 
2014) interviewed nearly 800 lobbyists, many of whom said that their government 
employment had given them both procedural knowledge and subject matter 
expertise. Access to former colleagues was not seen as a key attribute.  
Blanes i Vidal et al. (2012), however, concluded that the lobbying industry 
in Washington should be seen as a market for political connections, where indirect 
links to serving politicians can be acquired by hiring their former employees and 
colleagues. This was confirmed by Eggers (2010), who found that interest groups 
hire former staffers of the party in power mainly to gain access and communicate 
information. He argued that lobbying can be seen as information transmission with 
lobbyists seeking to inform politicians who are ideologically closer. Politicians with 
an ideology close to a lobbyist are more likely to trust the information they receive.   
However, the revolving door does not seem to exist evenly among all 
politicians. LaPire et al. (2014) found that revolving door lobbyists are more likely 
to have specialised in lobbying the Senate Appropriations Committee, one of the 
most powerful committees of Congress, showing the importance of being able to 
access powerful committees in Congress. Most studies on the revolving door 
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phenomenon only use data on those who have actually become lobbyists. Little is 
known in general about the careers pursued by politicians who have left Congress. 
Herrick and Nixon (1996) found that less than half of all the former members of the 
House were involved in the revolving door. They examined the post-congressional 
careers of House of Representative members who had left the House between 1971 
and 1992 and found that former members of the House pursue a wide variety of 
careers.  
Herrick and Nixon’s work focused on all types of post-Congress careers, 
without reaching particular conclusions about the revolving door of Congress. 
Butler and Sovey (2010), on the other hand, specifically focused on the revolving 
door by asking which former members of Congress had been hired by lobbying 
firms. They found that Congressmen in leadership positions, serving on powerful 
committees and who were ideologically moderate, were more likely to have a post-
Congress career as a lobbyist. Their results also suggest that knowledge of the 
legislative process is important for lobbyists when targeting key legislators (Butler 
and Sovey, 2010).  
A question arises as to whether to potential to move to a lobbying career 
after politics might impact on individuals’ behaviour while still employed as 
politicians. As Herrick and Nixon (1996) have argued, behaviour while in the 
House may have an impact on the employment options of politicians after leaving 
politics. In this context, Kim (2013) focused on former members of the House of 
Representatives for the 105th-108th Congresses and the relationship between the 
lobbying employment and voting behaviour of Congressmen. Kim considered the 
politicians’ last term in office comparing Congressmen who retired voluntarily with 
those who lost their re-election bid. He found that those who became lobbyists after 
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losing an election had served on more powerful committees and had more 
conservative voting records than those who did not become lobbyists. This effect 
was not found for those who retired voluntarily. For these retirees, their length of 
membership of Congress, a decrease in their conservative voting record and a 
slowdown in their legislative activity in their last term were all important predictors 
for becoming a lobbyist. Tenure rather than specific knowledge gained from being 
active on a committee, seemed to matter most.  
All in all, the US literature on the revolving door provides a useful starting 
point when studying the existence of the phenomenon in the EP. There are broadly 
two schools of thoughts emerging from the US literature. First, the idea that 
revolving door politicians are valuable because they have process and content 
knowledge; Length of service and having been on a powerful committee could be 
indicators here. Second, the belief that revolving door politicians are valuable 
because they have access to contacts; Having been in leadership positions and 
having a relatively closer ideological proximity to those in power are relevant 
factors here. It is worth testing which elements are found to be most important in 
the EP context.  
  
4.3. The revolving door of the EP 
Given that lobbying has become an important component of the EU legislative 
process, becoming a lobbyist after their time in the EP could be an alternative career 
option for MEPs. Former MEPs have a good insight into the modus operandi of the 
EP as they are familiar with the procedures and practices of the legislative process. 
They have also built up a network of contacts in the EP. This could make them 
attractive lobbyists for those who are looking to have their interests represented.  
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Where the US literature on the phenomenon of revolving door politicians 
has developed over the last few decades, it is virtually non-existent in the EU. This 
despite the fact that there are no restrictions on the work that MEPs can do after 
they leave office, allowing them to pick up lobbyist positions straightaway (Balosin, 
2016). Although the career paths of MEPs is a research area increasingly attracting 
attention (Daniel, 2015; Whitaker, 2014; Meserve et al., 2009a and b), MEPs 
becoming lobbyists has not been widely studied.  
Before looking at the revolving door of the EP in more detail, it is worth 
reflecting on the importance of studying this phenomenon. There are both social-
ethical as well as empirical academic reasons for this. First, from a social-ethical 
perspective, the presence of a revolving door may undermine public trust in MEPs 
and the EP as a whole. Citizens could question whether the activities and decisions 
of MEPs are the result of careful consideration of the electorate’s wishes or rather 
an MEP’s future career ambitions in the private (lobbying) sector. The revolving 
door may lead to politicians being overly sympathetic to the needs of a particular 
business because they seek to move into the private sector after their political life 
(Balosin, 2016). The existence of the revolving door in the EP may thereby 
undermine the trust of the public in the main democratic institution at European 
level, thereby deepening the democratic deficit. This in itself justifies further 
analysis of the phenomenon. 
Second, there are empirical academic reasons for studying the revolving 
door in Brussels. As argued by Schlesinger (1966), politicians can be expected to 
adjust their behaviour in line with their future career objectives. It could, therefore, 
be that the existence of the revolving door has an impact on the behaviour of current 
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MEPs. The revolving door is, therefore, a relevant phenomenon for those seeking 
to understand the legislative behaviour of MEPs.  
Coen and Vannoni (2016) is the only large-scale study on the revolving door 
of the EU. They examined at the career paths of 300 EU affairs managers and 
identified three types of EU affairs managers, one of which used to work at the EU 
institutions. In their dataset, they found that only ten percent of the EU affairs 
managers had work experience in the EU institutions. This low level of an exchange 
of personnel between business and EU institutions has led them to call into question 
the existence of the revolving door phenomenon. It should, however, be noted that 
their study only focused on corporate lobbying activity and did not consider other 
types of interest representation. Moreover, it did not single-out the revolving door 
phenomenon among those with key policymaking power, such as MEPs. 
Furthermore, their analysis did not assess any potential relationship between those 
who became lobbyists and their legislative behaviour. 
 Before moving to developing a number of hypothesis, I will, based on data 
collected for this paper, provide some information on the number of MEPs who 
become lobbyists. The sources of this data are discussed in more detail in the 
methodology section of this paper. When considering the EP, the data shows that a 
total of 480 MEPs did not return to the EP after the 2014 elections. Nearly 60 
percent of those who left the EP, moved to a career outside of Brussels. A 
significant part of them moved to national or local politics. Others moved to careers 
in academia, the national civil service or they started working in the corporate 
sector. Around 20 percent had (most likely) retired from politics and for about ten 
percent of the former MEPs it could not be ascertained whether they had taken on 
another job or had left the workforce altogether. Around ten percent decided to stay 
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in the Brussels bubble to pursue a career. Most of them, 33, became lobbyists, 11 
joined the European Commission and three joined Brussels-based NGOs in roles 
that did not seem to involve lobbying work. Two former MEPs joined think tanks 
focused on EU politics. Lobbyists were defined as those who had been hired by 
lobbying firms, corporates in a public affairs role, or other organisations (including 
NGOs) in a public affairs role.  
These numbers show that a smaller proportion of MEPs become lobbyists 
than the 43 percent of US Congressmen (combining the House of Representatives 
and Senate) that is quoted in Kim (2013). However, it could be argued that in 
absolute terms, the number of former politicians become lobbyists is not 
significantly different10.  
 
                                                          
10 This is the case when considering the incumbency rate in the EP of around 50 percent for each 
election and comparing that to the US House of Representatives, where the incumbency rate is 
around 95 percent, and the Senate, with an incumbency rate of around 87 percent (CRP, 2017). With 
an incumbency rate of 95 percent for the 435 House of Representative members and a two-year 
election cycle, this means that during the five-year period of the EP, around 54 House of 
Representative members will have left the House. For the Senate, which has a six-year election 
cycle, this means that during the five-year period of the EP, around 11 Senators will have left. This 
is an average of 65 politicians leaving Congress every five years. Applying the 43 percent rate of 
Congressmen who become lobbyists (Kim, 2013), results in around 28 former politicians who 
become lobbyists in Washington every five years. This is very similar to the number of MEPs, 33, 
who became lobbyists after the 2014 EP elections. 
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Breaking this data down by European Party Group (EPG) shows that in 
absolute terms those who used to be a member of the S&D, ALDE or EPP were 
best represented in the lobbyist category. In relative terms, however, the Greens, 
ECR and EFD also had a similar percentage of people who stayed in the Brussels 
bubble with ALDE having the highest percentage of MEPs becoming lobbyists. In 
this context, it is also important to consider whether certain groups had a higher 
percentage of MEPs deciding not to run for re-election in 2014. If many MEPs 
decided not to pursue a career in the EP, this could have an impact on the number 
of MEPs pursuing a career elsewhere, including as lobbyists. The data 
(DeHavilland consultancy, 2014), however, shows that for all groups, between 25 
and 35 percent decided not to stand for re-election (with the ECR being the main 
outlier). In terms of who was subsequently successful in being re-elected when 
standing, the success rate varied from about half of the ECR members to over 80 
percent of the GUE/NGL members. These numbers, then, do not suggest that 
becoming a lobbyist is related to the likelihood of an MEP standing and being re-
elected. 
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Besides considering the different political groups, it is also possible to look 
at variations among member states. Here it has been found that, in particular, those 
member states which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 do not have many MEPs who 
decide to stay in the Brussels bubble when they leave the EP after the elections. The 
Czech Republic is an exception here. Of the countries which had many MEPs not 
being re-elected, such as France, Italy and Poland, only very few individuals stayed 
in Brussels. It is also worth noting the large number of former MEPs from the UK 
who decided to stay in Brussels. Nearly one in four of those staying in Brussels 
were from the UK despite the fact that UK MEPs did not have a significantly 
smaller likelihood of being re-elected than their peers.  
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4.4. Hypotheses 
It is unlikely that every MEP has an equal opportunity of becoming a lobbyist after 
leaving the EP and some former MEPs are likely to be more attractive to lobbying 
firms. The data in table 17 shows that former MEPs have a range of career options 
when they are not re-elected to the EP. Many return to domestic careers but some 
do not want to leave the Brussels bubble. The US literature provides some ideas 
regarding which MEPs are more likely to become lobbyists. On the one hand, 
process and content knowledge would seem to be important. Others, on the other 
hand, argue that access to contacts is more important. 
 I would argue that particularly process and content knowledge are important 
for revolving door politicians in the EP, more so than having a network of contacts. 
Admittedly, having the right contacts and relationships with politicians and 
policymakers are important for a lobbyist, as lobbying is also about building a 
relationship of trust between the lobbyist and the politician; being able to establish 
informal contacts makes a former MEP a valuable lobbyist for his or her clients or 
new employer. I would, however, argue that in the EP context, having access to 
contacts is a less determinant factor of who becomes a lobbyist than having process 
and content knowledge.  
 One of the reasons for this is the high turnover of the EP. As mentioned 
before, the EP turnover is significantly higher than that of Congress. This provides 
MEPs with less time to develop a network of contacts in the European political 
arena. There is also a higher risk that a significant part of the network will not be in 
place anymore after fresh elections. Relying on revolving door politicians for 
having access to contacts could therefore be less relevant for Brussels lobbying 
firms.  
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Second, Congress is dominated by two political parties, one of which will 
hold a majority. The EP, on the other hand, is more plural and populated with a 
number of different political groups, which are in themselves again composed of 
national delegations elected based on national lists. Where in the US former 
politicians of one party would have a relatively close ideological proximity to 
around half of all politicians, this is less so the case in the EP. This again undermines 
the argument that access to contacts is particularly important for revolving door 
politicians in the EU.  
To test whether access to contacts is indeed less valued for revolving door 
politicians than process and content knowledge, a number of hypotheses are tested 
in this paper. As it is difficult to measure how many contacts an MEP exactly had 
in the EP, a proxy could be the extent to which an MEP had a central, coordinating 
role in the EP. For this, one could think of coordinating positions, such as being a 
committee chair, EPG coordinator in a committee or an EP (vice)president. These 
positions have been called ‘mega-seats’ (Carroll et al., 2006). It is likely that in 
these roles, an MEP builds up a broader network of contacts than MEPs who do not 
take up these coordinating roles.  
H1: MEPs in mega-seats are not more likely to be employed as lobbyists 
after their time in the EP  
 
Linked to importance of having access to contacts is the ideological 
proximity of a lobbyist to the politician he or she is seeking to influence. The work 
and decisions of the EP are dominated by the centrist groups of the S&D, ALDE 
and the EPP. As Eggers (2010) has argued, politicians with an ideology close to the 
lobbyist are more likely to trust the information they receive. Being from one of the 
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mainstream parties, and not a political outlier, makes a former MEP more appealing 
to be hired, as it is more likely that he or she will be able to gain access to and be 
trusted by the MEPs who need to be lobbied. Applying the logic from the US 
literature, it should be argued that having been from one of these centrist groups 
would also help in accessing contacts. However, as stated earlier, I do not believe 
this to be a key determining factor in the EP. 
H2: MEPs from one of the mainstream political groups are not more likely 
to be employed as lobbyists after their time in the EP 
 
Instead of emphasising the importance of having a network of contacts, I 
argue that having process and content knowledge are more important factors for 
determining who is likely to become a revolving door politician. Here, the 
underlying idea is that a lobbyist needs to be able to provide credible expert 
information at the right time. There are a number of ways former MEPs could have 
built up process and content expertise. Active participation in the EP’s legislative 
process is a possible explanatory factor here. Giving speeches, attending plenary 
sessions, being a rapporteur or writing own initiative reports are all examples of 
participation through which an MEP might improve his or her knowledge and 
expertise. For example, being a rapporteur on a legislative proposal gives an MEP 
in-depth knowledge of a particular dossier which could be valuable on becoming a 
lobbyist. Also, an MEP writing his or her own initiative reports may help such a 
person to become an expert in a certain policy area. Showing a higher level of 
participation in the legislative process could thereby make an MEP more attractive 
for lobbying firms and other interest organisations, as it is a signal of him or her 
having built up content knowledge. 
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H3: MEPs who have been more active as rapporteurs or by writing own 
initiative reports are more likely to become lobbyists after their time in the 
EP 
 
As lobbying is a resource-intensive activity, it is likely that those looking to 
have their interests represented will allocate resources carefully. In certain policy 
areas, the EP does not have a significant role in the legislative process, whereas in 
others it operates on an equal footing with the Council. The work of the EP is dealt 
with through the committee structure, which forms the backbone of the parliament 
(Neuhold, 2001). Some committees play a more powerful role in the legislative 
process than others and have more of an impact on external parties who will be 
seeking to influence the legislative process. A committee can be considered to be 
powerful when it has significant regulatory and/or budgetary powers (Yordanova, 
2009). These more powerful committees are therefore likely subject to more 
lobbying activities than the less powerful committees. Having expert knowledge 
about how these committees operate and the issues that are discussed could make 
former MEPs from these committees more attractive as lobbyists. This was also 
found to be relevant in the US context by Butler and Savoy (2010). 
H4: MEPs who have been members of a powerful EP committee are more 
likely to become lobbyists after their time in the EP 
 
Finally, as Kim (2013) discovered in the US Congress, length of service in 
parliament can be a predictor of the likelihood of becoming a lobbyist. The longer 
an MEP has been a member, the more process and content knowledge he or she has 
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that can be of use as a lobbyist. So those with a longer tenure in the EP are likely to 
be more attractive candidates to be hired by lobbying firms.  
H5: MEPs who have served longer in the EP are more likely to become 
lobbyists 
 
4.5. Methodology and data 
To analyse which MEPs become lobbyists and what their characteristics are, I am 
using a dataset comprising information from the seventh EP (2009-2014) as this 
was the most recent completed EP term. The data contains information on those 
MEPs who did not return to the parliament after the 2014 elections and includes 
information on which careers these former MEPs pursued. The information on the 
post-EP careers was derived from various sources including NGO transparency 
databases, interviews, former MEP’s websites and lobbying firms’ websites. An 
introduction to this data is provided in table 17. 
 To test the impact of the explanatory variables, a multilogistic regression 
analysis conducted using a dependent variable with three categories: i) those who 
become lobbyists in Brussels, ii) those who stay in the Brussels bubble in a different 
career, and iii) those who move away from Brussels either to a different career or 
to retire. It was decided to use a dependent variable with three categories (rather 
than a simple split between those who become lobbyists and those who did not) to 
avoid capturing the characteristics of those who want to stay in the Brussels bubble 
rather than those who become lobbyists. If any differences are found between 
category one and two, it confirms that those characteristics found for the lobbyists 
are indeed discrete characteristics and not those of a broader category.  
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Most of the information for the independent variables in the analysis was 
derived from the EP website. This includes information on an MEP’s gender, age, 
length of membership and whether he or she has held a mega-seat position. A mega-
seat position has been defined as having been an EP (vice)President, committee 
chair or a group coordinator. The population size in 2009 (the start of the seventh 
EP) of a country that an MEP represents was obtained from Eurostat. Information 
from DeHavilland consultancy was used to identify whether an MEP stood for re-
election in the 2014 election or whether he or she had not been a candidate. The EP 
website also gave the necessary information about an MEP’s EPG and national 
party. This was combined with information from Hix and Noury (2015) about the 
size of the EPG and national party group at the start of the seventh EP. Yordanova 
(2009) has provided a useful classification of the EP committees into more and less 
powerful categories. For the activities of MEPs, information compiled by Hurka, 
Kaeding and Obholzer (2015) was used. This includes detail of the attendance rates 
of MEPs at plenary roll-call votes as well as the number of speeches, 
rapporteurships and MEPs’ own initiative reports.  
 
4.6. Results 
Table 20 shows the results of the empirical analysis; deceased or imprisoned former 
MEPs, as well as those of whom the post-2014 career is unknown, have been 
excluded to avoid distortion of the data. This leaves 419 observations in the 
analysis. The multilogit regression analysis uses those who left Brussels as the base 
scenario and compares the two other categories with that. In columns one to four, 
the national party size is included as a control variable. Whether an MEP was a 
member of a mainstream party group is included as a control variable in columns 
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five to eight. These two variables are kept separate as they correlate with each other. 
Keeping them separate in two regression analyses allows us analyse their individual 
effects.  
 In columns three, four, seven and eight it is tested whether those holding a 
mega-seat are more likely to stay in the Brussels bubble or become a lobbyist after 
their time in the EP. It could however be expected that MEPs in more senior 
positions are more active and have been in parliament for longer. The correlation 
between the variable ‘mega-seat’ and the four types of legislative participation as 
well as the length of membership was, therefore, tested by conducting a t-test. These 
tests did indeed show a correlation between holding a mega-seat on the one hand 
and four types of activities and length of membership on the other. Therefore, these 
variables were not included in the analysis in columns three, four, seven and eight 
where the mega-seat variables were included.  
The coefficients shown are the results from the multilogit regression 
analysis and as it is easier to interpret the odds ratios of these coefficients, a formula 
is used to convert the coefficients into odds ratios (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 
1997)11. Table 21 shows the increases or decreases, in percentages, in the likelihood 
of an MEP staying in the Brussels bubble or becoming a lobbyist. From the results, 
it becomes clear that whether an MEP is male or female does not have an impact 
on the likelihood of him or her becoming a lobbyist, or staying in the Brussels 
bubble. Also, age or member state size are not factors influencing this.  
   
 
 
                                                          
11 The coefficient can be converted into odds ratios by using the following formula: %Δ = (e^βkΔ-
1) * 100 (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997) 
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 Some of the other variables do however show relevant differences between 
those who become Brussels lobbyists and those who pursue a different profession 
in the Brussels bubble. Certain forms of participation in the EP’s legislative process 
are associated with an MEP’s likelihood of staying in the Brussels bubble 
(excluding lobbyists). Those who attend plenary votes more often and write more 
of own initiative reports are more likely to stay in the Brussels bubble than others. 
Having written an own initiative report increased the likelihood of an MEP staying 
in Brussels after the 2014 elections in a role other than as a lobbyist by 88 percent. 
Also, having held a mega-seat increased the likelihood that an MEP stayed in 
Brussels significantly. Having been an EP (vice)President, committee chair or 
group coordinator increased the likelihood of this outcome by more than 400 
percent.  
 To become a lobbyist in Brussels, other factors are of influence, however. 
An MEP having served in the EP for a relatively longer period of time is associated 
with an increased likelihood of their becoming a lobbyist, confirming the fifth 
hypothesis. This is not something found to be of relevance for those who pursue 
other careers in Brussels. This could indicate that lobbying firms do indeed value 
process and content experience in the EP when hiring lobbyists.  
Interestingly, having given more speeches would seem to decrease the 
likelihood of an MEP becoming a lobbyist. All other forms of legislative 
participation were not found to be statistically significant. The third hypothesis, 
which suggested that becoming a policy expert by being active as a rapporteur, is 
therefore not confirmed. It was also found that MEPs from smaller national parties 
were more likely to become lobbyists than others. It might be the case that given 
the dominant role of certain large national parties in the EP, MEPs from smaller 
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parties might be looking for alternative jobs sooner. To make sure that the results 
were not driven by one or just a small number of national parties, the underlying 
data was further analysed. It was found that the revolving door MEPs came from 
22 different national parties and not a handful, which could have led to an incorrect 
interpretation of the results.  
Importantly, MEPs who sat on more powerful committees were between 
168 and 300 percent more likely to become a lobbyist, confirming the hypothesis 
on this point. As stated, it is more likely that clients are willing to spend money on 
seeking to influence committees which do have a say over policy. Attracting 
lobbyists who can serve these clients well is something lobby firms will be looking 
to do. Having been a member of these powerful committees gives former MEPs in-
depth knowledge about key files and working practices of the committee, which 
will be valued. The data also confirms the first and second hypotheses in this paper, 
namely that holding a mega-seat and being from one of the mainstream political 
groups does not increase the likelihood that an MEP becomes a lobbyist. This 
suggests that indeed having access to contacts is found to be less relevant in the 
revolving door context of the EP.  
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After having conducted the multilogit regression analyses, I now turn to 
some post-estimation analyses. The figures show the marginal effects of the 
independent variables, i.e. the predicted increment of the dependent variable 
associated with a unit increase in one of the independent variables keeping the 
others constant. Figure one and two analyse these effects for an MEP who becomes 
a lobbyist and figure three for someone who pursues a different career in the 
Brussels bubble. Figure one looks at the relationship between an MEP’s length of 
membership of the EP and the likelihood of becoming a lobbyist. The two lines 
show the differences for those MEPs who were member of more powerful 
committees and those we were on less powerful committees. The figure confirms 
that becoming a lobbyist depends on the membership length of an MEP in the 
parliament. It also shows that there is variation in the likelihood of becoming a 
lobbyist between MEPs who used to be members of a powerful committee as they 
are more likely to become lobbyists.  
Figure 1: Post-estimation of relationship between membership length and probability of becoming a lobbyist, 
by membership of a powerful EP committee or not showing the marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure two looks at the relationship between the size of the national party 
an MEP belongs to and the probability of becoming a lobbyist. The two lines show 
the marginal effects for those MEPs who were member of more powerful 
committees and those we were on less powerful committees. The figure confirms 
that the size of an MEP’s national party has an impact on the likelihood of becoming 
a lobbyist with those from smaller national political parties being more likely of 
becoming a lobbyist. Figure two shows that there is again a distinction between 
those MEPs who used to be members of a powerful committee with those who have 
been predicted to be more likely to become lobbyists. 
 
Figure 2: Post-estimation of relationship between national party size and probability of becoming a lobbyist, 
by membership of a powerful EP committee or not showing the marginal effects and 95% confidence 
intervals 
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The final post-estimation in figure three looks at the relationship between 
the age an MEP and the probability of staying in the Brussels bubble (excluding 
those who become lobbyists). The two lines show the different marginal effects for 
those MEPs who held a mega-seat and those who did not. The figure shows that the 
older an MEP becomes, the less likely it is that he or she will take on a role in the 
Brussels bubble when leaving the EP. This effect is however smaller for those who 
held a mega-seat when they were in the EP.   
 
Figure 3: Post-estimation of relationship between age and probability of staying in Brussels bubble (excl. 
lobbyists), by having a mega-seat or not showing the marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals 
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4.7. Discussion and conclusion 
Interest representation in Brussels has become more important in recent decades. 
The increase in powers of the EP has made it a key target for lobbyists, besides 
targeting the European Commission, it is agenda-setting capacity, and member 
states. For lobbying firms and others who are looking to have their interests 
represented, it is important to employ people who understand the functioning of the 
EP and who are able to convey the messages needed to influence the policymaking 
process. It could therefore be expected that former MEPs are an important pool of 
talent for these firms and organisations. Becoming a lobbyist can be an attractive 
option for MEPs who are keen on staying involved in the Brussels political process 
after their time in the EP. 
The revolving door phenomenon is well known in Washington but has not 
been studied in significant detail in Brussels yet. There is a lack of knowledge about 
both the size of the phenomenon as well as what the characteristics may be that 
MEPs who are keen on pursuing a career as lobbyist need to have. This paper has 
sought to address this gap by combining different data sources on MEPs who left 
the EP after the 2014 elections.  
 Around ten percent of MEPs who have left the EP stayed in Brussels after 
the 2014 elections. Around two-thirds of this group became lobbyists12. A question 
can be raised as to what extent the MEPs who become Brussels based lobbyists are 
different from others who stay in Brussels pursuing other careers after their time in 
the EP. To make sure that the analysis did not capture the overall characteristics of 
those who stay in Brussels, the group was split into those who started conducting 
                                                          
12 This might not seem significant and is indeed less in relative terms than is the case in Washington; 
however, in total the number of lobbyists is similar to the US given the Congress’s high incumbency 
rate. 
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lobbying activities and those who found a job elsewhere in the Brussels bubble. 
These other jobs turn out to be mainly with the European Commission. In the 
analysis, the lobbyists were found to have some distinct characteristics, different 
from their peers who stayed in Brussels as non-lobbyists, as well as distinct from 
their former colleagues who moved to careers elsewhere or left the workforce 
entirely. Three key characteristics are found to be of particular importance for those 
who become lobbyists: their length of service in the EP, whether they used to be a 
member of a powerful committee in the EP and their membership of a smaller 
national political party. 
 In terms of the political groups that Brussels lobbyists come from, unlike 
what could have been expected from the US literature, MEPs from the mainstream, 
more centrist, political groups are not found to be hired more often. Although 
former ALDE MEPs relatively often became lobbyists, mainstream parties overall 
do not dominate. This suggests that former MEPs from a broader spectrum are able 
to gain sufficient access to the EP for their lobbying activities, even if they had a 
different ideological proximity. Also, former MEPs who held one of the mega-seats 
in the parliament are not more likely to be hired as lobbyists. They do however stay 
in other careers in Brussels more often. They are significantly more often hired for 
jobs elsewhere, in particular by the European Commission.  
 With regard to the activities conducted by MEPs, it does not seem to be the 
case that MEPs who participate very actively, by being a rapporteur for example, 
are more likely to become lobbyists. The policy expertise developed by being a 
rapporteur or participating in other ways does not have a significant effect. MEPs 
writing own initiative reports does, however, increase the likelihood of pursuing 
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their careers elsewhere in the Brussels bubble possibly because this gives MEPs a 
certain profile on a topic. 
  One of the key findings in the analysis is that MEPs who become lobbyists 
are significantly more likely to have been a member of a powerful committee. The 
committees which have the most budgetary and legislative influence can be 
expected to be the prime targets of lobbyists. Hiring former members of these 
committees would be a strategy to gain access. These former committee members 
are likely to have a better knowledge of the procedures and main dossiers with 
which a committee deals.  
 Knowledge of the procedures of the EP comes with time. This could explain 
the fact that the longer an MEP has served in the parliament, the more likely it is he 
or she will become a lobbyist. Longer experience is likely to improve the service 
that a lobbyist can provide to his or her clients and this is found to be important.  
 Although the focus of former MEPs still seems to be on pursuing a domestic 
political career, a small group of them is involved in the revolving door of Brussels. 
The findings in this paper confirm some of the aspects of the revolving door 
phenomenon in the US. In particular, they broadly suggest that having process and 
content knowledge is more valuable for revolving door politicians than having 
access to contacts. This is understandable given the higher turnover and the plural 
nature of the EP. Those who become lobbyists are different from others who also 
decide to stay in the Brussels bubble outside of lobbying.  
 This area of research would benefit from further analysis. The literature 
available on former European politicians who become lobbyists is scarce, to say the 
least. It would be worth repeating this analysis for other EP terms to see if similar 
results could be found and trends identified. Also, given the important role that 
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assistants play in the work of MEPs, it would be worth conducting a more in-depth 
analysis of their role in the revolving door. It is possible that a considerable number 
of them become lobbyists after they have finished working in the EP.  
From a normative perspective it is difficult to say whether the revolving 
door at the EP is problematic. For this further analysis is needed, for example on 
whether the revolving door has an impact on the voting behaviour of MEPs. In any 
event, it would seem to be important for the EP to avoid MEPs potentially being 
influenced in their behaviour by future career opportunities at private lobby firms. 
For this it might be an idea to introduce a cooling off period as is already in place 
for European Commissioners. 
With the powers of the EP increasing over time, the value of those with 
knowledge of this institution can be expected to increase. Also likely to increase in 
number are organisations seeking to influence the policy process from the outside 
by hiring those who have experience from the inside. This is an understandable 
tactic, but important to be understood, both from an ethical and academic 
perspective. Familiarity with the process and content in the EP is important for those 
MEPs who wish to become lobbyists.  
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4.8. Appendix  
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As King and Zeng argued (1999), standard logistic regressions can sharply underestimate the probability of rare events. They argue that the real information which is of interest 
to researchers lies in the cases which have a positive value on the binary dependent variable, rather than the cases with a zero value. With the large number of zeros, the analysis 
will be biased in the direction of these zeros and underestimate an event from happening. King and Zeng have therefore developed an alternative statistical method; the rare 
events logistic regression. As a rule of thumb they say that the effects of using this alternative method will be largest when the number of observations is small (under a few 
thousand) and the events are rare (under 5%). With 419 observation and 16 cases where former MEPs stay in Brussels but do not take on lobbyist positions, both condition are 
met and would justify using this rare events logistic regression. I have therefore analysed the data and the results can be found in table 20c below. These should be compared 
with the results in table 20, which uses a traditional multilogit regression analysis. The results turn out to be broadly similar. The effects point in the same direction and the 
variables which were found to be statistically significant still are when using the rare events logistic regression. The main difference is that having had more rapporteurships is 
now found to have a positive, statistically significant effect on the likelihood of staying in the Brussels bubble (outside of lobbying). However, this effect is significant only at 
p<0.1.
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5 
5. Conclusion  
 
 
With the European Parliament’s powers being increased in recent decades, pursuing 
a career in this institution has become increasingly attractive for politicians. This is 
confirmed by the fact that there is a growing cohort of politicians who stay in the 
EP for a longer period of time (Verzichelli and Edinger, 2005; Whitaker, 2014). 
With the EU being a multi-level political ecosystem, various alternative career 
options are available and, in many cases, politicians move around during their 
careers. Where the career paths of MEPs have already been the focus of others, this 
thesis seeks to build on that by developing a more granular understanding of which 
career trajectories exist. And more importantly, it seeks to link those career 
trajectories to the behaviour that MEPs show when they participate in the EP’s 
legislative process.  
 The idea behind linking the career paths of MEPs to their participation in 
the legislative process comes from an acknowledgement that the connection 
between the citizens of the EU and their representatives in the EP is weak. The 
turnout at European elections is very low compared to national elections. It has been 
argued that the absence of this connection has little to do with a lack of knowledge 
about the functioning of the parliament or the different political groups which are 
represented, but has much more to do with the ‘second-order’ character of European 
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elections (Hix et al., 2007). EP elections are additional national second-order 
elections and are more decided by domestic political cleavages (Reif and Schmitt, 
1980). Those voters who do come out to vote in European elections do not vote 
because Europe ‘matters’ to them, but because they want to reward or punish their 
national governments. It is thus a mid-term contest for the national government 
office (Hix and Marsh, 2007). On average, in EP elections, governing parties lose, 
and opposition parties gain votes. Although there is a ‘Europe’ effect in these 
elections, where parties with strong positions on the EU and Green parties do better, 
this effect is minor (Hix and Marsh, 2007). Besides the problems this creates for 
the EP when it comes to legitimacy (Scully, 2007), it also has an impact on the 
internal functioning of the parliament. The developments in the EP, both 
institutionally and policy-wise, struggle to be explained by an electoral connection 
and must, therefore, be caused by other factors. As it has been put elsewhere:  
“Without an external motivation, political behaviour in the European 
Parliament is primarily driven by considerations internal to the institution and the 
EU policy process” (Hix et al., 2007).  
Thus, when studying the motivation of MEPs to participate in the legislative 
process, it is important to be aware of the absence of this electoral connection as it 
is unlikely to provide a plausible explanation for the behaviour of MEPs. The career 
incentives of MEPs have been mentioned as a possible explanatory factor for trying 
to understand the legislative behaviour of MEPs (Hix and Høyland, 2013).  
 This idea, that some MEPs’ behaviour can be explained by their making 
rational career choices, is consistent with Schlesinger (1966), who argued that the 
career path of politicians is the result of rational individual career decisions and that 
politicians adjust their behaviour in line with these ambitions. Since Schlesinger, 
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an extensive body of literature in the US further developed his theory of the role 
that ambition plays in politics, particularly in the context of the US Congress. This 
thesis takes a first step into this area in the EP context by linking the career 
ambitions of MEPs to their participation in the legislative process.  
 
5.1.  The importance of studying the interaction between career paths and 
behaviour 
A number of reasons justify looking into this area in more detail. First, there is a 
societal reason for trying to understand whether career paths influence behaviour. 
In a representative democracy, the electorate will expect politicians to represent 
their interests and fulfil the promises they made during the election campaign. This 
should also be the case for the EP, even though the electoral connection might be 
weaker than for some other representative bodies, in particular, that of national 
parliaments. If it is the case that pre- and post-EP careers influence the way MEPs 
fulfil their mandate, this is important to know when trying to better understand how 
the EP, as well as representative democracies at large, functions. This would give 
us a better insight into how different candidates for an EP election could be expected 
to represent citizens once they are elected. This is particularly important given the 
increase in powers of the EP in recent decades and expected further increases.  
 Second, besides gaining a better understanding of the representative 
democracy at European level, better understanding the interaction of career paths 
and legislative behaviour also tells us more about how policy is developed. It has 
been found that those politicians with a longer career path in the EP have more 
policy influence (Whitaker, 2014; Beauvallet and Michon, 2010). Better 
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understanding an MEP’s career path is therefore relevant for understanding policy 
outcomes themselves. 
 Third, longer career paths in a legislative institution are associated with 
higher quality politicians. Building a longer career in the EP gives politicians the 
opportunity to develop policy expertise which they can use to improve the quality 
of legislation. Again, improving our knowledge about an MEP’s career path can, 
therefore, be an indicator of how policy is developed. 
 Fourth, the length of a career in a legislature can also provide information 
about the legislative body itself in which the politician serves. Longer careers and 
more internal promotions are associated with the legislature being institutionalised. 
As others have found, the emergence of career politicians is strongly associated 
with party system development and legislative institutionalisation, which are two 
important aspects of democratisation (Shabab and Slomczynski, 2002).  
 
5.2. Key empirical findings 
Although covering different aspects of the careers of MEPs and their behaviour in 
parliament, the papers in this thesis have highlighted a number of regularities. The 
main finding is that different career paths can be associated with different levels of 
participation in certain forms of legislative activity. Those with an interest in 
staying in the EP for longer are found to participate more actively in various 
activities. The EPG leadership, which decides the distribution of certain tasks (e.g. 
rapporteurships) does not distribute these tasks evenly across all MEPs. It has been 
found that those with longer careers in the EP pick up more of these tasks. This 
might be because the EPG leadership makes an assessment of who they expect to 
stay longer and allocates tasks accordingly. However, given that the EPG leadership 
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cannot decide nor be sure about which MEPs will run for re-election, I find it more 
likely that the national party leadership seeks to nominate those MEPs for re-
election who have been active, built up a role of influence in the EP and can be 
relied upon to continue playing this role on behalf of the national party in the next 
EP. This, in turn, creates an incentive for MEPs to participate actively if they wish 
to stay in the EP for longer.  
 In the analysis here, it has also been found that particularly the involvement 
of MEPs in those activities which bring policy influence are rewarded by re-
nomination and re-election. Those MEPs who take on more rapporteurships or write 
more own initiative reports are more likely to have longer careers in the EP. The 
fact that direct policy influence by holding the pen on a legislative file is found 
more important than having a senior role in the EP is confirmed by the fact that 
having had one of the ‘mega-seats’ in the EP does not make it more likely that an 
MEP is re-elected. In fact, MEPs who have been in a mega-seat are more likely to 
leave early before the next EP election. This is not to say that those in mega-seats 
do not have more influence over policy than other MEPs, but it seems to be 
particularly those who obtain policy influence by holding the pen on legislative files 
who are preferred for re-nomination. This confirms findings from others that those 
with a longer political career have more policy influence (Beauvallet and Michon, 
2010; Whitaker, 2014). 
 For those MEPs who are looking to move to the domestic political level, 
active participation in the EP’s work is not a prerequisite. This could be the case 
because MEPs with the ambition to move to national politics spend more time 
fostering their relationships with the national party leadership and local constituents 
than participating in the EP’s work. Also, for others aiming for a career outside of 
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politics, active participation is not crucial. An example here is those who become 
lobbyists after their time in the EP but also those who are an MEP for only a short 
period of time.  
 In terms of external factors of influence, the electoral rules that MEPs are 
faced with are not found here to be a key determining factor for which type of MEP 
is more likely to become (re-)elected. Being a member of a larger group in the EP, 
either the member state group or political group, is however a relevant factor. 
Again, this could be because larger groups tend to dominate the work of the EP and 
are better able to allow their members to specialise and become policy experts. 
 
5.3. Theoretical and empirical contributions  
This thesis provides a number of theoretical and empirical contributions. First, this 
thesis has developed our understanding of the different career paths that MEPs tend 
to follow. Many to date have argued that three types of MEPs exist, namely the 
‘stepping stone’ politicians, the ‘EP careerists’ and the retiring MEPs; this thesis 
has built on this by introducing new types of MEPs, and recognising the more recent 
arrival of politicians who pursue a ‘second’ political life in the EP after having had 
a career in domestic politics. This thesis also introduces a category of ‘one-off’ 
MEPs. This group of MEPs has probably always existed but has not been 
recognised in the literature as such. Particularly for those seeking to understand the 
behaviour of MEPs, it is important to make sure that this category of MEPs is 
captured, as this group has different incentives to participate than their peers. In 
particular, taking post-EP careers into account has made it possible to develop these 
two new types of MEPs. This categorisation of five types of MEPs now captures 
183 
 
the vast majority of MEPs and brings us closer to developing a complete picture of 
where EP membership fits in one’s career. 
Second, the categorisation of career paths to date has mainly been done by 
combining the career background of MEPs and their age. This thesis has, in its 
attempt to provide a more granular insight into the different career trajectories, also 
considered the future career steps that MEPs take when they have left the EP. If one 
wants to explain an MEP’s behaviour, it is important to look at these future career 
steps as well. The additional data collected provides a better picture of the actual 
career path that an MEP follows. Also, not only has this thesis considered a broad 
range of careers outside of the EP, it has also taken into consideration the career 
advancement options that an MEP has when he or she is looking to stay in the EP 
by including the ‘mega-seats’ (Carroll et al., 2006) in the analysis. 
 Third, besides providing greater detail on those MEPs who continue to be 
politicians (either in the EP or at a different political level), this thesis has also 
provided new insights into a category of MEPs who leave the EP, but stay in the 
Brussels ‘bubble’: the revolving door lobbyists. This group of former politicians 
has not been studied in great detail before in the EP context and this thesis provides 
an introduction to this area. 
 Fourth, besides providing a better insight into the career trajectories of 
MEPs, this thesis develops our knowledge about legislative participation in the EP. 
It looks at a broad range of forms of legislative participation rather than focusing 
on just one aspect, such as roll call vote attendance. The analysis shows that when 
an MEP actively participates in one form of activity, he or she does not necessarily 
participate actively in other forms of activity. 
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Fifth, building on the above, the work in this thesis is one of the first 
attempts to analyse the interaction between the careers of MEPs and their behaviour 
in the EP. This has deepened our understanding of the motivations of MEPs to 
participate in legislative work. Legislative participation varies for different types of 
MEPs irrespective of the political group or member state they represent. MEPs 
adjust, to a certain extent, their behaviour in line with the career paths which they 
follow. Besides other aspects of the legislative process, such as voting behaviour, 
legislative participation is important to consider as it has an impact on democratic 
representation as well as on policy outcomes. The motivations of MEPs to be active 
are multiple and this thesis does not claim to have provided a full account, but it 
has rather focused on one subset of motivational factors. Given the weak electoral 
connection, the career ambitions of MEPs can, however, be expected to be a more 
important motivational factor than in some other legislatures. 
Sixth, new empirical findings are presented in this thesis around the links 
between expressed career ambitions, from survey data, and realised ambitions. The 
findings show that those with a desire to stay in the EP are also more likely to be 
successful in fulfilling this ambition.  
 Seventh, from an empirical, data perspective, this thesis contributes by 
having developed new datasets of various periods of the EP (2004-2007 and 2009-
2014). This new data has been combined with existing data sources on legislative 
activity and information about national parties. The collection of this new data 
allows us to broaden our perspective on the career paths of MEPs by taking both 
their pre- and post-EP careers into account.  
  The empirical analysis here has been conducted through using quantitative 
methods. For this, the career paths of MEPs were quantified, something which has 
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so far only been done to a limited extent in the European context. The results show 
that it is, however, an approach worth pursuing as it can lead to new insights.   
 
5.4. What does this mean for the European Parliament? 
The findings in this thesis are important when trying to understand the EP itself. As 
others have found, there is a growing group of MEPs who consider the EP to be 
their main political arena. This group consists of those who are pursuing long-term 
careers in this institution, either with or without having had a career in domestic 
politics. As shown, this group of MEPs is more actively involved in the EP’s work, 
writes more reports and participates more in other activities. This confirms the idea 
that this group of politicians has more policy influence than their colleagues. Given 
the growing powers of the EP in many policy areas, it is important to better 
understand who holds the policymaking power in the EP. If this small group has a 
disproportionate amount of influence over legislative issues, it is important to be at 
least aware of this.  
 These findings are also important in the context of the EP elections. It is 
likely that the electorate will look for MEPs who are most actively involved in the 
work of the institution to which they are elected. Having a better insight into the 
career paths and ambitions of the candidates on the ballot paper could help voters 
to make better-informed decisions when seeking a candidate who will work hard 
when elected.  
 The national party leadership will also take an interest in the results of this 
analysis. It has been found here that those MEPs with a longer-term commitment 
to the EP are more likely to be active and obtain policy influence. If a national party 
is interested in obtaining influence in the EP, it should better select candidates who 
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are keen on staying in the EP, rather than those who wish to use the EP as a training 
ground as ‘stepping stone’ candidates.  
 This thesis also focused on the existence of the revolving door in Brussels. 
Although it is not a significantly large group of MEPs who become lobbyists in 
relative terms, knowing more about the existence of this phenomenon is important 
from a social-ethical perspective as the presence of a revolving door might damage 
the reputation of the EP and undermine the trust of the electorate, thereby 
contributing to the democratic deficit of the EP. The analysis here shows that 
particularly MEPs from powerful committees are selected by lobbying firms. And 
although this does not seem to have an impact on these MEPs’ level of engagement, 
it might influence their voting behaviour. This was beyond the scope of the current 
analysis and should probably be examined further. The phenomenon might result 
in the EP wishing to consider introducing a certain ‘cooling off’ period, which 
already exists for members of the European Commission. Former commissioners 
need to seek permission from the European Commission in power if they wish to 
take up a job within the first two years after having left the commission. An 
alternative approach could be for the EP to introduce a ‘cooling off’ period that 
would not allow MEPs to take on a job for a certain period of time in a policy area 
that overlaps with the work that they have done as an MEP. This could be 
particularly important for those revolving door politicians from powerful EP 
committees. This would be a novelty among parliamentary democracies but could 
be justified in the case of the EP given the limited electoral connection between 
MEPs and voters which might make MEPs more receptive to proposals and 
positions from lobbyists. Controlling the revolving door in the EP would, therefore, 
be more important than in other parliaments. 
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5.5. External validity 
It is difficult to generalise the findings from this analysis of the EP to other 
legislatures because of the distinct characteristics of the EP. It is arguably the most 
powerful supranational, directly-elected institution in the world and yet very diverse 
in its structure. With representatives from 28 different countries, operating in nearly 
ten different political groups that are composed of hundreds of national political 
parties, the EP is truly unique in nature. At the same time, it has a weak connection 
with its electorate. This creates different opportunities and incentives for MEPs than 
exist for politicians in other legislatures. 
 There are however a few findings also potentially applicable to other 
legislatures. For example, it is important to develop an understanding of the 
political career paths of those active in legislative institutions, whether at national, 
regional or local level. Career advancement is a universal goal in professional 
careers that also applies to politics (Borchert, 2011). The findings in this thesis can, 
therefore, be of interest to a broader audience than just those who study the EP. 
Better understanding what the common paths of advancement are provides a better 
understanding of who is likely to put energy and resources into seeking to reach a 
certain position. The findings here show that the career paths of politicians are 
linked to their behaviour and level of participation in the political arena in which 
they operate. This can provide useful insights for studying this relationship in other 
political contexts. 
 The US literature has already confirmed, through ambition theory, that 
career ambitions have an impact on the way politicians participate in the legislative 
process in the US. It might well be possible that similar patterns can be found in 
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other parliamentary settings. Studying this would be worthwhile as it may mean 
that career paths have an impact on how representative democracies function. When 
doing this, scholars should take into account the broader multi-level structure in 
which a legislative institution operates. In order to be able to come to concrete 
generalisable conclusions about the impact of careers on behaviour, it is important 
to develop a granular insight into the different career structures that exist. This 
would allow one to analyse a majority of politicians rather than only a subset.  
 
5.6. Recommendations for further research 
As with any research, there is always more analysis that could be conducted but 
which fell beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, I provide some suggestions for 
other work that could be done to build on the findings of this thesis.  
 First, the analysis presented here focuses on a limited timeframe in the EP, 
namely the sixth EP in the first paper and the seventh EP in the introduction and 
second and third paper. By collecting information on what, for example, the career 
paths of those in the current, eighth, EP are, it could be established whether the 
trends identified in this work continue to be identified. This would also enable 
reaching further conclusions about whether MEPs from those member states which 
joined the EU more recently are developing career paths similar to those from the 
‘older’ member states. It would also be possible to collect such information about 
previous parliaments to be better identify trends over longer periods of time.  
 Second, although this work has identified various pre- and post-EP careers 
that politicians take, in the regression analysis the focus was mainly on MEPs with 
a pre- or post-career at the national political level (with the exception of the third 
paper which focused on those MEPs who become lobbyists). From the data, it is 
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clear, however, that there is not only an exchange between the EP and the national 
political level but that many MEPs also pursue careers at regional or local levels. 
This is particularly important to consider given the multi-level structure of the EU’s 
political system (Borchert and Stolz, 2011b). Careers in these regional or local 
political arenas might trigger a distinct form of behaviour but they have now been 
wrapped up in the post-EP ‘other career’ category in most of the analyses in this 
thesis. 
 Third, further work would benefit from even more granular data on the 
participation of MEPs in the EP’s legislative process. With committees playing a 
key role in the work of the EP, more data on the activities undertaken in the EP’s 
committees would be useful. This includes, for example, the number of 
amendments tabled at the committee level, the amount of speaking time used and 
attendance at committee meetings. This would give a much more complete picture 
of the participation of MEPs.  
 Fourth, this thesis very much focuses on the participation of MEPs in the 
legislative process. An alternative way of looking at the decisions that MEPs need 
to make, as also Hall (1996) has argued, is at what position they take. It might be 
that the voting behaviour of MEPs is partly impacted by an MEP’s career path and 
this is worth considering for those interested in understanding MEPs’ voting 
behaviour. 
 Fifth, as became clear from the work for this thesis on the revolving door 
phenomenon, this is very much uncharted territory and would benefit from further 
analysis. It would be worth not only looking more into the revolving door of MEPs 
but also considering the staff who work with MEPs and who subsequently decide 
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to move into the lobbying world. They might have a significant impact on the EP’s 
policymaking process as well.  
 
 While many still consider the EP to be a ‘second-order’ political arena, this 
view is not shared by a growing group of politicians. With the EP’s powers 
increasing over the years, so has the attractiveness of pursuing a longer-term career 
in this institution. The implications of this on the behaviour of politicians in the EP 
are not yet widely understood and this thesis has sought to fill, at least part of, this 
gap. For future scholars seeking to understand the behaviour and participation of 
MEPs, career paths and ambitions will be relevant factors to consider. When trying 
to understand the functioning of representative democracy at the European level, 
the presence of career ambitions should not be ignored.  
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